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Abstract

Analysis and Design of Message Authentication Codes
Shahram Bakhtiari Haft Lang
School of Information Technology and Computer Science
University of Wollongong
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) play an important role in today's information communication. Messages which are sent over an insecure channel need to
be authenticated to prevent attacks such as message forgery by an intruder who
can tamper with the channel. To provide message authenticity, assuming that the
transmitter and the receiver share a secret key, a M A C can be used. In a M A C
system, the transmitter generates a tag which is a function of the message and the
secret key, and appends it to the message before sending it over the channel. The
receiver can verify the authenticity of a received message, on the other end of the
channel, by recomputing the tag and comparing it with the appended one.
In analysis and design of M A C s two different approaches, known as unconditional
security and computational security, can be used. The aim of this thesis is to
study the existing M A C systems and propose new constructions which are more
efficient and meanwhile maintain the required security. W e justify the security of
our proposed constructions using computational security and unconditional security
approaches. W e also propose a new definition for keyed hash functions and relate
them to M A C s . Finally, we cryptanalyze two proposed collisionful hash functions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Cryptographic mechanisms for verifying the integrity and authenticity of infor
are necessary in today's rapidly proliferating distributed information systems. The
receiver of a message should be able to validate that it has come from the claimed
sender and has not been modified during transmission.
One should distinguish between message authentication and message confidentiality. Confidentiality is obtained by an encryption algorithm. A n encryption algorithm encrypts a message using an encryption key, and decrypts the result to
produce the original message, using a decryption key. In symmetric key systems,
encryption key and decryption key are the same.
Encryption algorithms were also used to provide message authenticity. In such
case, the transmitter encrypts the message and sends the encoded message to the
receiver. The receiver who knows the decryption key can compute the plaintext
message and become confident that it has come from a legitimate party w h o had
access to the encryption key.
It was later showed that message authentication is independent from confidentiality, and can be achieved without confidentiality [113]. Message authentication
can be obtained by using Message Authentication Codes (MACs). Efficient constructions for M A C follow the work of W e g m a n and Carter [128] who showed that hash
function families can be used for this purpose. This thesis focuses on the analysis
and design of M A C s .

1.1 Aims and Objectives

The main aims of this thesis are to examine possible approaches to the design o
efficient M A C s and to suggest possible constructions. The rapid growth in communication technologies requires fast cryptographic primitives that can ensure the

1
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reliability of the systems. Consequently, the design of fast M A C s are demanding to
achieve the above goals. In order to fulfill these main goals, a number of sub-goals are
considered. Thefirstsub-goal is to provide a framework for the security assessment
of M A C s and consider different approaches that can be used for M A C constructions. Such a framework will assist in evaluating existing proposals and could result
in possible security and efficiency improvements. The cryptanalysis of the existing
designs is another sub-goal which is considered in this thesis. The cryptanalysis of a
scheme is not necessarily aimed at finding an overall flaw in the scheme; rather, the
aim is tofindpossible methods of increasing the scheme's security and/or reducing
its computing time.
The above sub-goals lead to the design of new M A C s , by including the positive
aspects and excluding the negative aspects of the existing constructions. In particular, the aim is tofindfast and secure components which can be used for constructing

a MAC.

1.2 Structure of Thesis and its Contributions
The structure of this thesis is described as follows. Chapter 1 provides a brief
duction to the topic, a short description for each chapter and its main contributions,
and a list of the commonly used notations and abbreviations. Chapter 2 surveys
the main methods of constructing message authentication codes and presents a new
definition for keyed hash functions. It will be shown that the proposed definition can
result in M A C designs which are faster than collision-resistant hash functions. (This
is not the case with the previous definitions.) This chapter first gives the basics of
M A C s and some historical motivations which have resulted in the current status of
M A C s . It also provides an overview of cryptographic hash functions, which are one
of the most commonly used primitives in M A C constructions (cf. Chapter 3), and
studies methods of keying a hash function to produce a M A C . It will be shown that
a secure M A C does not necessarily have to be built-up on a collision-resistant hash
function.
Collisionful hash functions will also be addressed in the same chapter. These
functions can be considered as a particular class of keyed hash functions that provide
key collisions to decrease the probability of correctly guessing the secret key (by an
intruder).
The families of hash functions which can provide unconditional security are also
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studied in Chapter 2. It will be basically concentrated on the elegant approach of
W e g m a n and Carter that can be implemented efficiently. The two main methods
of attack on M A C s , exhaustive key search and extended birthday attack, will also be
discussed and several methods of M A C constructions, which are commonly used in
practice, will be elaborated.
In Chapter 3, the construction of practically secure MACs will be studied. The
contributions of this chapter are two fold. Thefirstis a new method of keying a
hash function which is constructed by modifying a previous proposal. The second
is the construction of a stand-alone M A C which is unique of its kind and does not
depend on any hash function.
In the first part of Chapter 3, the constructions of M A C s , by keying hash functions, are considered. Several designs will be addressed. In particular, it will be
concentrated on Tsudik's proposal which is believed to be the first proposal that
has motivated other keyed hash function constructions. A modified scheme which
removes the drawbacks of the Tsudik's proposal will be given. A security analysis
of the proposed scheme is also provided.
The second part of Chapter 3 is the design of a M A C using a set of highly nonlinear boolean functions. It will be shown that this M A C is a unique design with
many significant advantages. It takes advantage of carefully selected components to
maintain both the security and efficiency. It will be shown that this design is about
twice as fast as M D 5 . This M A C also verifies the claim that a keyed hash function
does not require to be constructed from a collision-resistant hash function.
In Chapter 4, unconditionally secure MACs are studied. The main contribution
of this chapter is the construction of a new universal class of hash functions based
on Latin squares. The Wegman-Carter scenario, which is explained in Chapter 2,
is used for constructing a new M A C . This M A C obtains its efficiency from a fast
table look-up hashing technique which is desirable for fast message communication
protocols. A similar design, which is based on M a x i m u m Ranked Distance ( M R D )
codes, will also be proposed and its properties will be examined. This design takes
advantages of the richfinitefieldtheory and has a very attractive and symmetric
structure. However, it has a small message compression ratio.

In Chapter 5, collisionful hash functions are explored. The contributions of thi
chapter are the cryptanalysis and augmentation of two proposed schemes based on
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collisionful hash functions. The first scheme is the construction of a collisionful
hash function that provides selectable key collision. It is shown that due to the
assumptions m a d e in the original proposals, the scheme can be broken and a message
' forgery is sometimes a trivial task. Different setups for the system are considered
and the proposed attack is applied to each case. Different levels of the attack
provide strong confidence about the vulnerability of the scheme. The claim will
be supported by some experimental results of the implementation of the attack for
different system setups. There is further discussion about how the scheme can be
improved to prevent the attack.
The second scheme is a password-based authenticated key exchange protocol using collisionful hash functions. The proposal is tended to be used for authenticating
the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. It will be shown how the session keys,
authenticated by this scheme, are related and how the knowledge of some old keys
helps an intruder to guess the current secret key. Similar to the previous attack,
the theoretical results will be confirmed by the implementation of the attack. Some
alternative solutions will also be proposed to replace the weak scheme.
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis. It will briefly review what has been studied
in the thesis and also will suggest future extensions and pose some open ended
questions.

1.3 Notations and Abbreviations

There are several notations and abbreviations that are commonly used in this thesis
Table 1.1 contains all the c o m m o n notations and Table 1.2 contains the c o m m o n
abbreviations. They are the standard terms which are commonly used in this area
of research. There are however some terms and symbols which are specific to this
thesis and will be defined as they are needed.

5
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Notation

Description
A
O n e communicant (Alice).
B
Another communicant (Bob).
E
The opponent (Eve).
The key in a symmetric key cryptographic scheme.
K
Encryption algorithm E with a key K and a plaintext P.
EK(P)
h(M)
A hash function h with input message M.
g(K, M)
A keyed hash function g with a key K and an input message M.
MACG K (M)
M A C generation for message M, using a key K.
MACV K (M,D) M A C verification for message M and tag D, using a key K.
Modular reduction (remainder of modular division).
mod
Bit-wise exclusive-or ( X O R ) operation (addition modulo 2).
©
String concatenation.
x
E
Set of all x-bit strings.
Size (number of elements) of the space (or the set) X.

II
1*1

0

' Va/

a!(o—a)!

Table 1.1: Notations.

Abbreviation Description
ASU2
Almost Strongly Universal
AU 2
Almost Universal
Almost Xor Universal
AXU 2
CHF
Collisionful Hash Function
CRHF
Collision-Resistant Hash Function
DES
Data Encryption Standard
GF
Galois Field
KHF
Keyed Hash Function
MAC
Message Authentication Code
M A C Generation
MACG
M A C Verification
MACV
Message Digest 5
MD5
MRD
M a x i m u m Ranked Distance
OWHF
One-Way Hash Function
SKHF
Strong Keyed Hash Function
XOR
eXclusive-OR
Table 1.2: Abbreviations, in alphabetic order.

Chapter 2
A Survey on Message Authentication
Codes

This chapter provides a survey on the theory and examples of message authentic
tion codes. A historical background will be presented and the important relevant
references will be highlighted.
The main contributions of this chapter, apart from the survey on message authentication codes, are the new definition of keyed hash functions and the way they
are related to message authentication codes.
Parts of this chapter appeared in a preliminary form in the Proceedings of Cryptography: Policy and Algorithms Conference, 1995 (cf. [7]).

2.1 Introduction
A Message Authentication Code (MAC) is a symmetric key cryptographic primitive
that ensures message integrity against active spoofing. A M A C uses a secret key K
and consists of two algorithms. (1) A MAC

generation algorithm, M A C G ^ , takes an

arbitrary message M and produces as output a tag or checksum, D —

MACGK(M),

which is appended to the message to form an authenticated message. Typically,
integrity of the message is provided by adding redundancy to the message. In
other words, the generated tag will be a redundant information extracted from
the whole message and when concatenated to it provides its authenticity. (2) A
MAC

verification algorithm, M A C V ^ , uses the same key K and takes a message-tag

pair of the form (M,D)

as input to produce a true or false value M A C V K ( M , D),

for authentic or fraudulent messages, respectively. It is assumed that the legitimate
communicants are not distinguishable from a cryptographic point of view. The secret
key K is only known to them and hence a valid tag can only be computed by them,
even if m a n y authenticated messages are available to the enemy. Essentially, the aim
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of an enemy is to bypass the M A C generation algorithm and generate fraudulent
messages that are verified as authentic by the M A C verification algorithm.

2.1.1 Security Approaches
There are two general approaches in the design of message authentication codes:
1. Computational security approach;
2. Unconditional security approach.

In the computational security approach, the security of a MAC depends on the computing power of the enemy which restricts her/him to a certain number of computing
instructions per unit of time. For example, consider a scheme in which security is
based on a widely believed hard problem, such as discrete logarithm problem. (This
is sometimes referred to as a proven security approach.) Despite the fact that one
can not perform discrete logarithm using a polynomial time algorithm, the scheme
is said to be secure in this approach.
It is assumed that the computational security approach includes both provably
secure and heuristic designs. In heuristic designs, it is usual to provide some justifications about the security and conjecture that the scheme is secure. However, such
designs are subject to the technology improvements and cannot guarantee that the
requirements of a M A C will be satisfied over a long period of time.
A computationally secure M A C is usually based on a dedicated hash function,
such as M D 5 [104], and/or an encryption algorithms, such as D E S [91]. In contrast,
an unconditionally secure M A C is based on a class of hash functions which can
provide probabilistic security. Therefore, even if an enemy has unlimited computing
power, the security of the M A C cannot be violated, with a probability higher than
that specified for it. However, it should be noted that in unconditionally secure
designs, a new piece of secret information is needed for each new message. This
piece of secret information can either specify a new instance of the hash function
family or can be used for encrypting the result of the same instance of the family,
repeated for all messages.
Block ciphers are symmetric key encryption algorithms that encrypt one message
block at a time and generate the same-size ciphertext block. Compared to stream
ciphers, this method of encryption provides higher dependency between consecutive
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bits. The simplest way to encrypt an arbitrary length message using a block cipher
algorithm, is to split the message into blocks of the required size (the last block might
be padded), and then encrypt each block one by one (cf. [94]). For afixedkey, block
ciphers should be reversible to provide a unique output in both the encryption and
decryption processes, and therefore are permutations. A block cipher is in fact a
class of permutations indexed by the key, and so an intruder who does not know the
key cannot perform a successful encryption or decryption.
Block ciphers, such as D E S [91], in Cipher Block Chaining ( C B C ) m o d e [68, 91]
are one of the most widely used primitives for the construction of computationally
secure message authentication codes [1, 69]. Bellare et al. [15] showed that this
method of authentication is secure under certain assumptions, but since the existing block ciphers are mostly slow (compared to the existing hash functions), the
resulting M A C is not very efficient. Another often used method is to add a key
to a cryptographic hash function, such as M D 5 [104]. Security evaluation of the
above method relies on examining computational complexity of various attacks on
the system, and is always subject to revision with the invention of new attacks. The
design parameters of a system should be carefully chosen so that any known attack
exceeds the computational cost for the enemy.
In the M A C with provable security (unconditionally secure), security relies on
the provably negligible chance of an intruder being able to tamper with the message,
without assuming any limit on the computational resources of the enemy. This is
called the information theoretic approach. Unconditionally secure authentication
codes have been extensively studied by several authors and developed mainly by
Simmons [114]. T w o other main works are due to Gilbert et al. [56] and Carter
and W e g m a n [27]. The latter [27, 128] proposed and investigated unconditionally
secure M A C s based on universal hash function families. They showed that efficient
M A C s can be constructed from a special class of hash functions (e-almost strongly
universal or, in short, e-ASU2) and the one-time-pad1 stream cipher. Their work
was extended by Brassard [24] by considering a complexity-theoretic approach with
the aim of providing practical solutions to message authentication. Stinson [116]
further developed the Carter-Wegman approach and proposed new constructions
with a smaller size of the required classes of hash functions. Krawczyk [78] showed
1

One-time-pad is a stream cipher that needs a key of the same size as the message; it encrypts
the message by XORing every message entity (bit) with its corresponding key entity (bit) [94].
One-time-pad is a perfect encryption algorithm.

2.1. Introduction

that a secure M A C only requires an e-almost X O R universal (or e-AXU2)
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function family. Stinson [119] further reduced the problem to the construction of ealmost universal (or e-AU2) families, by showing a composition method that yields
e-ASU2 from e-AU2 class. Hence the problem of constructing a provably secure
M A C reduces to the construction of efficient t-AU2 functions. Other constructions
and generalisations of this approach were proposed by Bierbrauer et al. [23, 70],
Gemmelland Naor [55], Johansson [71], Krawczyk [79], Rogaway [107], Shoup [112],
and Johansson [72, 73].
In the M A C s , the checksum generated by M A C G for any arbitrary message is
a fixed length bit string. A M A C uses a symmetric key and cannot be used for
producing a digital signature by itself. A digital signature scheme is an asymmetric
algorithm that allows everyone w h o knows the signer's public key to verify the
signature, and prevents the signer from denying his/her signature. Digital signatures
basically need public key cryptosystems that can provide more features [94, 111],
but they do not have a fast implementation in practice [53, 106].
It is assumed that the M A C key which is used in both the generation as well
as the verification algorithm, is shared only between the sender and the receiver
(insiders). Digital signatures are usually based on public key algorithms, such as
R S A [106], in which the group of insiders consists of only one m e m b e r (the owner
of the private key) and hence the signature can be generated by the signer only.
Everyone can however verify it, using the public key of the signer. In the case of
symmetric key algorithms, both the transmitter and the receiver know the shared
secret key and can thus produce a valid M A C for an arbitrary message. Therefore,
unique identification based on the M A C alone is not possible. However, an outsider
cannot alter the message or the M A C without the alteration being detected.
M A C s are normally used in applications that provide authentication and require
a shared secret key between participants. Message authentication between two or
among

multiple parties, password checking, and software protection are examples

of such applications [6]. Another application of M A C s is in the construction of
cryptographic primitives, such as encryption functions. In [6], the researcher of this
work devised an encryption algorithm similar to the method proposed by Luby and
Rackoff [83] (also cf. [2]). A cryptographic hash function based M A C was used for
providing the one-wayness required in this algorithm.

2.2. Cryptographic Hash Functions
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In this chapter, all the required background material needed for the analysis and
design of M A C s is reviewed. Section 2.2 defines one-way and collision-resist ant hash
functions. In section 2.3, a new definition for keyed hash functions is given and its
relation with message authentication codes is highlighted. It is argued that a keyed
hash function does not need to rely on a collision resistant hash function to maintain
the required security and therefore, it is possible to construct a keyed hash function
as a faster primitive (compared to collision resistant hash functions). Section 2.4
introduces collisionful hash functions. Hash function families which can result in
unconditionally secure M A C s are studied in Section 2.5. Section 2.6 covers methods
of attacks on M A C s . A few M A C construction methods are given in Section 2.7.
Finally, a summary of this chapter is given in Section 2.8.
It should be noted that the wordings in the definitions, which are cited from other
researchers' works, are not verbatim. The original definitions have been adjusted to
coincide with the rest of the definitions used in this chapter.

2.2 Cryptographic Hash Functions
Hash functions were introduced in the early 1950's [76]. The original aim was to
construct functions that could uniformly m a p a set of messages into a smaller set of
message digests (or hash values). A hash function can be used for error detection.
Appending a message digest to a message allows detection of errors that might occur
whilst the message is in transit. At the receiving end, the hash value of the received
message is recalculated and compared with the received hash value. If they do not
match, an error has occurred. This detection is only for random errors. A n active
spoofer m a y select any message (or intercept a message and modify it as desired),
calculate the corresponding hash value, and construct an acceptable (message,digest)
pair that could be sent through the communication line.
By using hash functions, it is possible to produce afixedlength checksum that
depends on all parts of the message and thus ensures its authenticity. A

MAC

constructed from an existing hash function is called a keyed hash function and can
be used for detection of both random error and active spoofing and, in this sense,
is analogous to error detection codes and authentication codes, respectively. Preneel [96] related keyed hash functions to M A C s , but Berson et al. [22] defined this
term as a new (independent) primitive.
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Let E x denote the set of all x-bit strings, {0,1}X. A hash function h is a function
that maps a message M

G E m to a digest D e E

n

, for some integers n < m. That

is,
h : S m -> E n .
A keyed hash function g takes an additional input K G S r , from the set of all r-bit
strings (keys), to generate a checksum for a given message M
fl:E

r

G £ m . That is,

xSm -• ST1.

The above defined function can be used for authenticating messages of a fixed
length. In both hash functions and keyed hash functions a message shorter than m
bits can be padded by a predefined bit-string, such as a string consisting of a '1'
followed by enough 'O's, to make its length equal to m. Furthermore, there exist some
constructions which extend the above hashing scheme to work with arbitrary long
messages. W e g m a n and Carter [128] gave a secure chaining method for universal
hash functions, in which the message length is reduced roughly by a factor of m/n,
in each chaining step. Their method requires different hash functions (or keys)
for every chaining step. Damgard [37] (cf. also [86]) gave a chaining method for
construction of collision-free hash functions, in which the same hash function is
used in all chaining steps, but each time part of the hash value is fed into the input
of the hashing process in the next step. This constructing method produces an
iterated hash function and M D 5 is an example of such method. In both methods,
the message is padded if its length is not a multiple of m bits. Thefinaloutput,
which is n bits, represents the hash value. However, the best way to do such chaining
constructions, that can maintain both security and speed, is yet to be determined.
Suppose a message M

is divided into t message blocks Mx to Mt. Given h,

as defined before, an iterated hash function is defined as H(M)

= Dt, where D{ =

h(Di-x,M{), for i = 1,..., t, and Do is the initial vector for h. This iterative method
can be extended to keyed hash functions by applying an output transformation ib,
which depends on a secret key, to the resulting hash value Dt calculated above. That
is, G(M)

= xbk(Dt).

In the following, the term hard means computationally infeasible. It is assumed
that the computation of the hash value for a given message is easy. It is further
assumed that the description of the function h is publicly known and that it does
not require any secret information for its operation.
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Definition 2.1 A function h : E m ->• E n is a One-Way Hash Function ( O W H F )

if,
1. Given D G S n , it is hard tofindM

G E m suc/i iAa< fc(M) = D.

2. Given M G Em, ii is fcani to find M' G Em, M' ^ M, such that h(M') =

h(M).
Although OWHF is a useful primitive, it is not strong enough for some cryptographic applications, such as cryptographic hash functions. Collision-resistant (or
collision-free) hash functions have one more property which makes them appropriate
for such purposes.
Definition 2.2 A function h : Em ->• En is a Collision-Resistant Hash Function
( C R H F ) if,
1. h is a OWHF.
2. It is hard tofindtwo distinct messages M, M' G E m such that h(M) = h(M').
It is believed that n = 80 for OWHFs and n = 160 for CRHFs are good settings
for the current technology [93]. A smaller value for n will result in weaker security
and m a y allow a successful birthday attack (cf. Section 2.6). It should be however
noted that today hash functions with 128-bit hash value (such as M D 5 ) are still
widely used.

2.3 Keyed Hash Functions

As mentioned before, using a secret key as part of the input to a hash function ca
extend the error detection capability to the detection of active spoofing. Hiding the
initial vector of a hash function and/or appending a secret key to the message (to be
hashed) are c o m m o n techniques that are used for this purpose [8]. Despite the fast
execution of hash functions and the lack of the export limitations, one of the main
reasons to construct a M A C from an existing hash function is to reuse the existing
code and not to implement a new primitive from scratch. However, it will be seen
later in this section that, this will limit the speed of the constructed M A C .
Preneel defines a M A C as follows:
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Definition 2.3 [98] A function g : {E r x E m } -> E n is a MAC
knowledge of the key K G E r , it is hard to determine g(K,M)
success "significantly higher" than ~, for any M

if without the
with probability of

G E m ; even when a large number

of pairs (Mi,g(K,Mi)) are known (M ^ Mi's).
The above definition implies that a MAC should be both one-way and collisionresistant for outsiders (the people who do not know the key). While the above
definition does not state whether a M A C should have those two properties for insiders, Berson et al. gave an independent definition of keyed hash functions which
stipulates this. (As mentioned before, the wordings in the definitions are adjusted
tofitsmoothly with other definitions.)
Definition 2.4 [22] A function g : {Er x Em} -> En is a Strong Keyed Hash
Function ( S K H F ) if,
1. Given K G E r , g is a CRHF.
2. Without knowledge of K, it is hard to compute g(K,M) for any M G Em;
even when a large number of pairs (Mi,g(K,Mi)) are known (M =fi Mi's).
The exact term used by Berson et al. is Secure One-Way Keyed hash function
(SOWKHF).

However, the term S K H F is used here to emphasise that it demands

strong requirements that are not necessary for a M A C .
Similar to the cryptographic hash functions, it is assumed that the description
of the function g is publicly known. The following proposition ensures that a S K H F
can be constructed from a C R H F .
Proposition 2.1 [22] If there exists a CRHF, then there exists a SKHF.
Because of the wide range of applications of keyed hash functions in cryptographic schemes, it is desirable to formulate a definition that leads to fast constructions which also satisfy the required properties of all those applications. The
following l e m m a is a direct consequence of Definition 2.4.
Lemma 2.2 A SKHF with a publicly known key is a CRHF.
This lemma indicates that the speed of SKHFs is upper-bounded by that of
C R H F s . Therefore, the speed of keyed hash functions that satisfy the requirements
of Definition 2.4 is limited to the speed of the fastest C R H F .
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Corollary 2.3 A SKHF

(constructed from a CRHF)

is at most as fast as the un-

derlying CRHF.
Proof: Based on L e m m a 2.2, when the key is public, a S K H F is a C R H F and can
be at most as fast as the underlying C R H F .

d

Definition 2.4 does not minimally capture the characteristic aim of a keyed hash
function which is the prevention of a message forgery. Because of the existence of
a secret key in the hashing process, the above definition may be relaxed and only
retain the main security properties required to thwart a message forgery.
Definition 2.5 A function g : {Er x Em} -)• En is a Keyed Hash Function (KHF)

if,
1. g is keyed one-way. That is, without knowledge of the key K G E r , even if a
large number of pairs (Mi,g(K,Mi)) are known, it is hard to:
(a) find M when g(K, M) is given; and
(b)findg(K, M) when M

is given,

where M ^ Mi's. (These properties imply that it is hard to find K.)

2. g is keyed collision-resistant. That is, without knowledge of K G Er it is har
tofindM^M'

G E

m

such that g(K, M) = g(K, M').

An important property of this definition is that the security requirements are
reduced to those required by authentication codes, which are much less stringent
than what were required in [22]. This allows development of much faster algorithms
which are equivalent (in terms of the proposed security criteria) to hashing followed
by encryption.
The above two definitions are markedly different. In Definition 2.5, cryptographic
properties of the keyed hash function relies on the secrecy of the key, while in
Definition 2.4, individual hash functions must be collision-resistant and one-way.
The relation between the two definitions is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4 A SKHF is also a KHF (but the converse is not true).
Proof: Let g satisfy Definition 2.4. Then, 1 in Definition 2.4 implies both la and 2
in Definition 2.5, and 2 in Definition 2.4 implies lb in Definition 2.5. Therefore, g
satisfies Definition 2.5.

•
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pft Keyed hash functions (KHF)
Hi'

Collision-resistant hash functions (CRHF)
PL,

Strong keyed hash functions (SKHF)
Figure 2.1: The efficiency comparison between SKHFs

and

KHFs.

One of the main advantages of relaxing Definition 2.4 is that it serves to motivate
the design of keyed hash functions as a new primitive and not as a combination of
other cryptographic primitives (such as hash function followed by encryption). A s a
result, Definition 2.5 can yield more efficient algorithms (cf. Chapter 3). Figure 2.1
illustrates this claim about the efficiency of keyed hash functions based on Definition 2.5. Indeed, a keyed hash function gains the difficulty of finding collisions or
reversing it, in part, from the secret key.
It should be also noted that Definitions 2.3 and 2.5 are similar in the sense
that if one of the properties of Definition 2.5 is violated, a message forgery become
feasible (violation of Definition 2.3). However, Definition 2.5 requires the infeasibility of finding the pre-image of a message (property la) which is not required in
Definition 2.3.

2.3.1

K e y e d H a s h Functions as Primitives

One-wayness and collision-resistance properties for keyed hash functions (and M A C s
in general) are rarely required for insiders. In applications such as software protection against modification, the secret key is known by only one person (or machine)
and the above properties are not required. In most other applications, such as message authentication between two parties, those properties are still wasteful, since a
cheating insider can perform m u c h more serious attacks than finding collisions or
reversing the function.
T h e most vulnerable applications are those in which the secret key is shared
a m o n g multiple parties. A s observed by Preneel [98], a good example of an application in which collision-resistance and one-wayness properties are required is given
by Mitchell [90].
Suppose K A B and K A C are the shared key between the users A and B, and A
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and C, respectively. Suppose that A broadcasts an authenticated message M

to

users B and C as follows.

A^B,C: EKAB(K), EKAB(g(K,M)), EKAC(K), EKAC(9(K,M)), M,
where g is a keyed hash function and Ex(y) denotes the encryption of y under
the key x. B (or C) can verify the authenticity of the message by decrypting
EKAB(K)

(or EKAC(K)), finding the session key K, and calculating the encoded hash

EKAB(g(K,M))

(or EKAC(g(K,M))).

A match indicates that M

is not modified.

It is obvious that if g is not collision-resistant for insiders, B can intercept the
broadcasted message and replace M

with M', where g(K,M)

= g(K,M').

C will

accept M' as a genuine message from A, because EKAC(g(K, M)) = EKAC(g(K, M')).
A similar comment applies to C.
It is argued here that the above protocol does not make appropriate use of
keyed hash functions. User A, who has already provided the information secrecy by
encrypting under KAB and KAC , generates another session key K to re-protect the
hash value. Such an inefficient application is not recommended and the following
alternative solutions are suggested:

A^B,C: EKAB(h(M)), EKAC(h(M)), M,
where h is a CRHF; and,

A^B,C: g(KAB,M),g(KAc,M),M,
where g is a keyed hash function.
It m a y be claimed that thefirstsuggestion is susceptible to a known plaintext
attack when the encryption algorithm E is not very strong (eg. see [5]). That is,
the intruder might be able to guess KAB

and KAC when enough pairs of plaintexts

and ciphertexts are available. However, Mitchell's scheme has the same problem
when B and C do not trust each other. For instance, B knows K and can perform
known plaintext attack to get C's secret key (KAC)-

It should also be noted that

the second suggestion requires twice g operations for KAB and KAC, respectively.
There are many protocols and applications that insist on S K H F properties without really requiring such strong properties. Examples of such applications are given
in [61, 81]. Those applications can be easily modified such that they only need a
keyed hash function which satisfies Definition 2.5.
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2.4

Collisionful Hash Functions

Berson et al. [22] introduced collisionful hash functions as a particular clas
hash functions. Such functions are useful in a situation where the secret key is poorly
chosen (eg. password) and is therefore susceptible to guessing attacks. For a given
pair of (message,digest), a collisionful hash function guarantees that multiple keys,
called key collisions, satisfy the above pair. Hence, even if a guessed key produces
a correct digest for a known message, an attacker cannot be certain that her/his
guess is correct. In other words, some degree of key collision is to be desired rather
than avoided, to make guessing of keys more difficult. Gong defines collisionful hash
function as follows.
Definition 2.6 [59] A function g : {Er x Em} -> £n is a Collisionful Hash Function ( C H F ) if,
1. Given K, it is hard to find M ^ M' G Em such that g(K, M) = g(K, M1).
2. Given t pairs of (Mi,g(K, Mi)), i = 1,... ,t, it is hard to find the secret
K, though it is less hard tofinda K' (£ K) with g(K, Mi) = g(K', Mi), for
all Mi's.
3. Without knowledge of K, it is hard to determine g(K,M) for any M G Em,
even if the above t pairs are given.
As stated earlier, collisionful hash functions provide an additional property,
namely the possibility of having the same hash value of a given message under
several keys, and reduce the chance of uniquely determining the key for the opponent [22]. One m a y expect to include this property in keyed hash functions and
in general in a M A C . However, it should be noted that C H F s are not necessarily
one-way. Hence, one may use a One-Way

CHF

as a M A C , when the key is rea-

sonably short. Furthermore, the above property is useful only if the number of
(message,digest) pairs is less than t. In practice, it is not easy to increase t and
indeed most proposed C H F s are vulnerable to guessing attacks when reasonably
large number of pairs are available.
There are some examples of constructions for collisionful hash functions, but most
are vulnerable to guessing attacks, due to the small size of the key space (which in
turn reduces t given in Definition 2.6). Gong [62] used polynomial interpolation to

2.5. Hash Function Families and Unconditionally Secure MACs

18

construct a collisionful hash function with the collision accessibility property. This
property allows a user to choose a set of keys that satisfy a given (message,digest)
pair, which is desirable when the key belongs to a distinguishable subset of the key
space (eg. meaningful words). In Chapter 5, it is shown that this application is not
secure.
Anderson and Lomas [3] used collisionful hash functions to propose an augmentation of the well-known Diffie-Hellman key exchange [47] that provides protection
against a middle-person attack. Their method verifies the initial key exchange by
means of a subsequent authentication stage based on communicants' passwords,
which are assumed to be poorly chosen. The authentication stage uses a collisionful
hash function in order to provide a safeguard against password guessing attacks.
The weaknesses of this scheme are studied in Chapter 5.

2.5 Hash Function Families and Unconditionally
Secure MACs

As mentioned before, a MAC construction can be based on a hash function followe
by an encryption algorithm. The advantage of such a construction is the clarity of
the security requirements of each component. There have been many constructions
based on dedicated hash functions, such as M D 5 [104], followed by block ciphers,
such as D E S [91]. Security analysis of such constructions is difficult due to the fact
that M D 5 and D E S are not proven to be secure. Furthermore, if the secret key is
not effectively used in the hashing process, an off-line attack on the hash function
could reduce the practical security of the system [99].
To obtain unconditional security, universal hash function families followed by
the perfect encryption algorithm, one-time-pad, m a y be used. In this chapter, it is
assumed that a family or class of hash functions is a collection of hash functions that
m a p elements of a space A into elements of another space B. It is also assumed that
the hash functions are indexed by a secret key and there exists a polynomial time algorithm that can efficiently and uniquely determine the hash function corresponding
to a given key. Let H be a family as follows:

H = {h : A ->• B},

where A and B denote the sets of all messages and all hash values, respectively
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general, % can be from any set A to any smaller set B, but in practice, it is usual
to have A = E

m

and B = E n which are more convenient (m > n).

Universal hash functions were defined by Carter and W e g m a n [27] in an attempt
to provide an input independent average linear time algorithm for storage and retrieval of keys in associative memories. Let |A| denote the size of the set X.

Definition 2.7 [27] A class % of functions from A to B is called universal, if f

all x 7^ x' G A,

\{heH:

h(x) = h(x')}\<\H\/\B\.

In a later work, they extended the above definition to strongly universal^, and
almost strongly universal classes of hash functions and showed the application of
the extended notions to multiple authentication.
Definition 2.8 [128] A class V. of hash functions is strongly universal (SUn) if
given any n distinct elements ax,...,an G A and any n (not necessarily distinct)
elements bx,..., bn G B,
\{heri: h(ax) = bx,..., h(an) = bn}\< \H\IWIn the context of unconditionally secure authentication codes, different terms
are used for representing similar concepts. A Cartesian authentication code is a
collection £ of mappings from a set <S of source states to a set T of tags (|T| = q);
that is, £ = {e : S —>• T } . A mapping e G £ is called an encoding rule and
determines a subset of S x T as the valid codewords. The codeword corresponding
to the source state s G S is (s || t), where t eT

and '||' denotes string concatenation.

The transmitter and the receiver share a secret encoding rule and this allows the
transmitter to construct valid codewords and the receiver to verify the validity of
a codeword. The enemy does not know the secret encoding rule. In a spoofing
of order r attack, the enemy uses her/his knowledge of r intercepted codewords
to construct another valid codeword. The code provides perfect protection against
spoofing of order r attack and enemy's best chance of success in the attack is Pr = i
A Cartesian authentication code provides r-fold security if P; = ^, i = 0, ...,r.
In such case they are equivalent to orthogonal arrays [110]. In [126], van Trung
has shown that 5 c V s are equivalent to orthogonal arrays and hence, the following
proposition can be concluded.
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Proposition 2.5 Cartesian A-codes with 1-fold security are equivalent to SU2 's.
A number of constructions for SU2 families were proposed by Carter and Wegm a n in [27]. In [128], they also gave a construction of SUn using polynomials over
finitefields.Other constructions of 5C/n's can be obtained using constructions of
orthogonal arrays. All such constructions are known to be inefficient as they require
exponentially many (in terms of the number of tags) encoding rules. To improve the
efficiency when a hash function family is used, one should be able to select random
elements of the family quickly and furthermore compute the hash value for a given
message very quickly.
Using universal hash functions, one can construct an unconditionally secure
M A C . Such M A C constructions are especially important because they result in efficient authentication systems with provable properties. Security of a M A C system in
this approach is determined by the best chance of success of an active spoofer, who
has seen a sequence of p authenticated messages constructed by the transmitter, to
construct a fraudulent message that will be accepted by the receiver.
Definition 2.9 [128] A MAC

for which the best chance of the enemy in the above

attack is at most e is called e-secure.
A similar definition used in the computational security approach is given below.
This definition is basically the more detailed version of Definition 2.3.
Definition 2.10 [13] A family of functions % constitutes an (e,t,q, £)-secure

MAC

if any adversary that is not given the key K, is limited to spend total time t (number

of operations) in the attack, and to request the value of the function hx G 7i in up

to q messages M\,..., Mq of its choice, each of length at most £, cannotfinda pair
(M, D) such that M

^ Mi for i = 1,... ,q, and D = hx(M)

with probability better

than t.
W e g m a n and Carter proposed a construction for e-secure M A C s using t-ASU2
class of hash functions.
Definition 2.11 [119] H is e-ASU2 if for all x G A and

\{heH:

ceB,

h(x) = c}\ = \n\/\B\,

and furthermore, for all x ^ x' G A and c,d G B,
\{herl:

h(x) = c, h(x') = c'}\ < t\H\l\B\.
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W e g m a n and Carter's construction is as follows. Let U be an e-ASU2 class of
hash function from A to B. The transmitter and the receiver share a secret key
K that consists of two parts. Thefirstpart identifies an element h G H and the
second part is a randomly generated sequence n,... ,rn G B. (It is assumed that
the sequence is obtained from a truly random function, such as the output of tossing
a balanced coin.) For a given key, there exists a counter £ which is initialised to
one and is incremented after each MACG is: algorithm. The tag value for the £}h
message, Me, is thus h(Mt)@ri, where '©' denotes bitwise exclusive-or ( X O R ) . The
receiver can reconstruct this tag to verify the authenticity of the message, using
M A C V K algorithm. W e g m a n and Carter proved that this construction is e-secure
and the key size is asymptotically optimal — the enemy's chance of forging a message
is upper bounded by e|#|-1. The construction is especially attractive because by
repeated application of hashing from A to B, it is possible to find the hash value
of arbitrary long messages (cf. Section 2.2). Hence, in practice, by using one of
the random masks rx,..., rn for every message, it is possible to generate a provably
secure M A C . Replacing the one-time-pad algorithm with a pseudo-random sequence
generator, reduces unconditional security to computational security in which the
security is upper bounded by the total size of the key information used for the hash
function and pseudo-random generator [112].

Definition 2.12 [78] A class of hash functions is called e-otp-secure if it is
in the one-time-pad construction of Wegman

and Carter.

Krawczyk showed that provable security in the above sense does not really requ
the e-ASU2 property:
Definition 2.13 [78] U is e-AXU2 if for all x ^ x' G A and ceB,
\{h€H: h(x) ® h(x') = c}\ < e\n\.

Theorem 2.6 [78] A class of hash functions, in the above construction scenario,
is e-otp-secure if and only if it is e-AXU2.
Similar theorem in the computational security approach is:
Theorem 2.7 [112] Assume W is e-AXU2. In the above MAC construction, if an
adversary makes qx queries to M A C G and q2 queries to M A C V , the probability of
forging a MA C is at most eq2.
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It is noted that the probability of a forgery in the above theorem does not depend
on qx, the number of queries to M A C G . Stinson proved that composition of hash
functions can be effectively used for replacing the construction of e-ASU2 by e-AU2
hash functions.
Definition 2.14 [119] H is e-AU2 if for all x ^ x' G A,
\{heH: h(x) = h(x')}\ < e\H\.
This definition is, in fact, a generalisation of Definition 2.7.
Theorem 2.8 [119] Let Ux = {h : A -> B} be ex-AU2 and U2 = {h : B -+ C} be
e2-ASU2. Then U3 = Ux o U2 = {h : A ->• C} is (ex + e2)-ASU2.
In the above composition, for every hx G Ux and h2 G H,2 one can construct
h3 G U3 such that h3(x) = h2(hx(x)), V z G A. Therefore, \H3\ = \Hx\ x \H.2\ is the
size of the key space for 7i3 (product of the size of the key spaces for Hx and 'H2).
Similarly,
Corollary 2.9 [107] Let Ux = {h : A ^ B} be ex-AU2 and U2 - {h : B -> C} be
e2-AXU2.

Then U3 = Ux o U2 = {h : A -^ C} is (ex + e2)-AXU2.

The main advantage of this result is that for computationally efficient hashing
only efficient ex-AU2 classes must be constructed. Using this result, the emphasis
of research in recent years has been on the construction of computationally efficient
e-AU2 families. Johansson [72, 73], Taylor [120], Krawczyk [78, 79], Rogaway [107],
and Shoup [112] have all explored computationally efficient M A C s that have a relatively small key size. The most efficient construction is bucket hashing [107]. Johansson [73] recently improved bucket hashing by modifying some known families
of hash functions. The proposed hash function families require a key which is a
few times shorter than that used in bucket hashing and therefore is more practical.
Other examples of such construction are given in Chapter 4.

2.6 Methods of Attack on MACs
Assume that there is an insecure channel between two users A (Alice) and B (Bob)
in which an intruder E (Eve) can read, analyse, change, and substitute the contents
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of the stream passing through the channel. Also assume that A wants to send an
authenticated message M

to B. If E is able to produce a pair (M,D),

which is

not generated by the transmitter but accepted as a genuine pair of (message,digest)
by the receiver, it is said that E has successfully forged a M A C . The case in which
the intruder might replace the pair of (message,digest) with another pair which
had been sent previously (Replay Attack) is ignored here. The usual methods to
avoid this kind of intrusion are the use of time stamps and counters.

It is also

assumed that the intruder never deletes a communicated message, as it is possible
to thwart this intrusion by adding a serial number to the message or waiting for the
acknowledgement of the message.
In the unconditionally secure approach, the probability of a successful forgery
should be always less than or equal to a small e. In the computational security
approach, the above probability should hold when the intruder is limited to a certain
amount of time, computer resources, and number of queries. M A C s that are based
on dedicated hash functions, such as M D 5 , and/or block ciphers, such as D E S ,
basically suffer from the lack of a provable security, because M D 5 and D E S type
algorithms are not proven to be secure. In M A C constructions, it is desirable to
have exhaustive key search as the best attack for a M A C forgery. However, in the
constructions that are based, for example, on hash functions, this forgery usually
depends on other factors, such as the existence of some drawbacks in the underlying
hash function.

Exhaustive Key Search
In the M A C s , a secret key is used in the M A C G algorithm to make the hash value
secure against an active spoofer. If the adversary has access to at least one pair (message,digest), the key can be guessed by examining the key space elements against
the (message,digest) pair(s). For a given message, since the m a p from the key space
to the digest space is not necessarily one-to-one, more than one key may be found.
However if enough number of pairs are available, it might be possible to determine
the key uniquely.
As stated in [96], the expected number of trials to find the secret key is upper
bounded by,

,
I

1
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where n is the hash value length and t is the number of (message,digest) pairs. The

2.6. Methods of Attack on MACs

24

total number of trials to identify the key is upper bounded by,

2r-l

where r is the key length. The number of resulting keys, including the real key,
expected to be 1 + ^jiir. It means that about - pairs of (message,digest) are needed
to uniquely determine the secret key, because (1 + 2 ^ r ) ~ 2 r _ t n .
As mentioned above, choosing a long enough key prevents an exhaustive key
search. Another important attack is called birthday attack.

Preneel [99] showed

that M A C s that are based on iterative functions (eg. H M A C [13]) are vulnerable to
the extended birthday attack.

Birthday Attack
This attack originates from the Birthday Paradox which is the probability of finding
at least two people with the same birthday among 23 people. It is one of the
most powerful attacks on hash functions with uniform message digest distribution
and short message digest length [95, 96]. Let n denote the size of the hash value
(in bits). If two pools from the digest space, one containing Xx (genuine) samples
and the other containing x2 (bogus) samples, are generated by an adversary, the
probability offindinga match from the pools is approximated by 1 — e

".

In

the best case, when Xx = x2 = 22, the probability of the match equals 0.63. If the
opponent slightly increases the size of the samples, xi and x2, the above probability
will significantly increase. In practice, the opponent wishes to substitute a genuine
message with a specific bogus message (xx — !)• Assuming that x2 genuine hash
values are available, the probability of a match equals 1 — e_2».
In [95], the authors have recommended that the length of the hash value should
be around 128 bits to avoid this attack. It has been shown that birthday attack
can be substantially improved by parallelising the search and also storing a set of
specific messages rather than the whole pool of messages. For example, if messages
are 16 bytes each, every pair of (message,digest) needs 16 + 16 = 2 5 bytes. Therefore,
if the intruder wants to have a pool containing about 2 6 4 pairs of (M, D) to get a
probability of success around |, s/he needs 2 5 x 2 6 4 = 2 6 9 bytes for storing the data
(this is almost 6 x 10 11 Gbytes). O n the other hand, if the processing of each pair
takes 2 - 2 0 (~ 10 -6 ) seconds, the processing of the pool takes 2 6 4 x 2 ~ 2 0 = 244seconds
(this is almost 557844 years).
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In [101], Quisquater and Delescaille gave an efficient algorithm to prevent the
storage of the large pools of messages. Their method was applied to D E S tofindkey
collisions. However, Their method can also be used for a collision search for hash
functions. They choose a random element x from the input space (finite set) D and
generate the finite sequence f°(x) = x, fl(x) = f(x), f2(x) = f(f(x)),—

Since

the set isfinite,there exists an integer / such that fl+c(x) = fl(x) and /'+c_1(a;) ^
fl~1(x). This is a collision for /. In their papers (also [102]), they provide an
algorithm to find collisions.
Oorschot and Wiener [123] proposed a technique based on parallel collision search
(see also [93]) to reduce the time and the memory required for meet-in-the-middle
attack. This attack is similar to birthday attack, but the collision is found in the
middle of the hashing process, by starting from the two ends of the algorithm.
In birthday attack, one only considers the resulting hash value and ignores the
intermediate values of the hashing process. Therefore, a better result is expected in
the meet-in-the-middle attack.
The above two techniques increase the expected probability of success of an
attack. Therefore, a hash value is recommended to be larger than 128 bits (say 160
bits) to avoid a realistic attack.
Because there is a secret part in a M A C which does not allow the intruder (Eve)
to produce an authenticated message easily, she cannot easily forge a new (not
previously sent) message. The extended birthday attack works as follows. Let G be
a M A C based on an iterated hash function (cf. Section 2.2). That is, given message
blocks M i to Mt,

G(M)=g(Dt),
where Z)t- = h(Di-\, Mi), for i = 1,... ,t, and h is a hash function (or compression
function) withrc-bitchaining variable (usually the same as the hash value length).
Given u known [message,MAC] pairs, an enemy uses birthday attack to find a collision before the output transformation g. Such a collision is called an internal
collision, and satisfies M

^ M' and Dt = D\,. If Dt + D't, but g(Dt) = g(D't,),

an external collision is found. The enemy can use an infernal collision to obtain a
verifiable M A C forgery by requesting the M A C for a chosen text (M||F), where Y
is an arbitrary message chosen by the enemy. It should be noted that if M
M' internally collide, (M\\Y) and (M'||F) do the same. Furthermore, if M
have the same trailing blocks, ie. M

and

and M'

= (X\\Y) and M' = (X'\\Y), then the enemy
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has additional freedom in the choice of the M A C , because those last blocks can be
omitted and replaced by an arbitrary chosen text. This will also enable the enemy
to keep the length of the forged message the same as the original one (in case the
length is prepended to the message). Preneel and van Oorschot [99] have extensively
studied this attack. Bellare et al. [16] have further studied the attack and showed
how such an attack can be avoided by making the scheme stateful.
The extended birthday attack is an important attack since it allows a forgery
to be successful faster than an exhaustive key search. However, large enough hash
values (eg. 160 bits) will thwart this attack..
The above two attacks are the major ones that do not depend on the underlying
components of the M A C process. In weak constructions, in which one canfindsome
drawbacks in some components or in the combination of the components, it might
be feasible to forge a M A C even faster. Some more specific attacks, such as padding
attack, are described in Chapter 3.

2.7 MAC Constructions
A MAC should basically prevent a successful message forgery by an intruder. Depending on the approach, unconditional security or computational security, used for
constructing a M A C , there would be slightly different interpretations of the security requirements. For instance, in the unconditionally secure approach, the M A C
should be designed so that the probability of a successful message forgery is not
more than a small number, no matter how much computer resources the enemy has.
In the computational security approach, the requirements are more relaxed and the
probability of a message forgery depends on the computing constraints of the enemy.
Therefore, the M A C s designed using this approach tend to be more practical.
Because the M A C G algorithm should generate afixedlength tag, usually a hash
function is used for compressing the given message (to afixedlength hash value). O n
the other hand, to contribute the key to the operation of M A C G algorithm, usually
an encryption algorithm is used. It is often desirable to eliminate the use of encryption algorithms in M A C constructions and use hash functions instead. Practical
solutions for hash functions and encryption algorithms have shown that hash functions are usually faster than encryption algorithms — probably because they do not
need to be reversible. Furthermore, encryption algorithms have some import/export
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restrictions in some countries that prevent construction of other applications based
on encryption algorithms.
In the followings, several methods for M A C construction are examined.

2.7.1 Construction from Existing Hash Functions
A n existing hash function (family) can be used for constructing a M A C . In this
case, security requirements of the M A C rely on the security of the underlying hash
function. Because hash functions are fast and do not have export restrictions, such
constructions are very common.

Hash-then-Encrypt Construction
This method is the simplest way of constructing a M A C and is defined as follows.
MACGK(M) = EK(h(M)),
where K is the secret key, M is the message, h is a hash function, and E is an
encryption algorithm. This construction still has an encryption algorithm as one of
the M A C components, and so retains the import/export restriction of encryption
algorithms. However it should be noted that, since the encryption is applied to
a short and fixed size checksum h(M), the speed of the encryption is negligible,
compared to the whole M A C process. Figure 2.2 illustrates this construction for a
cryptographic hash function h, where the length of h(M) is equal to the required
input length for E. This scheme was proposed in the C C I T T X.509 as a standard
M A C [25]. Note that if h is a hash function (does not depend on a secret component
k) and its hash value is short, an off-line attack can find collisions for h. However,
using universal classes of hash functions in which hash functions are indexed by the
secret key (or part of the key), such an attack can be ignored. A similar method can
be used for hash function families such as e-AXU2. In this case, the hash function
is selected from a family based on the secret key. Examples of such constructions
are given in Chapter 4.

Nested Hash Function Construction
There are many ways to construct a M A C from nested hash functions [6]. O n e such
construction, which is based on a O W H F and is obtained by a simple transformation,
is described below.
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Figure 2.2: Hash-then-encrypt construction, where h is a cryptographic hash fu
tion, E is an encryption algorithm, IV is the initial vector, M is the messa
the key, and D is the MAC result.
Suppose A is a OWHF with n-bit hash value. Define f(X,Y) = h(h(X) © Y),
where X and Y are each n bits. A given, arbitrary length, message M is divided
into t message blocks, M,-, i = 1,..., t, for some integer t. Using the above function
for iteratively computing the hash value, a M A C can be defined as:
MACG^M) = /(/(• • • f(f(K, MX),M2),..., MM), Mt),

where K is the secret key. Berson et al. [22] claim that the above MAC sa
the requirements stipulated in Definition 2.4. An advantage of this scheme is that
it requires only one one-way hash function. A disadvantage of this scheme is the
overhead in the calculation of h — twice for each message block Mi, in every round.
The ordinary use of this scheme suffers from a padding attack — an arbitrary message
M' can be appended to M to generate a genuine pair ((M\\M'), MACGJf(M||M')).
However, there are some easy methods to thwart this attack (cf. [8]). The reader is
referred to [22] for other such examples.
Construction Using a Key as Part of Message or Initial Vector
A M A C can also be constructed from a cryptographic hash function, by adding
the key to the message or the initial vector (cf. Figure 2.3). In such constructions,
the speed of the M A C remains almost the same as that of the hash function and
furthermore, there is no export restriction. Therefore, the resulting M A C is highly
attractive for internationally used fast applications.
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Figure 2.3: Construction of a MAC using a cryptographic hash function h, where
K is the secret key, M is the message, IV is the initial vector, and D is the M
result. The input to h is a combination of M and K (eg. concatenation). The initia
vector can be a combination of K and some public value.

As an example, suppose that h is a CRHF and K is the secret key. Define,
IV = K,
MACGJC(M) = h(M\\K),
where '||' denotes concatenation. Here, K is used as the initial vector of the hash
function and also is appended to the message. It has been shown that this M A C
is safe against known attacks and at the same time is very efficient [8]. It should
be however noted that divide-and-conquer attack can be still considered as a better
attack compared to the exhaustive key search. This attack will be studied in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2.2) and it will be shown that for a M A C with 128-bit result the
attack is infeasible.
A similar method was suggested by Tsudik [122], but the method used here
improves on both the security and the efficiency of his method. For a complete
discussion on this construction refer to Chapter 3 (Section 3.2).

2.7.2 Construction from Block Ciphers
Since a block cipher uses a secret key to provide secrecy, it can be used for constructing a M A C . One can use the C B C method [68, 91] in block ciphers, such as D E S , to
calculate hash values for arbitrary long messages. Such a construction is referred to
as C B C - M A C [13]. However, a problem arises when the block cipher is not properly
used in the construction to satisfy the security requirements of keyed hash functions
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(cf. some weak examples in [96, 129] and the required conditions in [13]). Furthermore, most of the known block ciphers have 64-bit input and output which m a y not
be desirable to be used as the hash value length. In [95], it was suggested to consider
about 128 bits for the digest length to thwart a birthday attack. However, a M A C
which depends on a secret component K can remain secure with even smaller length,
if it is properly constructed. This construction will not be investigated further in
this thesis, because it is extensively studied in the literature (eg. [13, 15, 99]). It is
reemphasised that block ciphers are usually slow, compared to hash functions, and
also suffer from export limitations. Consequently, a M A C constructed from a block
cipher retains those limitations.

2.7.3 Construction from Scratch
In the previous two sections, constructions of M A C s from hash functions and block
ciphers were examined. Existence of a secret key makes the analysis of an algorithm
more difficult for the outsiders. In Section 2.3, it was shown that a keyed hash
function with a publicly known key does not need to be a C R H F and therefore, it is
possible to increase its speed by using simpler underlying components, rather than
a C R H F . In this case, the M A C can be considered as an independent cryptographic
primitive that is specifically designed for message authentication. A n example of
such a construction is presented in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3) and shows that it is
faster than other designs which are constructed from hash functions.

2.8 Summary
This chapter was an introduction to various aspects of Message Authentication
Codes (MACs).

In Section 2.1, a historical background on the line of research

towards design of M A C s was presented. The basic requirements and the operational configurations of M A C s were discussed and was also shown that a M A C can
be constructed from other cryptographic primitives, such as hash functions and/or
encryption algorithms.
In Section 2.2, a brief introduction to cryptographic hash functions was given.
The applicability of hash functions in the construction of M A C s was discussed and
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was shown that hash functions are the most c o m m o n primitives used for such purpose. Such constructions are usually referred to as keyed hash functions. In Section 2.3, keyed hash functions were studied and a new definition, which is closely
related to the M A C s , was presented. It was shown that the new definition minimally
captures the requirements of the M A C s . In Section 2.4, the class of collisionful hash
functions was studied and was shown that this class is a particular class of keyed
hash functions. T h e introductory description given in that section will be further
referred to from Chapter 5.
Families of hash functions which can be used for unconditionally secure M A C s
were also considered in this chapter. The work was mainly concentrated on the
Wegman-Carter M A C construction which has a simple and efficient description and
meanwhile is provably secure. T w o examples of such a construction will be proposed
in Chapter 4.
In Section 2.6, two major methods of attack on M A C s were described and their
applicability on M A C s was studied. It was noted that correct use of a secret key,
in the M A C s designed from hash functions, can thwart most of the existing attacks
applicable to hash functions. Some examples of such construction are given in

Chapter 3.
In Section 2.7, several methods of M A C construction were shown. The M A C
constructions were represented in general forms. Specific examples of those constructions will be given in the next two chapters.

Chapter 3
Design of Practical M A C s

In this chapter practical solutions to the construction of Message Authenticatio
Codes ( M A C s ) are studied. ThefirstM A C is constructed by keying a cryptographic
hash function. T h e second construction is from scratch and only depends on simple
components such as boolean functions.
Parts of this chapter appeared in a preliminary form in the Proceedings of Series
of Annual Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography (SAC), 1995 (cf. [8]); and in
the Proceedings of Cryptography: Policy and Algorithms Conference, 1995 (cf. [7]).

3.1 Introduction

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the security in computationally secure MAC
relies on the computational limitations of the enemy and therefore depends on the
improvement of the computer technology and also the discovery of new methods of
attack. Computationally secure M A C s are interesting because their security is based
on the computer power of the enemy and hence their efficiency can be maximised
based on the best known attacking algorithm. However, they should be upgraded
with the technology improvements and the invention of new attacks.
The contributions of this chapter are two fold. In Section 3.2 a new method
for M A C construction, by keying a cryptographic hash function, is studied. It will
be shown that if the key is properly added to a hash function, the resulting M A C
satisfies the requirements discussed in Chapter 2. However, the performance of the
M A C , in such consideration, will be upper bounded by that of the underlying hash
function.
In Section 3.3, a M A C will be proposed which does not depend on any other
primitive and its performance is considerably higher than the ones constructed by
keying a hash function. This gain-up motivates design of a M A C as an independent
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cryptographic primitive. It should be noted that Message Authentication Algorithm
( M A A ) is the only other publicly known algorithm which similar to the design
proposed here does not depend on any pre-existing hash function.
M A A was designed by Davies [38] and became ISO 8731-2 banking standard [67].
In contrast to the algorithm proposed here, M A A is about 40 percent slower than
M D 5 . Furthermore, Preneel and van Oorschot [100] have given several methods of
attack on M A A and showed that it is not secure.

3.2 Construction of Keyed Hash Functions
Because hash functions produce a fixed length and randomly distributed output,
they are suitable to be used for message authentication when properly keyed by
a secret component shared among the legitimate communicants —

typically two

communicants: transmitter and receiver. Hash functions are usually fast, compared
with encryption algorithms, and are publicly available. However, hash functions
are not designed for message authentication and therefore, special care should be
taken when they are used for M A C constructions. If the underlying hash function is
weakened by the technology improvement and/or invention of new attacks, it should
be replaced by another secure hash function, with possibly larger hash value.
In [122], Tsudik proposed three methods for message authentication, which were
based on a one-way hash function ( M D 4 [103]), keyed by some secret components. In
this section, the security and performance of his methods are studied and improved
by reducing the key length to 128 bits or even smaller. This reduction not only
increases the speed of the process, but also increases the security. It is noted that a
128-bit (16-byte) key is widely used in practice. 512 (or 1024) bits which are the key
lengths required in Tsudik's methods are excessive. It is shown that the improved
method satisfies the requirements of Definitions 2.4 and 2.5, and results in a good
candidate for a M A C .
There are other proposals that are all motivated from Tsudik's work. In [99],
Preneel and van Oorschot proposed M D x - M A C which is based on an MDx-type
hash function. They extended the secret key to three sub-keys A'o, Kx, and K2,
and applied them in their scheme by setting the initial vector to Ao, adding Kx to
the round function (step function), and putting K2 in a separate last message block.
They have conjectured that if the underlying hash function is secure, the best attack
on M D x - M A C is an exhaustive key search.
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T w o other examples of keyed hash functions are N M A C and H M A C which were
proposed by Bellare et al. in [13] and later in [77]. Thefirstscheme is based on a
keyed version of an iterated hash function h (cf. Section 2.2). Let hk denote the
corresponding keyed hash function indexed by a key k, and kx and k2 be the secret
keys. N M A C is defined as,

MACG^M) = MMM)).
Assuming the underlying hash function h satisfies the properties of hash functions
(such as being C R H F ) , they prove that M A C G is secure. This method is studied
in [75], where hk is defined as secret prefix method with 128-bit prefix key.
H M A C is a variant of N M A C in which the underlying hash function can be
plugged into the design without any modification. This will be useful when, for
example, a hardware copy of the hash function is available and one cannot modify
any part of the hardware. H M A C is defined as,
MACGfc(M) = h(k © opad, h(k © ipad, M)),

where h is an iterated hash function, k is the string obtained by appending 'O'
the secret key k to make it a full 6-bit string (block-size of h), and opad and ipad are
fixed 6-bit constants. H M A C [77] has replaced the Request For Comment (RFC)
1828 which was an Internet proposed standard recommended by the IP Security
(IPSEC) working group, for the authentication of IP datagrams.
Touch [121] gave a list of the Internet protocols that use Tsudik's approach,
where M D 5 was chosen as the underlying hash function. Further discussion and
comparisons of various keyed hash function designs are given in [75].
Throughout this section, the assumption given in Chapter 2 (Section 2.6) is used.
Therefore, there are two communicants A (Alice) and B (Bob) who intend to use an
insecure channel to communicate an authenticated message, and there is an enemy
E (Eve) who tries to forge a fraudulent message, either by modifying a transmitted
one or generating a new one.

3.2.1 Tsudik's Proposed Methods
Tsudik [122] proposed three methods for message authentication. They are Secret
Prefix, Secret Suffix, and Envelope methods which are briefly explained below. In
the followings, SAB

an(

^ $AB

are

512-bit secret keys shared between A and B.
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1. Secret Prefix Method: When A wants to send a message M to B, she performs
the following steps:
• Use the 512-bit secret key S^B,
• Compute £> = M D 4 ( S £ B | | M ) ,
• Send the pair (M, D) to B.
Since B knows the key SAB, he can verify D by recomputing

MD4(SAB\\M).

Note that, the key length is 512 bits and M D 4 needs to process this extra 512
bits (one block).
2. Secret Suffix Method: A does the following steps:
• Use the 512-bit secret key SABi
• Compute D = M D 4 ( M | | S ^ B ) ,
• Send the pair (M, D) to B.
B can again verify D, since he knows the key SAB. Same as the previous
method, 512 bits is appended to the message (one extra block).
3. Envelope Method: This is the combination of the previous two methods, where
A:
• Uses the secret keys SPAB

an

d ^AB (1024 bits),

• Computes D = M D 4 ( S , ^ | | M | | ^ B ) , and
• Sends the pair (M, D) to B.
In this method the message M

is surrounded by SPAB and SAB. T w o blocks

(1024 bits) that are added to the message cause M D 4 to perform 2 x 64 = 128
extra steps.
The key advantage of these methods are the plain use of the underlying hash
function. Therefore, even a hardware copy of M D 4 can be used to generate a M A C
(similar to H M A C ) . However, the secret prefix method is completely insecure [8,
99], because one can take an authenticated message of the form (M, D) and easily
calculate D' = MT>4(SAB\\M')
in M D 4 and M"

for any M' = (M\\P\\M"), where P is the padding

is an arbitrary chosen message. This is called padding attack or

message extension, which is specific to such construction. The researcher of this
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work has shown how to cope with this attack and has suggested three ways to avoid
it [8]. Preneel and van Oorschot [99, 100] showed that, in contrast to Tsudik's
claim, in the envelope method the difficulty of recovering SAB and SAB (512 bits
each) is not equivalent to that of recovering a 1024-bit key — it is not exponential
on the added length of the two keys. In their divide-and-conquer attack, they only
need an off-line search on the individual keys together with a substantial amount
of known [message,MAC] pairs to recover the key. It should be noted that SAB
occupies exactly one block and is equivalent to a 128-bit random initial vector for
M D 4 . Consequently, one only needs to search for 128 bits, rather than 512 bits, of
SAB- Regardless of this important point, their attack is not practical, because it
needs at least 2 6 4 authenticated messages to be recorded by the enemy.
Although the secret suffix method is secure, it greatly depends on the collision
resistance property of the underlying hash function. That is, the intruder only needs
tofinda collision for the message before the contribution of the secret key (internal
collision), and then replace it with the original message. This is not however a major
drawback, because it can be assumed that the underlying hash function is collision
resistant. W h e n this property is violated, another hash function can be used.
It is obvious that increasing the key length in the above methods will not increase
the security, as it is still equivalent to the cryptanalysis of M D 4 . It is shown that
reducing the key length to 128 bits can maintain the security of the system. It is
further explained how to mix the key with the message in such a way that the hash
function does not need to process the extra key bits. The improved method, in
which the key length is 8 times smaller than that of used in Tsudik's methods, is
presented in the next section. The key is X O R e d to the message and also used as
the initial vector.

3.2.2 The Improved Method (Using Small Key)
It is believed that a 128-bit key is strong enough for a system to remain secure against
an exhaustive key search.1 A new method is proposed here, which is similar to the
Tsudik's methods but is more efficient in terms of the speed and the key length. This
section only presents a description of the proposed method. The detailed security
analysis is given in Section 3.2.3.
^n fact, 128 bits are even more than enough for the current computing technology. 128 bits
are considered to retain the security for longer period of time in the future. One may use smaller
key (eg. 64 bits) if the security is not required for a long period.
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In the proposed method, an MDx-type hash function, such as M D 4 , M D 5 ,
S H A [92], or H A V A L [131], is used as the underlying hash function (refer to [6]
for a survey on cryptographic hash functions). A n MDx-type hash function is a
hashing algorithm that maps an arbitrary length message to a 128-bit hash value.
It should always pad some bits, P, consisting of a '1' followed by zeros and the
length of the message, to the end of the input message to make its length an exact
multiple of t, which is the length of one block. Each block consists of several steps
and the result of each block is called an intermediate value. In the processing of
the first block, a 128-bit buffer, called initial vector (IV), is used. For other blocks,
the output of the previous blocks is used. Finally, the last block output is the hash
value. It is assumed that the underlying hash function is C R H F . Dobbertin [49]
cryptanalyzed M D 4 and showed that it is not collision resistant (see also [21,41, 51]).
He also showed that M D 5 is not collision resistant [50] and produced a collision pair
to confirm his claim. However, the given colliding messages require different initial
vectors which are not the same as the provided, andfixed,one given in the description of M D 5 . Therefore, M D 5 is still being used in practice (see also [40, 127]).
S H A and H A V A L are still believed to be collision resistant and they can be used as
the underlying hash function. The interesting point with H A V A L is its additional
property to produce message digests of different lengths. For instance, the method
proposed in this work can be changed by increasing both the key length and the
message digest length from 128 to 256 bits.
As mentioned before, plain use of the secret prefix method allows a message
forgery by appending a text to an authenticated message and also the envelope
method with two keys is a little more secure than the secret suffix method. The
proposed method here is an improved envelope method that can be described as
follows.
Let KAB he a 128-bit secret key shared between A and B. X © V

denotes ©-

suffix, which is bit-wise exclusive-or ( X O R ) , when X and Y have, probably, different
lengths. The short one, between X

and Y, will be padded by zero bits from the

left hand side to make its length the same as the other's. In other words, the short
one will be X O R e d to the end of the other one. For example, if X = 0110001011
and Y = 1100110, then X © Y = 0111101101. Let h be an MDx-type C R H F and
hiv(M) denote the hash value for a message M, with the initial vector set to IV.
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Figure 3.1: KAB &S both the initial vector and ©-suffix of M.
underlying MDx-type hash function is chosen to be MD5.

In this figure, the

The MAC can be described as:
MACGKAB(M)

= hKAB(M © KAB),

where the secret key is used twice to provide more security (Figure 3.1). This
method uses only a 128-bit key which is 8 times smaller than that of used in Tsudik's
envelope method. This length of the key also speeds up the process by saving two
block processes. In fact, the proposed method is almost as fast as the underlying
hash function h.
This method was independently proposed in [8]. Similar methods were considered by several authors, such as Kaliski and Robshaw [75], in a very same period.
Their method is the same as Tsudik's envelope method, but they use the same
key to be appended to the both ends of the message (ie. SAB = SAB).

They also

considered a 128-bit key, rather than a 512-bit key used by Tsudik. To provide an
independent first block, they padded the first key by 384 bits and then prepended it
to the message. The method proposed here is more efficient, because thefirstblock
in their proposed method needs extra computation while it is still equivalent to a
secret initial vector, used in the method here.

3.2.3

Security Analysis of the Proposed Method

It will be shown that the proposed method, described earlier, satisfies Definition 2.4
and is a S K H F (also a K H F ) . Therefore, it is a good alternative for a secure M A C .
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The justification is as follows. Based on the given assumptions, the underlying hash
function is a C R H F . The defined M A C G is the same as h, in cryptographic point of
view, when the key is publicly known. Therefore, given the key, M A C G is a C R H F .
Since every bit of the hash value depends on all bits of the input message2 and the
secret key is part of the input message, without knowing the key it is impossible to
calculate the hash value.
It is desired to further examine the method proposed here against the related
possible attacks. The key length assures that an exhaustive key search cannot be
applied to the method. The major possible attack could be the divide-and-conquer
attack which was described in Section 3.2.1. In [100], Preneel and van Oorschot
extended their divide-and-conquer attack and gave a new key recovery attack which
substantially increases the feasibility of their attack.

Proposition 3.1 [100] There exist a key recovery attack on one-key envelope meth
ods such as that of RFC

1828, which requires q — [64/t] steps (1 < t < 64) to find

64 bits of the key. Step i (1 < i < q) requires y/2 • 2 6 4 known texts of bitlength
d • 512 — t • i for somefixedCi > 1, and 2 < + 2 chosen texts.
For instance if t = 16, the enemy needs about 266 known [message,MAC] pairs
and about 2 2 0 chosen [message,MAC] pairs to be able to forge a new message.
Because the hash value is chosen to be 128 bits, the scheme is secure against this
attack. The padding attack is thwarted by adding the key to the end of the hashing
process. The secret part does not allow the intruder to evaluate the new message
digest D' and form a pair ((M\\M'), D') or ((M'\\M), D') from a given pair (M, D).
In Tsudik's methods, a 512-bit key was added to the message before applying
MD4 —

the key was 1024 bits in the envelope method. This length of the key

not only makes the system slow, but also requires unnecessarily large tamper proof
memory to store the key. Appending 512-bit information to the input message causes
h (eg. M D 5 ) to process the extra 512 bits (one block) and therefore, decreases the
speed of the system.
In the method proposed here, not only the key length was reduced by up to 87.5%,
but also the key was X O R e d to the message to prevent concatenation (message
enlargement). Existence of the secret keys in the method does not increase the
2

This is, in fact, the property of the underlying hash function. Because otherwise, it is vulnerable
to collision search attacks.
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input length, and therefore, does not decrease the speed of the process. ( X O R
operation takes no time, compared with the process of one block in M D 5 . ) It should
be noted that, speed was one of the main reasons to use hash functions for M A C
constructions. O n the other hand, the message is surrounded by the secret key and
thwarts any possible attack.

3.3 A New Construction for a Fast and Secure

MAC
This section is the construction of a new MAC which does not depend on any
other cryptographic primitive. Desirable properties of this design are gained by
including important features of M D 5 [104] and H A V A L [131], some nonlinear boolean
functions proposed in [28], and some additional properties such as variable rotations
(cf. Section 3.3.2). In this section, the original proposal which appeared in [7] is
described. Appendix D provides some improvements in this scheme to increase
its security. T h e nonlinear boolean functions used in this scheme form the round
function /,• as follows:

D~E"(((DkEYA)k ~(BkC)),
ifi = 0 (mod 5),
(A&Ey(BkC)'((B~C)kD),
if i = 1 (mod 5),
fi(A,B,C,D,E)={A'(B k (A"D)Y(((A k D)'C) k E), if i = 2 (mod 5),
A\CkDkEY((AkC)
| (BkD)), if i = 3 (mod 5),
[ B~((DkE) | (A kC)),
if z = 4 (mod 5),
where '&', '|', and '*' denote bitwise A N D , O R , and X O R operations, respectively.
/o to / 4 are functions offivevariables and have the following important properties:
• They are 0-1 balanced.
• They satisfy the Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC).
• They are highly nonlinear.
• They are pairwise linearly non-equivalent.
• They are far from each other, in terms of the Hamming distance.
• They can be described by short Algebraic Normal Forms ( A N F ) .
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This M A C takes an arbitrary length message and a secret key (with flexible
length, 128 to 384 bits) to compute a secure 128-bit message digest. It is assumed
that the key is, in general, 384 bits which is represented by three 128-bit buffers
Kx

= (Xx,X2,X3,X4),

KY

= (Yx,Y2,Y3,Y4), and Kz = (ZX,Z2,Z3,Z4).

The

algorithm is software oriented and is designed to be fast on 32-bit register machines,
such as S U N S P A R C stations. Similar to M D 5 , this algorithm does not require any
large substitution tables (S-boxes).
In this discussion, 7rm?n denotes the m

to the n

binary digits of n, where

TT = 11.001001000011 • • •, in binary. For instance, 7r2,5 = 1001.

3.3.1 Description of the Algorithm
The M A C in this work consists of four steps. Thefirststep is to pad the input
message by the message length, afixedrandom block, part of the key, and a string
of a '1' bit followed by some '0' bits; the second step is to initialise the buffers for the
message chain and the digest chain; the third step is to apply the round function
fi to all the message blocks (32 bits each); and the fourth step is to extract the
message digest from the digest chain. These steps are described in the following
paragraphs. The following three functions are used in this algorithm:
add(X,Y) = (X + Y) mod 232,

rol(X, s) = Rotate left A" by 5 bits,

shr(X,s) = Shift right X by s bits.
Step 1: Adding the Length and Padding Bits
Let T denote the left most 640 binary digits (bits) of TT (T = 7rli640) and L denote the
length of an arbitrary input message M. First, (L © T ) is prepended to the message,
where ' © ' denotes ^-prefix. For example, if X = 0110001011 and Y = 1100110,
then X © Y = 1010111011. This increases the message length by 640 bits. T h e
message is then padded by a single '1' bit followed by enough '0' bits such that the
padded message length (in bits) is a multiple of 32. This padding is at least one bit
and at most 32 bits. Next, the 128-bit key buffer Kz = (Zu Z2, Z3, Z4) is appended
to the padded message. Finally, (L © T) is again appended to the previous result.
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Figure 3.2: Message padding, where L is the length of the message M, T is a fixed
640-bit block, P is a (V followed by enough 'O's, and Kz is part of the secret key.
The notations '\\' and ' © ' are, in turn, concatenation and Q-prefix operations.

Let Mi, 1 < i < n, denote the i™1 block (32 bits) of the final padded message, wher
n (> 45) is the number of blocks. Figure 3.2 shows thefinalpadded message.

Step 2: Initialisation
A 4-word (128-bit) buffer IVX = (Xx,X2,X3,X4),

which is used for keeping the

message digest in the digest chain, is initialised to the 128-bit key Kx-

Another

4-word buffer TVy — (Y\,Y2,YZ,Y4), which is used for keeping the message block in
the message chain, is initialised to the 128-bit key KY. A 16-word (512 bits) buffer
B = (Bi,...,JBi6), which is used for creating message redundancy in the round
function, is initialised to 7T64i,n52Step 3: Processing the Message in 32-bit Blocks
Processing of the message can be described by the following pseudo-code, where T\,
T 2 , and T 3 are temporary variables and '=' denotes an assignment:
for i from 1 to n do

begin
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M
B (0-1) mod
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Figure 3.3: One round of the MAC, where the left chain is the digest chain and the
right chain is the message chain. In every round, one element of the array B will
be added to the message chain to provide message redundancy. This array will be
altered in each round, based on the eight bits of the /,• function output.
Tx = fi(Yx,Y2,Y3,Y4,Mt);
T2 = shr(Tx,16) © Tx;
T3 = rol( add(X4,Tx) , (T2 m o d 32) );
X4 = Xx] Xx = X2; X2 = X3; X3 — T3;

T2 = shr(T2,3);
B(T2 mod 16)+1 = B(T2 mod 16)+1 © Mf,

for j from 1 to 4 do
begin
T2 = shr(T2,2);
Yj = rol( add(Yj,B{{i_x) mod ie)+i) , (T2 m o d 32) );
end
T 3 = Y4; Y4 = Yx; Yt = Y2; Y2 = Y3; Y3 = T3;
end
Step 4: M e s s a g e Digest
The computed message digest is the 4-word (128-bit) output D =

(Xx,X2,X3,X4).

Figure 3.3 illustrates one round (step) of the design. In the design implementation, the above algorithm can be optimised for software efficiency. For instance in
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the last round, when i = n, the following instructions can be omitted:

T2 = shr(T2,Z);
B(T2 mod 16)+1 = Brr2 mod 16)+1 ©

M n]

for j from 1 to 4 do
begin
T2 = shr(T2,2);
Yj = rol(add(Yj,B{(n_x)r*odi6)+i), (T2 m o d 32));
end
T3 = ^V, Y4 = Yx; Yx = Y2; Y2 = Y3; Y3 = T3;
Every hash function uses a chaining method to compress an arbitrary long message to a fixed length checksum. In most cases, such as in M D 5 , the input of the
chaining block is added (XORed) to the result of the same block to increase the
one-wayness. In the design proposed here, such a chaining technique has not been
used, to thwart a key recovery when IVx is initialised to a secret key and a short
message is used. In general, four possibilities for the key buffers Kx-, Ky, and Kz
are suggested:
1. Kx, Ky, and Kz are all secret keys with Kx = Ky = Kz (total key bits =
128).
2. Kx is a fixed and public initial vector, and Ky and Kz are secret keys with
KY = Kz (total key bits = 128).
3. Kx is a fixed and public initial vector, and Ky and Kz are different secret
keys (total key bits = 256).
4. Kx, Ky, and Kz are different secret keys (total key bits 384).

If the second or the third possibility is chosen, the chaining technique, that wa
mentioned above, can be added to the design. For instance, the buffer (Xx,X2,X3,

X4)

can be saved in a temporary m e m o r y to be added (or X O R e d ) to (Xx, X2, X3, X4) after 64 rounds. Again, the result should be saved in a temporary m e m o r y to perform
the same procedure for the remaining message blocks.
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Properties of the Designed M A C

The following is a brief outline of the properties of this design.
• Block size is only 32 bits long. Therefore, the padded string of '1' followed
'O's will be at most 32 bits (low overhead).
• Length of the message M is added to the two ends to thwart possible attacks.
Prepending the length (L) to the message, in particular, thwarts padding
attack.
• Rotations are variable. They depend on the result of /,- functions.

• /,• functions, themselves, have properties that are very important in this des
(especially the nonlinearity).
• Each message block Mt- is used several times in the process, to make redundancy. The desirable advantage is the addition of Mi to an unknown step
(depending on the result of /,• functions).
• The digest chain does not have a direct (linear) connection to the message
chain. Therefore, the adversary cannot control the contents of the digest chain
by choosing or changing the message.

• Different possibilities for the key length are available (128, 256, or 384 bits
• The structure can be easily extended to 64-bit register machines, and/or it
can be changed to produce 160-bit message digests. In the former case, each
block should be 64 bits, instead of 32 bits. In the latter case, a new path (line)
should be added to the digest chain — ie.

(Xx,X2,X3,X4,X5).

• The 640-bit block added to the beginning and the end of the message thwarts
attacks such as correcting block attack, even for the key holders. In particular,
the prefix removes any specific format or structure that the secret key values,
Kx and Ky, might have. The suffix makes sure that the last message blocks
are used more than once in the evaluation of the digest. It needs at least 16
extra rounds to use all elements of the buffer B which holds the last message

blocks.
• The M A C is very fast (cf. Section 3.3.3).
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File

T i m e (seconds)

Size (bytes)

KHF

MD5

10
1,000
10,000
50,000
100,000
500,000
1,000,000
5,000,000
10,000,000

0.100
0.100
0.100
0.100
0.129
0.428
0.802
3.624
7.026

0.100
0.100
0.100
0.104
0.205
0.700
1.311
6.535
12.998
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Rate
TMDS/TKHF

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.04
1.59
1.64
1.64
1.80
1.85

Table 3.1: Comparison between the proposed MAC and MD5, where different file
sizes are examined. Each entry is tested 100 times to get the average execution time.
The result shows that KHF is faster than MD5 when the Hie is large. The inclusion
of the fixed prefix and suffix (L © T) makes the algorithm almost the same as MD5
when the file is very short. In this test, the source codes were written in C and ha
been executed on a SUN SPARC station.

3.3.3 Implementation of the Proposed MAC
The author has implemented this M A C in C language. In the implementation, it
has been tried to perform some code optimisation so that it can be compared with
other implementations. Appendix A provides the complete listing of this code.
To test the performance of the design, both the proposed design and M D 5 have
been examined against several inputfilesand the run time has been recorded for
each case. This performance comparison is summarised in Table 3.1. The source
code for M D 5 was obtained from the original paper of M D 5 [104]. Both the designed
and M D 5 coded were compiled with cc compiler on U N I X , using -04 option.

3.3.4 Security Analysis of the MAC
The basic property of a hash function, or compression function in general, is its
random behaviour. A hash function should uniformly distribute the message digest
in the message digest space, for randomly chosen inputs. This property has been
tested in different ways.
1. It has been shown that, if a user randomly choose a message M and then form
another message M' by flipping a randomly chosen bit of M, the difference
between the corresponding digests D and D', which is shown by D © D', has,
on average, the same number of zeros and ones. In other words, flipping one
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bit of a randomly chosen message results in a completely different message
digest, on average.

2. Similarly, one bit change in the secret key results in a completely different
message digest. In other words, if K and K' differ only in one bit, the difference
between the corresponding digests, D © D', has almost the same number of
zero and one bits, for a randomly chosen message.

Assuming the above basic properties and the properties in Section 3.3.2, differe
possible attacks are thwarted as follows.
• Because of a 128-bit message digest, it is secure against birthday attack and
meet in the middle attack.
• The key length of at least 128 bits thwarts exhaustive key search.
• Padding attack is thwarted by prepending the message length to the message.
• XORing the message block to the message chaining variable (Xx,X2,X3,X4)
of an unknown round provides redundancy in the message block and thwart
correcting block attack.
• /,• functions provide high nonlinear relationship between the message and the
message digest. Therefore, linear cryptanalysis is unsuccessful.
It should be noted that, attacks depending on the algorithm are even less successful for the outsiders who do not know the key. In this case, the intermediate
values of the process are unknown. This prevents the enemy to analyse the components of the algorithm. While Definition 2.5 does not require any protection against
the key holders, the design proposed here provides some level of protection not to
trivially find collisions.

3.4 Summary

In this chapter, practical constructions of MACs, which tend to be computational
secure, were studied. In Section 3.2, several methods of keying a hash function, to
construct a M A C , were mentioned. The focus was on Tsudik's proposals and was
shown that his schemes could be improved by reducing the key length and modifying
the way the secret key was added to the algorithm.
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In Section 3.3, a new design for a M A C was proposed which was not dependent
on any other cryptographic algorithm. Only a set of highly non-linear boolean
functions was used and the M A C was built-up on those functions. The security
of the proposed scheme and its advantages were described. The practical results
showed that the design proposed in this work is about twice as fast as M D 5 .

Chapter 4
Design of Unconditionally Secure M A C s
In this chapter, MAC constructions using unconditional security approach are studied. A pioneering work in this area is a construction of W e g m a n and Carter [128]
which provides a framework for M A C constructions, using universal classes of hash
functions. Their work has led to the development of numerous M A C s which have
motivated this work.
Parts of this chapter appeared in a preliminary form in the Proceedings of Australian Conference on Information Security and Privacy (ACISP), 1997 (cf. [11]).

4.1 Introduction
As mentioned in the previous chapters, MACs with computational security are usually constructed from the existing hash functions by using some secret key information as part of their input. Security evaluation of such constructions relies on
examining computational complexity of various attacks on the system and designing parameters of the system to exceed the computational resources of the enemy.
However such assessment is always subject to revision with the invention of new
attacks.
Unconditionally secure M A C systems are especially important because they result in efficient authentication systems with provable properties. Security of a M A C
system in this approach is the best chance of an active spoofer to successfully construct a fraudulent message-tag pair which is acceptable to the receiver, without
assuming any limit on the computational resources of the enemy.
T w o n e w M A C s are proposed in this chapter. They are based on Wegman-Carter
construction described in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5). In Sections 4.3 and 4.4, two eAU2 hash function families are constructed which are based on Latin Squares and
M R D codes, respectively. Their advantages, in terms of the key size, speed, and the
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simplicity of their operation, are shown and then Corollary 2.9 and Theorem 2.6 are
used for constructing the corresponding M A C s which retain the desirable properties
of the underlying e-AU2 families. T h e constructed M A C s are comparable with the
previously defined M A C s .
T h e next section presents some examples of M A C constructions using W e g m a n Carter approach. However, there are numerous other constructions that are not
considered in this chapter. T h e reader is referred to the provided references for
more details.

4.2 Previously Proposed Wegman-Carter based
MAC Constructions
In Chapter 2, it was explained how to construct an e-secure MAC from an c-AXU2
or an t-AU2 hash function family, using the Wegman-Carter proposal. Some previously proposed t-AXU2 and e-AU2 families are described in this section. They have
motivated the proposed designs which are described in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
One of the simplest e-AXU2 families is as follows. Let M
n x m binary matrices. Define KM

be the class of all

= {h>M'•S m -» E n } , where every hM

£

HM

corresponds to a unique M € M, and has the following description.

Vx€Em, hM(x) = M-x,
where '-'is matrix multiplication and x is an m x 1 matrix corresponding to an mbit binary string. It is not difficult to show that UM is 2~n-AXU2

(cf. [107]). T h e

hashing rate, which is the ratio of message compression, is m/n and directly depends
on the message block length, m , and the security parameter, e = 2~ n . Assuming
a fixed and reasonably small security parameter, m should be increased to increase
the hashing rate. This will, in turn, increase the key length by a factor of n.
There are numerous proposals that aim to optimise the key length, hashing
rate, and/or the computational complexity (speed of processing one message block)
of hash function families. For example, consider an e-AXU2 family, proposed by
Krawczyk [78], which is based on polynomials over binary Galois Field, GF(2). Let
UK

= {hK '• £ m ->• S n } , and X be a formal variable in the polynomials. To each

irreducible polynomial K(X)
hn € HK-

of degree n over GF(2), associate a hash function

For a message x £ Yi"1, let P(X) denote a binary polynomial whose
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coefficients are given by the sequence of bits in x. Define hx(x) to be the n-tuple
obtained from the binary coefficients of P(X)Xn
that WK,

defined as above, is

A comparison between %M

m o d K(X).

Krawczyk showed

1
2^-AXU2.

and %K

indicates that while the security parameters

in both classes are almost the same, the key length is significantly reduced in %KHowever, HM

is based on simple matrix multiplication while HK

needs modular

division on polynomials. It should be noted that binary matrix multiplication is
a specific case of modular multiplication of polynomials over GF(2) and can be
efficiently implemented (bitwise X O R ) .
Krawczyk proposed another e-AXU2 family, called HT,

which was based on

Toeplitz matrices. In Toeplitz matrices, each row can be constructed from the previous row and the first element of the current row. That is, the second element of
the current row is equal to thefirstelement of the previous row; the third element
of the current row is equal to the second element of the previous row; and so on.
Therefore, a Toeplitz matrix can be represented by itsfirstrow and column, and
can be obtained from a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR), by using the first
column and thefirstrow of the matrix as its input (refer to [78] for more details).
Similar to %M,

this matrix should be multiplied to the given message to calculate

its hash value. The security parameter for this class is ^ r which is almost the
same as that of the previous designs. The key length is (m - n — 1) bits which is
bigger than that of HK,

but less than that of HM-

However, HT

can be efficiently

implemented, especially in hardware.
For thefinalexample, Rogaway's bucket hashing [107], which has been claimed to
be nearly three times faster than M D 5 , is considered. Assume a fixed word size of w
= {hB : Y,mw -» E ™ } ,

(> 1) bits. For m>n,

where n(n-l)(n-2) > 6m, define %B

where each hB G HB

is specified by a length m list of entries, where each entry

consists of three integers between zero and (n — 1). That is, hB = (h0,... ,hm-x),
where hi = (h\,h},h2-). For a given message x = x0xi...xm-i € S m w , calculate
V = VoVi • • • Vn-i G S n w as follows.
for i from 0 to n — 1 do
begin
Vi = 0;
.

end
for j from 0 to m — 1 do
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begin
for k from 1 to 3 do
begin
Vh) = (yfcj©»i);
end
end
The resulting yoyx... yn-i bit string represents the hash value. That is, hB(x)
y. Rogaway showed that HB is e-AU2 with,
_ 720(n - 3)(n - 4)(n - 5) + 1944(n - 3)(n - 4)2 + 648(n - 2)(n - 3)2 + 36n(n - l)(n - 2)
a-n(n-6lT(n-2))"3("-l)3("-2)3
and e does not depend on the value of the word size w. From the above equation
it is obvious that m has a small role in the expression for the security parameter
e, and hence, changing m will not significantly change t. For instance when n is
160, e is close to 2 - 3 2 for almost all possible m's (cf. [107, Section 3.2]). The main
advantage of the bucket hashing is its fast operation on large message blocks. It
should be noted that in the above example, n = 160 results in a practical solution,
because e = 2 - 3 2 is accepted as a suitable security parameter for M A C constructions.
However, nw could be quite large when w is not close to 1. In practice, a 32-bit
register machine could be used, in which w = 32 will be a good choice to maximise
the machine performance. But w = 32 results in nw = 160 x 32 = 5120 bits hash
value which is not acceptable. Bucket hashing needs further hashing to reduce the
hash value to an acceptable length, say 64 bits.
The main disadvantage of bucket hashing is its huge key length which approximately equals 3mlog 2 n bits [73]. For example, if m = 1024 and n = 100, then one
should supply a key of more than 20000 bits, which is too large.
Rogaway suggested using pseudo-random number generators to calculate such
a long key. Johansson [73] proposed some modifications to bucket hashing, by
modifying and using some known families of hash functions, to effectively reduce the
required key length. The main result of this work is a hash function family which
has a small key size of a few hundred bits, compared to the hundred thousands key
bits in the bucket hashing.
In the next two sections, two other constructions which are comparable with the
above interesting constructions are proposed.
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A M A C Construction based on Latin Squares

In this section, a well-known combinatorial design, called Latin Squares, is used
for constructing a M A C . This design has been motivated by the previous works of
Denes and Keedwell [44], Krawczyk [78, 79], Rogaway [107J, and Shoup [112]. In this
design, Rogaway's representation of M A C constructions and Denes and Keedwell's
Latin square based quasi-group are used.

4.3.1 Background on Latin Squares
A Latin square of order q is a q X q matrix whose elements are g-ary numbers
{1,..., q] and each element occurs exactly once in each row and each column. A n
example of a Latin square of order 4 is give below.
"1 2 3 4 "
2 3 4 1
3 4
4

1 2

1 2
3

Properties of Latin squares are extensively studied by several authors [32, 42, 43].
A n interesting property of Latin squares is that they can be represented by their
critical sets [30, 33, 34, 36]. A critical set of a Latin square has less than q x q
elements and can uniquely determine the Latin square. Removing an element of a
critical set should destroy such property, and so, they have least information one
needs to represent a Latin square. Denote by {(h,jx\ kx),..., (it,jt\ h)} a critical set
(with t elements) of a Latin square, where (ix,jx; K), the ar11 element of the critical
set, indicates that kx is the element of the Latin square in row ix and column jx.
A minimal critical set is a critical set with m i n i m u m cardinality (number of known
elements). For instance for the following Latin square,
"12
2 3

3"
1 ,

_ 3 1 2 _
one of the minimal critical sets is,
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which can be represented by {(1,2; 2), (2,3; 1)}.
There has been some research towards finding lower and upper bounds for the
cardinality of Latin square critical sets. Let scs(q) denote the cardinality of the
smallest critical set in Latin squares of order q.
T h e o r e m 4.1 [125] q+ 1 < scs(q) < [£], for q > 5.
In the above theorem, [x\ denotes the largest integer value which is smaller than
x. It is noticeable that there is a big gap between the lower and upper bounds.

4.3.2 Towards Constructing an e-AU^ Family
In this section, a hash function family H based on Latin squares is proposed. This
family is used for constructing an efficient M A C . It is conjectured that this family
is an e-AU2 family and some justifications for this claim are provided.
Let q, which represents the order of Latin squares, be a power of two. For a
given Latin square LS of order q, such as:

n,i
LS =

• • h,q
•

l

•

i

?,i

b = q/2 variants of LS, called LS1 to LSh, are required to define an element of t
family H. LS1 to LSh are derived from LS by applying, in order, row/column/label
permutations on elements of LS. Hence, LS and LS1 to LSh fall into the same
isotopy class [42]. A n isotopy class of Latin squares is a collection of Latin squares
in which every element can be mapped to another element, by performing a number
of row, column, and/or label permutations (cf Appendix C).
This construction does not need to be restricted to an isotopy class. Nevertheless,
it is desirable to select the squares from an structured class which has a fast element
retrieval — especially for the random selection.
Denote by /* the element of LSk in row r and column c. LS1 to LSb should
satisfy the followingfirstproperty.
Property 1 l\fi ± l{c, V I < i,j < b, V I < r,c < q, i ^ jFor a given LS and its variants, define the sets ST}C = {ll<c,..., lhriC}, for 1 < r, c <

q. N o w define Tr,c = {Sr>,c> : Sr>,c> = Sr,c, 1 < r', d < q}, for 1 < r, c < q. I
apparent that 5r>c € TT,C and \%,c\ > 1. A second property which follows, is required.
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Property 2 max riC \Tr,c\, 1 < r, c < q, should be minimised.
Let tr|C = maxr(C|7^,c|, 1 < r,c < q. The second property indicates that from
the collection of all Latin squares and their variants, the ones which result in small
trtcS, for all possible values of 1 < r,c < q, should be selected. It is not known
how many elements satisfy the above property when q = 8,16, • • •. However, the
minimum value satisfies a lower bound.
«r
L e m m a 4.2 In the above scenario, tTiC, 1 < r, c < q, is lower bounded by -fr\.
Proof: Since Z*c, k = 1,... ,6 are g-ary numbers, there exists at most (£) = b,(
distinct STtC sets. In other words, there exists some 1 < r,r',c,c' < q such that
ST,C = Sr^c1, where r =fi r' and/or c ^ c'.
To find a lower bound on tryC, consider the case in which the same Sr<c sets are
equally distributed in %>c sets. There exist some equal TTfi sets which are redundant.
For example, if 5V,C = S V v , then Tr,c = %',c'.
Because there exists exactly q2, ST,C sets corresponding to all the possible r and c
values, and also because only (b) of them are distinct, the m a x i m u m size of %iC sets
2

will be minimised if each %,c set has exactly -frr elements. This proves the lemma.
U

D

The above two properties are required when an element of H is defined, corresponding to LS and LS1 to LSb. It is noticed that LS and its variants have a much

more compact representation. Suppose Kx = {(ix,ji', &i), • • •, (it, Jt] &t)} is a critical
set of LS (preferably a minimal one). Based on Theorem 4.1, between 3(g+1) log2 q
and 3[g2/4j log2 q bits are needed to represent K\. Let K2 be the row/column/label
permutation information needed to derive LS1 to LSb from LS. K2 has 3q\og2q
bits. (Kx,K2) will uniquely determine the Latin square and all its variants, and
requires between 3(2<? + 1) log2 q and 3(q + [g2/4j) log2 q bits'. Obviously, (Kx, K2)
is much shorter than LS and LS1 to LSb which have a ((6 + l)g2log2g)-bit representation. It should be noted that even if LS and its variants are represented by
their critical sets, between 3(6 + l)(q + 1) log2 q and 3(6 + 1) [g2/4j log2 q bits would
be needed to represent them, and this is still larger than (A'I, A^).
The hash function family is defined as follows. Let m

= q2 log2 q and n =

q log2 q, where q is a power of two, as defined earlier. Define H

= {h : E m —>

E n } , where every h € % corresponds to a unique pair (Kx,K2), which in turn
represents a Latin square and its variants. It should be noted that since the number
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of Latin squares exponentially increases when q increases, they might be restricted to
a smaller collection such as Isotopy or Isomorphism classes of Latin squares (cf. [42]).
For a given message M G S m ,
mi.i • • • mi,,
M=

:

;

:

,

_ m,,! • • • m,,, _
where each m,j (1 < i,j < q) is a g-ary number, calculate the hash value D € E n ,
a string of q, q-ary numbers [dx- - • dq], as follows.
First initialise D to all one elements (d,- = 1, i = 1,... ,q). Add each message
element mtJ- to 6 elements of D at positions Z* •,..., lbj, based of L5*. That is:
djk = mi j -k djk , k = 1,..., b,

where '=' denotes assignment and '*' is an operator which takes two opera
and o2 (q-ary numbers) and results in l0l,o2 — this is the element of LS in row Oi and
column o2. The pseudo-code for this hashing scheme can be described as follows.
for k from 1 to q do
begin
dk = l;
end
for i from 1 to q do
begin
for j from 1 to q do
begin
for k from 1 to 6 do
begin
dik = m,- ,• -k dik ;

end
end
end

The checksum will be D = [dx,... ,dq], which is n = q\og2 q bits. This sch
has been implemented in C + + language. Appendix B includes the source code and
a sample run of the program.
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In the above pseudo-code, (m^-kd^ .) is the element of LS in row mtj and column
dtk , and dtk. itself is the value of digest D in position Zfj G LSk. The V operation
on q-ary numbers results in a quasi-group Q that can be easily implemented in
computers (table look-up) [44].
Theorem 4.3 [44] ifa*x = y and b*x = y, then a = b.

This method is claimed to be a good option for practical message authentication.
Conjecture 4.4 % defined as above is e-AU2 with c = , _})b+1 •
The above conjecture is motivated from the results of exhaustive testing of the
scheme for small values of q, namely for q = 4. It was not possible to experiment
with q = 8,16, • • •, because of the huge hash function space —

even when they

are restricted to smaller groups of Latin squares (eg. isotopy class). The results
are briefly discussed below together with some justifications for the conjecture. To
justify the claim, it is required to show that,
\{h 6 H = h(M) = M M ' ) } |

\H\

1

~ (?-l) 6+I '

f

'

The crucial factor in the above equation is the size of H. Because elements of H
are not specified for large q's, it is not possible to practically search for the colliding
messages. Nevertheless, there are some known facts which follow.
Lemma 4.5 If two messages M and M' differ in only one q-ary element, then
h(M) ^ h(M'), for all heH.
Proof: Suppose that the different elements are in row i and column j of M and M'.
That is, m,j = m'—. It is known that those two elements will be mapped into digest
positions l\-,..., lbj. Based on Theorem 4.3, the hash value for M and M' will have
different elements in positions l}j,..., Z£ •.

d

The above l e m m a indicates that no matter what the size of % is, the probability
of collision for messages that differ in one element is zero. This result supports the
conjecture.
For messages that differ in more than one element, a formal proof could not be
provided. The number of elements of % when q > 8 are not known, simply because
the number of Latin squares of order q is very large and it is infeasible to test all Latin
square sets that satisfy the two given properties. Extensive experiments on Ti have
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been done, using different sets of properties — not only the two properties included
here. A m o n g them, Properties 1 and 2 were found as the best ones which most
coincide with the proposed claim. Appendix C reviews some of these experimental
results.
To achieve a class of independent hash functions, it might also be considered to
select different elements of H. from different isotopy classes of Latin squares. This
might reduce the collision probability due to the fact that there will be more irregularities among the elements of H — one element cannot be permuted to generate
another one. This possibility has not been fully explored here, however.
In [44], Denes and Keedwell proposed an authentication scheme based on Latin
squares. Their scheme generates an n-tuple tag of q-ary elements for a given m-tuple
message and can be described as follows.
Let two communicants, A and B, collaborate in choosing a Latin square of order
q as their shared key. To authenticate an m-tuple message M

= (Mi,...,M m ),

where M,- is a q-ary element,fori = 1,..., m , divide the message into n blocks, each
of length t, for some positive integer t. Assume that m is always a multiple of n. If
m is not a multiple of n, the scheme can be modified so that the last block contains
less than t elements (cf. [44]). For each block i, represented by (M tl , M8-2,..., Mit),
calculate:
d{ = (••- ((M{l * Mi2) * Mi3) * • • • ) * Mit,
where V is the same as the quasi-group operator introduced earlier in this section.
The resulting n-tuple D - (dx,..., dn) will represent a tag for M. Hence, (M, D) is
considered as an authenticated message.
Dawson et al. [39] showed that under certain circumstances an intruder may
recover the key (Latin square) and as a result, forge a fraudulent message. This
attack requires the intruder to know about the method used for determining the
message blocks. That is, an intruder should be able to divide the message into n
blocks, and then try to identify the hash value elements corresponding to a given
block.
Denes and Keedwell's scheme seems to be the only other message authentication
scheme using Latin squares. The proposed system here, although based on Latin
squares, is completely different from their work. In the next section, it is shown how
to use the above hash function family to construct a secure M A C .
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4.3.3 An Example
In this sub-section, an example of the proposed hashing scheme is provided. In this
example, q = 8, 6 = 4, and the following Latin square is considered.

LS =

1 7 3
2 5 4
3 8 1
4 6 2
7 1 8
8 3 7
5 2 6
6 4 5

8 5 6 4
6 7 8 3
7 6 5 2
5 8 7 1
3 4 2 5
1 2 4 6
4 3 1 7
2 1 3 8

2
1
4
3
6
5
8
7

Four variants of LS are constructed by permuting rows only:

7 1 8 3 4 2 5 6
5 2 6 4 3 1 7 8
1 7 3 8 5 6 4 2
LSX =

LS3 =

3 8 1 7 6 5 2 4

8 3 7 1 2 4 6 5
4 6 2 5 8 7 1 3
5 2 6 4 3 1 7 8
LS2 =

1 7 3 8 5 6 4 2

8 3 7 1 2 4 6 5

7 1 8 3 4 2 5 6

6 4 5 2 1 3 8 7
2 5 4 6 7 8 3 1
4 6 2 5 8 7 1 3

3 8 1 7 6 5 2 4
6 4 5 2 1 3 8 7
^2 5 4 6 7 8 3 1

1 7 3 8 5 6 4 2 "
3 8 1 7 6 5 2 4
7 1 8 3 4 2 5 6

'4 6 2 5 8 7 1 3

5 2 6 4 3 1 7 8

2 5 4 6 7 8 3 1
6 4 5 2 1 3 8 7
L54 =

8 3 7 1 2 4 6 5

2 5 4 6 7 8 3 1

3 8 1 7 6 5 2 4

4 6 2 5 8 7 1 3
8 3 7 1 2 4 6 5
6 4 5 2 1 3 8 7

1 7 3 8 5 6 4 2
5 2 6 4 3 1 7 8
7 1 8 3 4 2 5 6
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LS can be represented by the following critical set,
1

—

—

8

—

6

—

2

-

4

-

7

-

-

4
- - 2 5 - - 1 3
- - - 3 - - 5 6
8 - 7 - 2 - - 5

_

CS =

8

-. -_ -_ -_ -_

-45--3-7
which has 24 elements and can be written as,
{(1,1; 1), (1,4; 8), (1,6; 6), (2,1; 2), (2,3; 4), (2,5; 7), (3,2; 8), (3,8; 4),
(4,3; 2), (4,4; 5), (4,7; 1), (4,8; 3), (5,4; 3), (5,7; 5), (5,8; 6), (6,1; 8),
(6,3; 7), (6,5; 2), (6,8; 5), (7,6; 1), (8,2; 4), (8,3; 5), (8,6; 3), (8,8; 7)},
It should be noted that CS is not a minimal critical set. Four row permutations
corresponding to LS1 to LS4 are:
RP1 = [57136824],
RP2 = [64715382],
RP3 = [13572468],
RP4 = [42863175].
For instance, the first element of RP1 indicates that thefirstrow of LS1 is equal
to the first row of LS; the second element of RP1 indicates that the second row of
LS1 is equal to the seventh row of LS; and so on.
Assume that the following message is given.
3 2 5 4 12

16

7 8 4 5 2 3 3 1
4 8 6 7 5 4 3 2
14

5 7 8 6 6 6

M =
7 12

8 7 3 4 5

7 8 1 1 8

2 6 5

3 4 8 12

3 7 6

2 4 5 3 3 6 8 7
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The digest D is set to [11111111] and the hashing scheme given in Section 4.3.2
is used for calculating the digest for the above given message. The corresponding
hash value will be [17 544581]. The 64 steps in Table 4.1 show the intermediate
results, where the last result is the hash value. For example, from step 16 to step
17, m 3i i = 4 is applied to digest positions 1, 5, 6, and 7 which are elements of LS1
to LSb in row 3 and column 1, respectively. The results for each case is Z4i4 = 5,
Z4,4 = 5, Z4)6 = 7, and Z4)2 = 6, respectively.

4.3.4 Defining a New MAC
As mentioned before, Stinson proved that in the Wegman-Carter M A C construction,
composition of hash functions can be effectively used for replacing construction of
e-ASU2, and similarly e-AXU2, by e-AU2 hash functions (cf. Theorem 2.8 and Corollary 2.9 in Chapter 2). The main advantage of this result is that for computationally
efficient hashing only efficient e-AU2 classes must be constructed.
Let % be the e-AU2 hash function family defined in the previous sub-section
(4.3.2). Based on Corollary 2.9, an existing, and not necessarily efficient, e'-AXU2
family is needed to construct an (e + e')-secure M A C . Suppose that an r-bit M A C
value is safe for the current computing technology, and n > r. A n e'-AXU2 family
is needed that maps n-bit strings to r-bit strings. As an example, HK

= {h>K '•

S n —>• E r } , which was defined in Section 4.2, can be used, where n = qlog2q and
r is a desirable digest length (eg. 60 bits). It was shown that HK
e1 = |F=T- N O W based on Corollary 2.9, Hnew = HOHK

is e'-AXU2 with

is (e + e')-AXU2, and hence,

Wegman-Carter construction results in an (7—JTE+T + 2^zr)-secure M A C .
It should be noted that %new and HK

are both almost X O R universal families,

but Tinew is more efficient, because % is efficient. Applying %K
be time consuming due to the modular division required in HK-

to m-bit strings will

In contrast, applying

H to m-bit strings only needs table look-up and can be efficiently implemented.
Then, HK

only needs to be applied to n-bit strings (result of W) which can be as

short as 64 bits.

4.3.5 Implementation
In the above construction, the security, e, directly depends on q, the order of Latin
squares, and 6, the number of LS variants. M a n y different choices for q and 6 result
in gaining the required security needed for a M A C . For instance, if q = 16 and
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dx d2
3 1
4 1
4 7
5 7
5 4
5 6
5 6
5 4
5 4
5 2
8 6
8 6
8 6
4 6
7 5
4 5
5 5
1 1
1 1
1 5
7 5
1 8
1 8
1 1
1 1
1 4
7 4
7 4
7 2
6 2
6 3
6 7
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d3 (Z4

<z5

1 3
2 3
1 3
4 3
4 3
4 4
4 8
1 8
5 8
5 8
5 3
5 8
7 8
7 8
2 8
7 2
7 2
7 4
6 4
1 4
7 3
1 3
1 1
1 1
1 1
4 1
3 1
3 5
5 5
5 2
5 3
5 7

1
1
1
4
8
8
2
3
6
3
3
8
8
4
4
4
5
5
2
2
1
1
3
3
3
3
3
3
5
2
2
3

^6

<ZT

1 3
2 4
2 3
2 3
2 3
5 4
5 4
2 4
2 4
4 4
5 4
4 3
6 4
6 7
6 2
6 2
7 6
7 3
6 3
6 3
6 3
7 3
7 1
3 2
3 2
3 6
8 2
8 2
7 2
6 2
4 3
4 3

4
3
3
8
3
3
3
3
3
3
5
5
5
7
2
2
7
7
7
6
1
1
1
3
4
8
3
3
6
6
6
6
4

Step

di

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

6
6
8
7
7
7
7
5
3
3
3
3
5
5
2
2
2
2
2
7
3
1
1
8
8
3
3
3
1
1
6
1

<fe
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4

7 3
7 3
7 3
7 5
7 5
2 5
6 8
6 8
6 8
6 8
6 2
6 2
6 2
6 5
4 5
3 4
1 4
4 5
4 5
8 5
1 7
1 2
1 2
1 2
2 2
2 2
1 2
3 8
3 8
7 5
7 1
7 5

d4
7
7
3
3
6
5
5
4
4
2
2
2
2
2
3
8
8
3
5
5
5
6
6
6
8
3
8
8
4
4
4
4

<*s
3
3
3
3
3
1
4
3
3
3
3
3
5
7
7
7
2
6
3
3
3
3
3
7
7
1
7
2
2
2
4
4

£?6 dr d8 Step

4 6 4
4 6 8
4 8 1
2 7 1
2 7 1
2 7 3
6 7 3
2 7 3
2 7 3
4 8 5
4 8 5
4 2 5
2 2 1
5 5 1
5 5 8
5 4 8
6 4 4
6 4 4
3 2 4
3 2 4
3 5 4
3 5 7
6 3 7
6 7 6
8 3 6
3 3 6
3 3 2
1 3 2
1 1 8
1 8 5
1 8 1
5 8 1

33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

Table 4.1: The 64 steps of the LS hashing example, di represents the digest value
in position i. The last value set [17544581] (in step 64) is the hash value.
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6 = 8, then %new

will be 2

36

-AXU2

63

which is considered as a good choice for the

current technology. (Note that e + e' = ^

^

+ $&

if q = 32 and 6 = 10, then Unew will be 2-™-AXU2

= ^ + p

~ 2"36.) Similarly,

which is very secure, yet needs

a larger key.
Another important factor is the hashing rate which measures the level of message
block compression. The rate of hashing in % is q which is very high when q > 4.
It precisely equals the order of Latin squares, q, and increases when the order does.
For instance, if the order of Latin squares is chosen to be 16, the length of the hash
value will be 16 times shorter than the message length.
The key in this design consists of a bit string for the one-time-pad encryption
algorithm, a Latin square critical set, some Latin square row/column/label permutation information, and also a key to represent an instance of H!. In practice, a secure
pseudo-random bit generator might be used for providing a long key bit string —
particularly for the one-time-pad.
Comparing the proposed system with other designs such as bucket hashing [107],
which was described in Section 4.2, in this design the key length is smaller and
meanwhile the hashing rate and the security are higher. It should be noted that
the message length, key, and security parameter of the proposed scheme all directly
depend on q and because q is chosen to be a power of two, these parameters are not in
a continuous range. The only suitable values for q are 16 and 32. A bucket hashing
that maps 1024-bit messages to 140-bit digests has a security parameter nearly equal
to 2 31 , which is worse than that of the proposed scheme here when q = 16. The
hashing rate in this bucket hashing is about 7, which is even less than half of the
proposed scheme's rate, 16. Also, the system proposed here does not require any
complex computations and, similar to the bucket hashing, only needs table look-up
and memory manipulations, load and store. However, the proposed scheme needs
a much smaller table look-up (key) which results in a faster implementation when
same security is obtained.
Similar to other proposals, this design provides only one-block hashing. To hash
arbitrary length messages, the Wegman-Carter chaining method [128] can be used
before encrypting the digest by one-time-pad (cf. Section 2.2 in Chapter 2).
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Construction of a M A C based on M R D Codes

This section introduces another new class of e-AU2 hash functions, inspired by t
M R D codes, and demonstrates its efficiency in terms of the key size, and ease and
speed of the hashing process. This scheme is an example of evaluation hashing of
Shoup [112], but has the added property that polynomial evaluation over GF(2n) can
be replaced by matrix multiplication over GF(2), which results in faster software
implementation. Although this scheme has a small hashing rate of 2, it enjoys
important properties such as small key size, flexibility in the block size of the hashed
messages, and application to secure group authentication, which makes it a good
choice in some applications.
The theory of M R D hashing for constructing M A C s was mainly developed by
Safavi-Naini [109]. Section 4.4.1 shows the development of the background on M R D
hashing. The original works [54, 72] were used and added to by Safavi-Naini and
then used and further developed by the researcher of this work. In particular, the
structure of the C matrix and its properties were proposed and analysed by SafaviNaini. Nevertheless, the researcher, in the joint work with Safavi-Naini [109], has
implemented the codes to verify some of the claims. Also, the complementary property of the C matrix was discovered by the researcher and resulted in L e m m a s 4.6
and 4.8. The reader is referred to [109] for more information on M R D hashing.

4.4.1 Background on MRD Codes and Finite Fields
Maximum

Rank Distance (MRD) codes were introduced in [54] and used by Chen [29]

for identification and by Johansson [72] for arbitrated authentication. Although the
M A C system proposed here is inspired by M R D codes, an independent presentation
will be given below because no result from the theory of such codes are directly
used. Throughout the section, basic knowledge offinitefieldsis assumed. Some
of the important definitions are given below. The reader is referred to [80] for an
excellent introduction to finite fields.
Consider Fn, a finite field with 2n elements. The binary case is considered
here, although most of the results hold for a general q-aryfield.Thefieldis an ndimensional vector space over F = GF(2). It can be constructed using an irreducible
polynomial, f(x), of degree n. Let a denote a root of f(x). Then 1, a, a2 • • • an~l
forms a basis of Fn. A n element of Fn is a primitive element, if its powers generate
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all non-zero elements of Fn.
Elements of Fn are partitioned into conjugate groups. The conjugate group
corresponding to an element /3 consists of /?, (31, • • •, /?2"-1.

If the elements of a

conjugate group are linearly independent, then they form a basis for Fn. A normal
basis is a basis of the form /?, (d2" • • • /?2"-1 and everyfieldhas at least one normal
basis.
Let ij> denote an element of afinitefieldFn. The minimum polynomial of ip is an
irreducible polynomial f(x) over Fn such that /(V>) = 0 and any other polynomial
g(x) with g(ip) = 0 has f(x) as a factor. It can be shown that every element of
the field has a unique minimum polynomial and all the conjugate elements have the
same minimum polynomial.
A polynomial of the form L(x) = Y%-i QiX2' with a{ e Fn is called a linearised
polynomial over GF(2).

If a{ € GF(2), the polynomial is called a 2-polynomial.

Linearised polynomials satisfy the following two properties.

L(a + /?) = L(a) + L(/?), Va,/3€Fn;
L(ca) = cL(a), V a , € Fn, V c € GF(2).
It should be noted that '©' may be used later in this chapter instead of the
addition '+', defined above. The ordinary product of linearised polynomials is not a
linearised polynomial. Symbolic multiplication of two polynomials Lx(x) and L2(x)
is defined by
Lx(x)®L2(x)

= Lx(L2(x)),

and produces a linearised polynomial.
Let ip € Fn and f(x) denote its minimum polynomial. The minimum linearised
polynomial of t/> is a linearised polynomial L(x) such that f(x) is a factor of L(x)
and any other linearised polynomial for which Zq(i/>) = 0 can be written as Lx(x) =
L2(x) <g> L(x). It can be shown that L(x) is unique.
Consider Fn = GF(2n). Although the results are general, only prime values for

n are considered here. Let §_= ((dx, /32,..., /3n) = ({3,(32 • • • /?2"~ ) denote a norma
basis for Fn. A n element x G Fn is an n-tuple x = (xx,..., xn), where x,- € F, for i =
1,..., n. In the rest of this chapter, all references to linearised polynomials should be
understood as 2-polynomials. For a linearised polynomial L(x) consider the n-tuple
(L(/3x), L((32),... L((3n)). It is noted that each component of this vector is an element
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of F„ and so can be written as a binary n-tuple. Hence a linearised polynomial L(x)
defines a mapping fL, fL:Fn-+

Fn, given by fL(u) = CL.u = v, where CL denotes

the matrix representation of fL, '.' is matrix multiplication and u,v G Fn are n x 1
binary vectors. Let u = (Ul,...,un) G Fn. Then fL(u) = £ ? = 1 utL(/32,_1), which
because of the linearity of L(x) reduces to £(E£=i Ui/32"1), which is the value of
L(x) at u.§_ = E L i Wt/?2"1 € Fn. Hence evaluating / L for u G Fn is equivalent to
finding the value of L(x) at u.^, where u andfi_are n-dimensional row and column
vectors, respectively.
Consider a matrix C whose rows are labelled by fl, columns are labelled by the
elements of Fn, and the element in row fi and a column a is equal to /L(O:). That
is, C(fi,,a) = fL(ct), ex G Fn. Let Vn denote the n-dimensional vector space over
GF(2). For a mapping / : Vn ->• Vn the null space, A//, is the collection of vectors
v G Vn such that f(v) = 0. For a linear mapping, it can be shown that A// is a
subspace of Vn.

Linearised Minimal Polynomials
Suppose that a G Fn is the root of an irreducible polynomial f(x).

To find the

minimum linearised polynomial p(x) for a, let q(x) denote the minimum polynomial
of a. It can be shown that,
n

x

P( ) = J2tix2'

= m x

{ )<l(x)i

(4-1)

t'=0

where m(x) is a polynomial over GF(2).

For i = 0, ...,n, let r,(a;) denote the

remainder of dividing x2' by q(x). To satisfy equation 4.1 the following equation
must hold.
n

53*,Tf(a;) = 0 mod
;=o

q(x).

(4.2)

By expanding this equation, a set of n equations, with n + 1 variables to,... ,tn, is
obtained. The solution that results in a polynomial with minimum degree determines
p(x).

The following example clarifies this procedure.

Example 4.1 Consider the field F5 obtained by using the irreducible polynomial
f(x) = x 5 + x 2 + l. Let x = a29 G F be the element for which the minimum linearised
polynomial is required. The set of conjugates of x is {(CM 2 9 ) 2
can be written as:

: i = 1,... ,n}, and
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Therefore, q(x) = (x+a29)(x + a27)(x + ot23)(x-\-als)(x-T-a30), which after reduction
using f(x) will be:
q(x) = x5-f-x3-r-l.
Next, r,(x) = x2' mod q(x) can be found as follows.
r0(x) = x, rx(x) = x2, r2(x) = x4, r3(x) = x3+x2+l, r4(x) = x4+xz-\-x-\-l, r5(x) = x.
Equation 4.2 results in:
t0x + txx2 + t2x4 + t3(x3 + x2 + 1) + t4(x4 + x3 + x + 1) + t5(x) = 0,
or
(t2 + t4)x4 + (t3 + U)x3 + (tx + t3)x2 -r (t0 + t4 + t5)x + (i3 + t4) = 0.
Solving the above equation results in:
t2 + t3 = 0, t3 + *4 = 0, <i + t3 = 0, to + t4 + U = o.
The minimum degree can be obtained when ^ = 0 and t4 = t3 = t2 = tx = t0 = 1.
Therefore,
p(x) = x + x 2 + x 4 + x 8 + x16.
O

Lemmas 4.6 to 4.10 give important combinatorial properties of rows and columns
of C which can be readily translated into probabilities. Let da denote the degree of
minimum linearised polynomial of a.
Lemma 4.6 In C, the column labelled by 0 contains only 0 G Fn. The column
labelled by all one vector may only have 0,1 G F n .
Proof Sketch: For all linearised polynomials such as L(x), x is a factor. Hence
1(0) = 0. W h e n x = (1,1, - - -, 1), based on [80, Page 52], x.§_ G GF(2). This
completes the proof.

a

Lemma 4.7 If a £ Fn occurs in a row of C labelled by fL) then it occurs |A/L|
times, where ML

is the null space of fL-
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Proof Sketch: In a linearised polynomial the set of zeros form a subspace ML of
G F ( 2 n ) [80, Theorem 3.50]. N o w if L(x) = y for some y, then for all z G

ML

we have L(x + z) = L(x) + L(z) = y. Conversely, if L(x) = L(u) = y then
L(x + u) = 0 = L(z) where z G NL. Hence if an element occurs once, it occurs
exactly \Mr\ times.

•

Lemma 4.8 For a fL(x) corresponding to a row of C, if L(x) has even number of
terms then \AfL\ > 2. In this case fL(x) = fL(x) where x is binary complement of
x.
Proof Sketch: If L(x) has even number of terms then L(x) = x(x + l)/(x) and so
L(0) = L(l) = 0. Hence, ^(11, • • •, 1) = 0. This results in the following complementary property
L(x) = L(x + 11 • • • 1) = L(x) + 1(11 • • • 1) = L(x)
•

Lemma 4.9 The number of zeros in a column of C labelled by a G Fn is Ma =
2t~da, for some t <n.

Moreover if an element (d occurs once in this column then it

occurs Ma times.
Proof Sketch: Let u G F n . There is a unique minimum linearised polynomial L(x)
such that L(u) = 0. N o w if L'(x) is a linearised polynomial such that L'(u) = 0,
there exists a linearised polynomial L"(x) such that L"(x) = L'(x) <g) L(x) [80,
Theorem 3.68, page 113]. Let Mu

denote the collection of linearised polynomials

for which u is a root and \MU\ = Mu. Then, Mu = 2f~du, for some t < n, where du
is the degree of L(x). N o w if Lx(x) is a linearised polynomial satisfying Lx(u) = v
and L2(x) G Mu, then (Lx + L2)(u) = Lx(u) + L2(u) = v and hence v occurs 2t_£fu
times in the column labelled by u.

D

Lemma 4.10 For any two elements x,y G Fn, x ^ y, the number of rows in C with
h(x) = h(y) is equal to Mx+y.
Proof Sketch: For a pair x,y G GF(2n), the number of rows, L(x), of C, such that
L(x) = L(y) is the same as the number of rows of C with L(x + y) = 0, and hence
the result.

D
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L e m m a 4.8 shows a complementary property for linearised polynomials which is
undesirable in the context of hashing. This property can be removed by considering
only polynomials with an odd number of terms. Alternatively, the message space
can be limited to those with a zero in the last column, which will effectively remove
complementary property at the expense of the loss of one bit information.
Let cZmtn = min a€ F„ da. If only linear polynomials of degree less than <Zmtn that
have odd number of terms are considered, then the following properties hold, which
are direct consequence of L e m m a 4.6 to 4.10.
Corollary 4.11 Let t < dmin. Then the array C satisfies the following properties.
1. Every row of C is a permutation.
2. Vx G Fn and x + 0,1, \{fL : fL(x) = 0}| = |{/L : fL(x) = 1}\ = 0. That is,
a column labelled by x G Fn and x ^ 0,1 does not contain 0

orl£Fn.

3. Vx,y G Fn and y ^ 0,1 G Fn, \{fL : / L ( X ) = y}\ < 1. That is, in a column of
C, an element x G F n and x ^ 0,1 occurs at most once.
Corollary 4.11 shows that every mapping in C is a permutation and an element
of the field occurs at most once in a column, or equivalently, two mapping result in
the same value when applied to the same element of thefield.Item 3 shows that
given two arbitraryfieldelements x and y, there is at most one mapping fa with

h(x) = fL(y).
Although C, as a collection of mappings, has the required property of an eA U 2 class of function but each m a p is from F n to Fn and hence does not result in
any compression — the basic requirement of a hashing algorithm. In the following
section, an e-A\]2 class of hash functions is defined. This class reduces the size of
the input by a factor of two and is based on the C matrix.

4.4.2 Constructing an e-A£/2 Family based on MRD Codes
For each mapping //, : S n -> S n , corresponding to a row in C, define a mapping
hL : E 2 n -5> E n as hL(x) = fL(xx) ® x2, where xi,x2 G En, and x G E 2 n . That is,
the value of hL for x = (xi||x2) is obtained by applying /L to x\, and XORing the
result with x2. Let V, denote the collection of hash functions defined above, where
the m a x i m u m degree of the linearised polynomials considered in the construction is
2f, for some t < n.
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Theorem 4.12 U is a i^-AU2 class of hash functions.
Proof: Based on Definition 2.14 in Chapter 2, it is only needed to show that,

Let M = (MX\\M2) and M' = (M'X\\M'2), then hL(M) = fL(Mx) © M2, hL(M') =
fL(M[)®M'2, and \H\ = 2 f_2 . In Section 4.4.1, it was shown that each row of matrix
C is linear and hence h(Mx)@ fL(M[) = fL(Mx® M[). This linearity is transferred
to H and is sufficient to prove that,
\{h : h(Mx © M[) = (M2 © M'2)}\ < 1.
Since M ^ M', both Mx = M{ and M2 = M'2 will not occur at the same time.
• If Mx = M[, then fL(Mx © M[) = /L(0) = 0 ± (M2 © M'2), and so |{/L :
fL(Mx © M{) = (M2 © M'2)}\ = 0 < 1.

• If Mx ^ M[, then (Mi © M[) ^ 0 and based on Corollary 4.11 \{fL : fL(M
AfO = (M 2 0jl^)}|<l.
This proves the theorem.

•

% is the basis of the proposed M A C system. In section 4.4.3, example compositions that result in the required £-AXU2 class of hash function will be given.

Example 4.2 Let n = 5, f(x) = x5 + x2 -fl be a primitive polynomial of deg
and f(ot) = 0 for some a G H n . Group the elements of F5 = GF(25) into conjugate
groups as shown in Table 4.2 and find the minimum linearised polynomial of each
group. Since the smallest degree of the minimum linearised polynomials is 16, all
the linearised polynomials of degree less than 16, with odd number of terms, can be
used for constructing a matrix which represents the hash function.
It can be verified that a3, a6, a12, a24, and a17 are linearly independent and
form a normal basis vector. Let L(x) = x4. The vector corresponding to L(x) is:
cL = (L(a3), L(a6), L(a12), L(a24), L(a17))
=

((a3)4, (a6)4, (a12)4, (a24)4, (a'7)4)

=

(a12, a24, a17, a3, a6)

=

(a3 + a2 + a, a4 + a3 + a2 + a, a 4 + a + 1, a3, a3 + a)
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a, a2, a4, a 8 , a 1 6
a 3 , a 6 , a 12 , a 24 , a17
a5, a 10 , a 20 , a 9 , a18
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a 11 , a 22 , a 13 , a 26 , a 2 1
a 15 , a 30 , a29, a27, a23
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Minimal polynomials
x 5 + x 2 4-1
x 5 4- x 4 4- x 3 + x 2 + 1
x 5 4- x 4 4- x 2 4- x 4-1
x 5 + x 3 4- x 2 4- x 4-1
x 5 4- x 4 4- x 3 4- x + 1
x 5 4- x 3 4-1

Linearised minimal polynomials
x 4- x 2 4- x 4 4- x 8 4- x 1 6
x 4- x 3 2
x + x32
x 4- x 2 4- x 4 4- x 8 4- x 16
x 4- x 3 2
x 4- x 2 4- x 4 4- x 8 + x 16

Table 4.2: Conjugate groups with the corresponding minimal and linearised minimal
polynomials.
The matrix representation of the function /L is:
/ 0 0 1 0 0\
1 1 1 0
CL=

1

1 1 0

0 0

1 1 0

11

^ 0 1 1 0 0J
Now let M = [11010 01100], which results in Mx = [11010]* and M2 = [01100].
Then, fL(Mx) = CL • Mx = [00011] and so,
hL(M) = fL(Mx) @M2

= [00011] © [01100] = [01111].

O

4.4.3 Defining a New M A C
Similar to what was done in Section 4.3.4, define rlnew = /Ho%K,

where H is the

t-AU2 family introduced in the previous sub-section (4.4.2) and H K is the e'-AXU2
family suggested in Section 4.2. Hnew defined as above is (e-\-e')-AXU2, and so, the
Wegman-Carter construction results in an (2 2_t + f£r)-secure M A C .
The proposed MAC requires a setup phase during which a collection of parameters for the system will be determined. For every chosen prime value n, an irreducible
polynomial, a normal basis, and dmin will be determined and published. Calculating
dmin requires finding m i n i m u m linearised polynomials of each conjugate group of
G F ( 2 n ) . This is computationally expensive, but since is done only once in the life
time of the system, it is acceptable.
It should be noted that t < n - 1 determines e (Theorem 4.12) and hence it is
important to have large values for t. T h e experiments with n < 19 are shown in
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n
5
7
11
13
17

Umin
4

2
23
2io
212

28

KB
3
2
9
11
7

€

2~3
2"2
2~9
2-n
2"7

Table 4.3: Parameters for % for n < 19. dmin is the smallest degree of linearised
polynomials for all elements of E n ; KB (Key Bits) is the number of bits required to
select a linearised polynomial, and e is the security parameter of the e-AU2 class.

Table 4.3. It has been seen that some values like n = 11 and 13 give the maximum
value (2 n_1 ) for cfmtn, but others like n = 17 give small t value. In practise a range
of suitable values for n must be calculated and published. The user can choose
the n that gives the required level of security and is most suitable for the message
sizes considered. The key is an n-tuple that determines a linearised polynomial
L(x). Knowing the n-tuple, the user can generate the matrix representation CL of
polynomial fi and use it for hashing.
In this method, for the same value of e the message block length can be as small
as 74 words, when n = 37. This is assuming that for this value of n there exists
dmin > 2 31 . In this case the key is k = (\og2dmin — 1) bits, and so 30 < k < 35.
By choosing an appropriate n, the message block can be increased and the required
level of security, e, can be retained. The digest length can be as low as 37 bits.
This scheme does not need large memory. With n = 37, it only needs 172 bytes
for CL- It should be noted that, for key distribution only the n-tuple determining
the polynomial L(x) can be used, but for hashing CL must be calculated and saved.
The message block requires 5 bytes, and 5 bytes are needed for the digest.

4.5 Summary
In this chapter, the design of unconditionally secure MACs which are constructed
from e-AXU2 (or e-AU2) hash function families, followed by one-time-pad, were
studied. In Section 4.2, some of the previous designs were briefly reviewed. In
Section 4.3, a similar design based on Latin squares was presented and its advantages
were discussed. Another similar design was given in Section 4.4 which was based on
M R D codes.
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There were some open questions discussed in this chapter. Answer to these
questions can improve the designs and can result in better constructions. The Latin
square based design can be improved byfindinga better class of Latin squares that
satisfy the requirements of universal hash functions. In particular, one can search
for a limited number of independent Latin squares that fall into the same class
(cf. Appendix C ) . The M R D code design can be improved byfirst,increasing the
hashing rate and second,findinggood values for n > 32 and t < n.

Chapter 5
O n the Security of Collisionful Hash
Functions

In this chapter, two proposed schemes based on collisionful hash functions are st
ied and cryptanalyzed. All the claimed theories are supported by implementing the
proposed attacks.
Parts of this chapter appeared in the Proceedings of Australian Conference on
Information Security and Privacy (ACISP), 1996 (cf. [9, 10]); and in the Journal of
Universal Computer Science, 1997 (cf. [12]).

5.1 Introduction
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the term collisionful hash function was introduced by
Berson et al. in [22]. Collisionful hash functions can be considered as a particular
class of keyed hash functions, in which it is possible to have the same hash value of
a given message under several keys. This property reduces the chance of uniquely
determining the correct key, for the opponent who has access to a certain amount
of authenticated messages [22].
This chapter shows that providing such collision property requires a very careful
consideration of the possible drawbacks. Because collisionful hash functions are
only useful when the key space is small, and because small key space results in
the possibility of a guessing attack, therefore, a collisionful hash function should
clearly indicate the minimum key length which can be used to retain the security.
In Sections 5.2 and 5.3, two applications of collisionful hash functions are analysed,
in which the designers assumed that the key space could be exhaustively searched.
It will be shown that both systems have major drawbacks and a reasonably large
key space should be selected to prevent an exhaustive search.
In Section 5.2, Gong's selectable collisionful hash function is first described and
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is shown h o w he computes and verifies a tag for a message. Then, a multi-level
attack is proposed and a claim is m a d e that with Gong's assumptions it is trivial
to forge an authenticated message, or even sometimes find the secret key. This
claim is confirmed by the results of an implementation of the attack. Finally, some
alternative solutions are given to replace Gong's scheme.
In Section 5.3, a similar start is maid, with the description of Diffie-Hellman key
exchange protocol and Anderson and Lomas' scheme which is for authenticating their
key exchange protocol. Then, the attack and a discussion of its success probability
is provided. T h e optimal parameter values, for which the success probability of
the attack can be minimised, are also given. Finally, some alternative methods are
proposed to replace Anderson and Lomas' scheme.

5.2 Gong's Selectable Collisionful Hash Function
Gong [62] used polynomial interpolation to construct a collisionful hash function
with the collision accessibility property. This property allows a user to choose a
set of keys that satisfy a given (message,digest) pair, and is desirable when the key
belongs to a distinguishable subset of the key space (eg. meaningful words).
A similar approach is used by Zheng et al. [130] in construction of Sibling Intractable Function Family (SIFF). SIFF was used for providing secure and efficient
access in hierarchical systems with proven security properties. It will be shown that
Gong's construction, which is insecure for protection against modification, can be
turned into a SIFF. This results in a proof of the security of that construction when
a large password space is used.

5.2.1 Description of Gong's Method
Let V be the set of all possible passwords (publicly known) and K be a small subset
of V, so that an attacker can perform an exhaustive search on it [62, Sections 1
and 4]. Suppose a user A (Alice) intends to protect a binary code or file, referred
to as a message M. She calculates a checksum, derived from M

and her password

kx e K,, and appends it to the message. She will verify the checksum whenever she
wants to use the message. (An example of such scheme is to safe-guard executable
files against viruses.)
In Gong's scheme, Alice should select n — 1 other passwords k2,...,kn € V,
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for some integer n. Let A = {kx, k2,..., kn} denote the set of selected password
collisions. Also assume that g is a keyed hash function (cf. Chapter 2) that produces
integer hash values and g(ki, M) > n, Vfct- € A . Furthermore, g(ki, M) ^ g(kj, M ) ,
Vfci ^ kh where k{, kj G A . It is noted that, K C V is the set of passwords that are
commonly used by the users. In general, \V\, the size of the space V, m a y not be
small, but K, the set of all passwords that are often used by the users, called poorly
chosen passwords, is usually small and therefore weak against dictionary attack
(cf. Section 5.2.2). It should be emphasised that Gong's construction assumes a
small password space that can be exhaustively searched:
"... collisionful hash functions are useful in generating integrity checksum from user passwords, which tend to be chosen from relatively small
space that can be exhaustively searched." [62, Section 4]

Computing the Checksum
Alice (A) chooses a random key K € GF(p), where GF(p) is the Galois Field of p
elements, for a suitable large prime p, and defines w(x) = K -\-a\-x-\

\- an • xn

(mod p), where the n coefficients ax,..., an are calculated by solving the following
n equations. Equation T is w(g(ki,M)) = ki, and all calculations are performed in
GF(P).
K + ax- g(kx,M) 4- • • • 4- an • g(kx,M)n = kx

K + at- g(k2, M ) + • • • + an • g(k2, M ) n = k2
.

.

(5-1)

K-r-ax- g(kn, M) + • • • 4- an • g(kn, M)n = kn
Using K and w(x), the checksum will be:

wx\\w2\\---\\wn\\g(K,M), (5.2)
where '|(' denotes concatenation and u>; = w(i) is a (log2p)-bit number for i =
1,..., n. Alice does not need K and w(x), and m a y throw them away after producing
the above checksum.
Verifying the Checksum
To verify the checksum, Alice needs to remember only kx, assuming that p is publicly
known. She solves the following (n + 1) equations in GF(p) and finds the (n 4- 1)
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variables 60,61,..., bn.
b0 + bx-g(kx,M) +

4- bn-g(kx,Mf

60 +

61-1

4-

4-

bn-ln

=

kx

=

Wx
(5.3)

<

60 + 61 • n 4-

4-

bn-nn

=

wn

Then, she calculates g(b0, M) and compares if with g(K, M) in the checksum. In
the case of a match, she will accept the checksum as valid.

5.2.2 Attacking Gong's Method
In this section, it is shown how an intruder can break Gong's scheme. The intruder Eve (E) exhaustively searches K, (Gong's assumption) and for each candidate
password k £ K solves Equation 5.3 in GF(p), by replacing kx with k, and finds
bo,b\,... ,bn. T h e complexity of solving this equation depends on both n and |/C|,
Od/CIn2,376).1 T h e attack has been practically examined for n = 5 and \K,\ = 2 22 .
The probability of the attack increases for larger n's — refer to "Attacking the basic
scheme", below. If g(b0,M) is the same as that in the checksum, she keeps k as
an applicable password. After exhaustively testing K, Alice will find m applicable
passwords T = {kri,..., kTm).
Theorem 5.1 (AH/C) C T, and therefore, m is greater than or equal to the number
of passwords chosen from K.
Proof: For any ki E (A D K), Equation 5.3 becomes,
b0 4- bx-gi 4- • • • + K- g? = h
b0 4- bx -1

+

••• +

bn-ln

=

wx

<

b0 4- bx • n 4- • • • + bn • nn = wn
^ h e complexity of Equation 5.3 depends on the size of the key space, |/C|, and the inversion
of a n n x n matrix. Coppersmith and Winograd [35] showed that there are efficient algorithms
to invert a matrix and the best complexity is of the order n 2376 . Therefore, Equation 5.3 can be
solved in 0(|/C|n2376).
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where g{ = g(ki, M ) , w{ = w(i), for i = 1,... ,n. Similarly, the Equations 5.1 and
5.2 can be summarised as,
an-gin

«o +

ax- gi 4-

+

«o +

ax • 1

+

4- an • l n

Qo +

aj • n

+

=

k{

=

• • • 4- an-nn

i^

=

wn

where a 0 = AT and g{ = g(ki, M ) , w{ = w(i), for * = 1,..., n. From the above two
equations,
(60-a0) +

(61-a1)-firi

(60-a0) +

(6i — ai) • 1

••• 4- (bn-an)-gin

+
+

=

••• 4- (bn - an) • ln

0
=

0
(5.4)

k

(bo-a0) + (bx-ax)-n + ••• 4- (6n - a„) • nn = 0

This results in:
1

^i

1 1

ST
ln

7^0
1 n

a

i = & i ) j = 0 , l,...,n

nn

In other words, aj = bj, j = 0,1,... ,n, if and only if the determinant of Equation 5.4 is non-singular. Since gi > n, i = 1,... ,n, and because the modulus p is
prime, the above determinant is non-singular, and therefore, aj = bj, j = 0,1,..., n.
This proves that 60 = K is the real key which was chosen by Alice. Hence, A;,- is an
applicable password, and so, (A fl K) C V. This implies that m (= |T|) is greater
than or equal to the number of passwords chosen from K. (= \A(1 )C\).

•

In the following, Gong's basic and extended constructions are considered and a
possible attack for each case is presented. Alternative methods with higher security
are also suggested. It is important to notice that the attack is aimed at forging a
valid checksum without requiring the specific value of kx.
Attacking the basic scheme (m < n)
It is not unexpected to have m

< n. W h e n K,ax,...,an, and M

are given, it

is improbable to find a password k £ A such that K 4- ai • g(k, M) + • • • + a n •

5.2. Gong's Selectable Collisionful Hash Function

g(k,M)n

79

= k, because |£| is usually m u c h smaller than \GF(p)\ and there is no

guarantee that one can find a K' &

K) such that g(K',M) = g(K,M).

It should

be noted that g is not a collisionful hash function. For instance, g m a y be defined
as g(k,x) = h(k\\x\\k), where h is a collision resistant hash function. Furthermore,
k2,...,kn are selected from ? (D /C), and an exhaustive Search on K might not
give all passwords k2 to kn. This decreases m , the number of applicable passwords.
(Note that, kx G K.)
If m ^ n (i.e. m < n), the attacker E randomly selects (n - m ) passwords (£ T)
and adds them to T. Using these n passwords, which include kx, the opponent
uses the procedure given in Section 5.2.1 to calculate the checksum for an arbitrary
message M' and a randomly chosen key K'. Contrary to Gong's claim that the
chance of a successful guess is as most \ [62, Page 169], the probability of a successful
attack is 1, when m < n.
As mentioned before, choosingfct's,2 < i < n, from V will reduce the number
of resulting applicable passwords, T, which is more desirable in this attack (for the
attacker). However, a more secure version of Gong's method might be considered,
by assuming thatfc,-G JC, i = 1,... ,n. With this assumption, Theorem 5.1 results
in:
Corollary 5.2 If k{ e K, i = 1,... ,n, then ACT, and therefore, m>n.
Proof: Direct conclusion from Theorem 5.1.

•

Attacking the extended scheme (m > n)
Gong [62, Page 170] extends his method by calculating the checksum as,
U?I||K;2||

••• ||iun||<7(A' mod q,M), (5.5)

for a suitable integer q. Employing modular reduction can increase m, the size of T,
if q < \K,\. Gong does not disclose the state of n (= |A|), and therefore, two cases in
which n is eitherfixed,always the same n being used, or it is an arbitrary integer,
which m a y vary every time, are considered here. It should be noted that for a given
message M, Alice m a y fix the number of password collisions, n, and publicise it
such that the corresponding hash value will be accepted only if it is verified by n
password collisions. This is not discussed in the original paper, however.
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If n is not fixed, E can construct a fraudulent checksum by solving the following
m equations in GF(p), for ax,..., am,
K' + ax • g(kri,M') + ••• + am.g(kri,M')m = K
:
K' +

«i-^rm,M') +

••• +

:
am • g(krm,M')m

=

(5.6)

kTm

where K' is a randomly chosen key and M' is an arbitrary message; and calculating
the new checksum as,
u;(l)||u;(2)||-.-|Km)|^(A' mod q,M'), (5.7)
where w(x) = K' + ax • x + • • • 4- am • xm (mod p). In this case, when A wants to
verify the above checksum for the forged message M', she takes g(K' m o d q, M')
off the checksum and divides the size of the remaining part by [log2 p], tofindthe
number of chosen password collisions. She follows the procedure in Section 5.2.1,
which will result in the acceptance of M' as a genuine message.
If n is fixed, the attack will still succeed with significant probability. Let m =
n + 1. Then E can solve the following (n 4- 1) equations for (n 4- 1) variables
ao,a\,... ,an,
' a0 +

ax- g(kri ,M')

+

• • • 4-

an - g(kn, M ' ) n

=

kr
(5.8)

k

flo +

«i • g(krn+%,M')

+

••• 4- an-g(kTn+1,M')n

=

kTn+l

where M' is an arbitrary message. T h e valid checksum for M' will be,
^(1)^(2)11 • • • \\w(n)\\g(ao mod q, M'), (5.9)
where u)(x) = ao + ax - x + • • • + an • xn (mod p).
If m > n + 1, since A C T (cf. Corollary 5.1), E can randomly choose (n 4- 1)
passwords {kh,..., ktn+1} from V and have A's password, kx, among them, with the
probability:

Pr[ kx G {ktl,... ,fcWl} ] = W

= ^±i

\n+l)

which is a high probability if m is not much larger than n.
Now, E can use {ktl,..., ktn+1} to solve Equation 5.8 for a0,..., an, and calculate
a valid checksum for an arbitrary message M' (Equation 5.9). That is, E can
generate a valid checksum with the probability of v^.

5.2. Gong's Selectable Collisionful Hash Function

81

For example for n = 9, A should ensure that the number of the applicable
passwords, m , will be at least 105, to decrease the probability of attack to 10~4,
which is the probability of guessing a 4-digit number —

typically the size of the

password used by bank Automatic Teller Machines ( A T M ) . This would be a difficult
task due to the fact that m is not controllable, because it depends on \K\, p, and q.

Attack by discarding some of the applicable passwords
Another attack on Gong's method is to reduce the size of T, the set of all applicable
passwords, by discarding the inappropriate passwords.
It is already proved that if n is not fixed or m

< n -\- 1, there are attacks in

which E succeeds with the probability of 1 (100%). N o w , assume that n is fixed
and m > n + 1, and denote by A = { A ^ ,..., Kkrm } the collection of the resulting
keys that correspond to the passwords in T = {kn,...,kTm} (cf. Section 5.2.2). It is
noted that, if at least two password collisions are chosen from K,, A will have some
repeated elements. This is true because Kki = Kkj, Vki,kj G A C T. A should be
partitioned into / sub-collections Ai,..., A/, corresponding to the / distinct values
in A, for some positive integer /. That is, Ka = Kp, WKa, Kp G A*, t = 1,..., /.
O n one hand, it is obvious that there exists a A* such that Kki G A<, Vfc; G A . O n
the other hand, to derive Kka G A from ka G T, Equation 5.3 is used, which maps
the small password space K into the large key space GF(p).

Therefore, it cannot

be expected to come up with many, more than n, distinct passwords (G- A ) that are
mapped to the same key K G A. Hence, the above At, where {A^,..., Kkn} C At,
can be easily distinguished among the other portions, and the claim is emphasised
when n, the number of password collisions, is large (cf. the experimental results in
Table 5.2).
Consequently, At can be selected as the portion that includes Kkl,... ,Kkn, to
attack the method using the techniques given in the previous sections. In particular,
even if n is fixed and |A<| > n + 1 , the probability of successful attack is yj=4 (>

z

^)-

To decrease the probability of an attack, Alice should use a collisionful hash
function in Equation 5.1, not a keyed hash function g. Also, if she can find one
more key collision set of at least n elements which result in a different key K', she
can halve the success probability. However, this is a very difficult task due to the
difficulty of solving Equation 5.3 for &i,... ,bn, and kx, when b0 is a givenfixedkey.
In other words, since g is generally not invertible, it is hard to find s (> n) key
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collisions ktl,..., kt, that result in afixedb0 (^ K), using Equation 5.3.

Attack by using t pairs of (message,checksum)
One restriction to Gong's method is that whenever kx, A's password, is used for
calculating the checksums for other messages, the same password collisions should
be used. Otherwise, the intruder can guess kx from the intersection of the different password collision sets, with a high probability. Suppose t pairs of (message,checksum) are available and the enemy has found the corresponding t sets of
acceptable passwords. If the size of the intersection of these sets is less than n + 2,
the previous given techniques, for the extended scheme, can break the system, with
100% success. Otherwise, this intersection can be partitioned, similar to the way
described in the previous method of attack, to select the appropriate set with a high
chance. This probability will significantly increase when t, the number of the given
pairs, increases. In fact, the chance of reducing the number of guessed passwords to
kx,..., kn will significantly increase.
Also, Alice should be careful when kx is used for other purposes, since some
information about kx is always leaked from Gong's method. For instance, if kx is
also used for logging into a system, the enemy can use the proposed attack, guess
all the possible password collisions, and try them one by one until she logs into the
system.

5.2.3 Practical Results of the Attack
Both Gong's method and the corresponding attacks have been implemented on a
S U N S P A R C station E L C . The experiments completely coincide with the previously
mentioned theories and support the claims about the weaknesses of the proposed
selectable collisionful hash function.
Table 5.1 illustrates the results of the attack on the basic scheme. In all cases,
the number of password collisions, n, was chosen to be 5. It shows that in all cases
it was possible to find exactly thefivepassword collisions and forge the checksum
based on the attack given for the basic scheme.
Table 5.2 is the results of the attack on the extended scheme. Different modulo
reductions were examined, where in all cases it was possible to select the exact
valid password collisions based on the "Attack by discarding some of the applicable
passwords". It is important to notice that, it was not required to use the "Attack
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Collisionful Hash

Function

\ic\

|r|

2 14

5
5
5
5
5

2 16
2 18
2 20
2 22
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Table 5.1: Basic scheme, where the checksum is wx\\ • • • ||iun||#(Af, M) and A C fC.
For n = 5, the number of resulting applicable passwords, \T\, was exactly equal to
5, in all cases. Therefore, T = A (m = n).
Partition of A
|/C|

q

2 14

2047
8191
32767
131071
524287
8191
32767
131071
524287
2097151

2 16
2 18
2 20
2 22
2 14
2 16
2 18
2 20
9 22

1

L

|r|
14
13
12
13
13
7
5
8
8
7

|Aj|

|A2|

|A3|

|A4|

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1

|A5|

1
1
1
1
1

|A6|

1
1
1
1
1

|A7|

1
1
1
1
1

]
]
]
]
]

|A sl

|A9|

lAiol

L

1

1

L

1

L
L

1
1

Table 5.2: Extended scheme, where the checksum is wx\\w2\\ • • • \\wn\\g(K m o d
q, M) and A C K. For n = 5, the number of resulting applicable passwords,
\T\, was usually larger than 5, but after partitioning A, in each case, there was only
one partition (Ai) with 5 elements (Ai = A ) . This table is part of the extensive
experimental results. Two different modulo reductions, q, are examined for every
instance of K.

by using t pairs of (message,checksum)''', which is even more powerful attack wh
several checksums are available. That means, the scheme could be broken without
assuming multiple available checksums.
The results show that with Gong's assumptions, especially the small password
space, it is possible to attack his method. In the next section, some secure methods
will be presented in which additional assumptions are met.

5.2.4 Securing the Method

In this section it is shown that the security of Gong's method under certain res
ing assumptions is related to the security of Sibling Intractable Function Families
(SIFF) [130]. This ensures the security of the scheme for a large password space.
However, it should be noted that assuming a large password space might not be

5.2. Gong's Selectable Collisionful Hash Function

84

realistic in practice and hence alternative methods that reduce the probability of a
successful attack are required.

Gong's Construction and SIFF
In this section, it is shown that Gong's construction can be turned into SIFF [130],
Suppose a message M, a randomly chosen key K G GF(p), and n password collisions kx,... ,kn are given. Define h(x) = g(x, M), where g is a secure keyed hash
function (Definition 2.4). It is noted that h is one-way, because g is one-way on
both parameters. It is further assumed that h is collision resistant. A n example
of h which satisfies these assumptions can be obtained by starting from a collision
resistant hash function H and defining g as g(k, M) = H(k\\M). It can be seen that
g(k, M) is collision resistant on both parameters and hence h(x) = g(x, M) will be
collision resistant.
N o w calculate x,- = h(ki), i = 1,... ,n and solve the n equations,
ax • xx + • • • 4- o,n • x" = kx — K
ax • x2 4

h a n • x 2 = k2 — K

ax- xn-\ Yan-xnn = kn- K
for ax,..., an. The above is the rearrangement of Equation 5.1. Therefore, one may
use the same technique, given by Gong, to calculate the checksum of a given message
M. It is claimed that if u is defined as,
u(k, y) = k-ax-y an-yn,

then (u o h) defined as u(k, h(k)) is an n-SIFF, when h is chosen to be a one-to-o
and one-way function family. This is true because of the way u and h are defined
(cf. [130]). It should be noted that u(ki,Xi) = K, for i = 1,... ,n, and therefore,
u(ki, h(ki)) = K, for i = 1,..., n. That is, (u o h) will m a p all keys kx,...,kn to
the same value K. The reader is referred to [130] for a more detailed description of
SIFF.
The above ensures the security of Gong's construction if g is properly chosen and,
in practice, implies that for a large password space the method resists all possible
attacks.
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Large Password Space

As noted in the previous section, the security of Gong's construction can only be
guaranteed for large password spaces. Also, the whole idea behind the construction
of collisionful hash functions, and in particular Gong's method, is to take advantage
of small key space. These assumptions might not be realistic in practical cases.
In the following, alternative solutions are proposed by relying on more reasonable
assumptions which can provide smaller chance of success for an intruder.
1. Suppose A always uses n passwords kx,... ,kn to calculate the checksums —
they can be words chosen from a phrase. She can solve,
a0 4- ax • g(kx, M) + • • • 4- an-i • g(k1,M)n~1 = kx

. ao + ax- g(kn, M) + • • • + an_x • g(K, Mf"1 = kn
for a0,...,an-x, and calculate the checksum as g(a0,M). This will be appended to the message M and can be verified only by solving the above equations.
A n adversary, E, should guess n passwords from K and check whether the
\K~\

resulting a0 satisfies the checksum —

there are (

) possible selections. A

proper choice of n will prevent E from finding the correct selection which
results in the genuine g(ao, M).
Moreover, if g is collisionful on the first input parameter (cf. [22]), E will
not be sure that she has found the right passwords. In fact, E m a y find
an a'0 such that g(a'0,M) = g(ao,M), but it does not necessarily result in
g(a'0, M') = g(a0, M'), for another message M'.
A disadvantage of this method is the difficulty of memorising n passwords,
when n is large. However, a very large n is not needed in this method and
only part(s) of a sentence or phrase can be used as the password.
2. Let c be the least integer such that 2C computations are infeasible. Further
assume a user password has on average d bits of information. (Clearly, d < c
and 2d computations are feasible.) The checksum of a given message M is
calculated as h(kx\\R\\h(M)), where kx is A's password, R is a randomly chosen
(c — cQ-bit number, and h is a collision resistant hash function [6, 96].
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To verify the checksum, A exhaustively tests 2c~d possible values of R and calculates h(kx\\R'\\h(M)) for each candidate R! G GF(2c~d).

A match indicates

that the checksum is valid, because h is collision resistant. Since both kx and
R, which have in total d 4- (c — d) = c bits of uncertainty, should be guessed
by an enemy to verify the checksum, a random guessing attack is thwarted.
It should be noted that, this verification has a m a x i m u m overhead of 2c~d
computations, but instead, selectable password collisions are not demanded.
Furthermore, one m a y use h((h(kx) m o d 2b)||.R||/i(M)), for a suitable integer
b (< d), to provide password collisions. In this case, R should be (c — b) bits.
For example, assume c = 64, d = 50, and h results in 128-bit digests. A can
verify the checksumft(A:i||i?||n(M))by computing h for at most 2 1 4 candidate
i?'s. This takes about 2 seconds on a S U N S P A R C station E L C , when h is
M D 5 [104]. Verification time is almost independent of the message length,
since h(M) needs to be calculated only once, not 2 1 4 times.
Disadvantage of this method is the difficulty offindinga constant c which suits
all the users. In practice, different computing powers result in different values
of c. Therefore, the largest amount should be chosen, which is not desirable
on slow machines, because 2c~d computations m a y become time consuming.

5.3 Anderson and Lomas' Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange

Anderson and Lomas [3] used collisionful hash functions to propose an augmentati
of the well-known Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [47] that provides protection
against middle-person attack. Their method verifies the initial key exchange by
means of a subsequent authentication stage based on communicants' passwords,
which are assumed to be poorly chosen. The authentication stage uses a collisionful
hash function in order to provide a safeguard against password guessing attacks.
It is shown here that if an old session key is compromised, then an attacker can
successfully guess a secret password, without being detected, and hence, compromise
the whole system.
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Diffle-Hellman Key Exchange

In a seminal paper [47], Diffie and Hellman proposed a method to securely establish
a shared secret between two users who do not share any prior secrets. Assume
that g is the publicly known generator of a large cyclic group Q, where \Q\ and '*'
denote the order of the group and the group operation, respectively. Let gr denotes
g-kg-k ••• * g (r times) —

this is in fact the exponentiation in Q (eg. if Q is the

multiplicative group of GF(p), then gT denotes gr m o d p). Suppose U and H are
interested in establishing a secret session key, using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange
protocol. U randomly chooses a positive integer rv < \Q\, and sends gru to H.
Similarly, H randomly chooses rH < \Q\ and sends gTn to U. That is,

1. U^H: gTu,
2. H-±U: grH.
Both U and H can calculate the desired session key as k = gTvTH. Assuming that
the discrete logarithm problem is hard, an enemy cannot obtain k from the available
public information Q, g, gTu, and gTn.
A well-known problem with the Diffie-Hellman key exchange is the middle-person
attack — an enemy Eve (E) can interpose herself in the middle and send gTE to both
U and H, where rE is a positive integer chosen by E, such that rE < \Q\. As a result,
U and H inadvertently end up with two different keys kv = grE'ru^and kH = grE'TH,
respectively, which are both known to E. Such an attack can be detected if U
and H mutually authenticate the calculated session keys. Indeed, there are many
protocols aimed at extending the basic Diffie-Hellman key exchange to provide the
required authentication [19, 105]. W h e n authentication is based on user passwords,
the protocols must be resistant to guessing attack. It is also advantageous to devise
alternative protocols that do not employ conventional encryption algorithms for
this purpose [3]. Diffie et al. [48] have suggested way of using Diffie-Hellman scheme
securely.

5.3.2 Anderson and Lomas' Scheme
Motivated by the above considerations, Anderson and Lomas suggested a scheme,
referred to as the A L protocol, where the basic Diffie-Hellman key exchange is augmented by means of a subsequent password-based authentication protocol. The
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scheme uses a collisionful hash function q,
q(K,M) = h((h(K\\M) mod 2m)||M),

where h is a collision-free hash function and '||' denotes concatenation. The fun
q has the property that if thefirstinput, K, is given, it is hard tofindcollisions on
the second input; however if the second input, M , is given, it is not hard to find
collisions on thefirstinput — depending on the choice of m. It is also assumed that
both U and H share a secret password P, where a password has n bits of information
and eavesdropper E can perform 2n computations. The authentication protocol runs
as follows:

3. U-+H: q(P,kv),
4. H^U:

q(h(P),kH).

U sends q(P,kv) to H, and H computes q(P,kH) and compares it with the received
value. Since q is collision-free on the second input, a successful match indicates that
kv = kM. Consequently, H obtains assurance that kH is shared with U since it is
infeasible for outsiders to calculate q(P,ku). O n the other hand, an unsuccessful
match indicates that an attacker is at work.
Suppose that E, who this time knows both distinct keys kv and kH, intercepts
q(P,ku) and finds a candidate password P' such that q(P,kv) = q(P',kv).
Anderson and Lomas claim that since there are, on average, 2n~m possible passwords that satisfy the equation, and all are equally likely, she cannot verify P'
without further information. Although she can send q(P',kH) to H and her guess
is verified if H replies, this can happen only at the risk of exposing herself in the
event of a wrong guess. The probability of a successful guessing attack of this kind
is minimised when m = y, and is equal to 2 1 " .

In this work, it is shown that an attacker can find the password if an old session key is somehow compromised. For instance, the session key might have been
used in a weak cryptographic algorithm which leaks the key information. This is
a serious security threat, as all further communications between U and H will be
compromised. A n attack under similar conditions is considered by the authors of
the well-known E K E protocol [115].
It is also shown that the probability of attack is slightly different from that measured in the original paper, and the value of m is calculated when that probability
is minimised.
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Attacking Anderson and Lomas' Scheme

Suppose U and H have successfully established a session key using the A L protocol.
In other words, U and H have a verified session key k (= kv = kH) by using the
above protocol. Further assume that k is somehow compromised and that E has
recorded q(P, k) and q(h(P), k) from the corresponding run of the protocol between
U and H. It is also assumed, as in the original paper [3], that E can perform
2 n computations to exhaustively search the password space. The attack proceeds as
follows.

Sl. E exhaustively searches the password space and uses the known pair (k, q(P, k
to find all the candidate passwords Pi, i = 1,... ,t, for some integer t, such
that q(Pi,k) = q(P,k).

S2. E then calculates q(h(Pi), k) for every candidate password Pi, and reduces the
set of likely candidates by retaining only those P,'s that q(h(Pi),k) matches
the known value q(h(P),k).
S3. E masquerades as H and sets up a key kv with U using the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange. She then intercepts message 3 from U to H of the subsequent
authentication protocol and uses the known pair (ku,q(P,ku)) to uniquely
determine the password from the reduced set obtained in Step 2.
Knowing the correct password P, E can successfully impersonate as either U or H.
E can also successfully complete the protocol and come up with two distinct keys
kv and kH, which are shared with U and H, respectively.
Table 5.3 illustrates the results of the implementation of the attack on Anderson and Lomas' protocol, where m = |, M D 5 [104] is used as the hash function
h, and each result is the average of 100 trials. The results of Step 1 show that
the number of candidate passwords is almost equal to 2 m . In Step 2, the number
of candidate passwords is reduced to 2. Finally, a unique password is found in Step 3.

In the following, these results are formalised and theoretical justification of t
experiments are given.
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14 7
16 8
18 9
20 10
22 11
24 12
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Candidate passwords
S3
|
Sl S2
130 2
1
260
2
1
525
2
1
1023 2
1
2046
2
1
4087 2
1

Table 5.3: The result of implementing the proposed attack on Anderson and Lomas'
proposed protocol, where m = ^. The hash function used in this implementation is
MD5, and the password is uniquely determined in the third step. Each result, the
number of candidate passwords, is the outcome of the average made on 100 trials.

5.3.4 Probability of Success
Figure 5.1 shows the schematic flowchart of the evaluation of q(P, k), where

| u(P,k) = h(P\\k),
\ w(u) = u mod 2m.
Let k be the shared key between U and H, obtained from a previous run of the
protocol, and which is somehow compromised. Denote by V the set of 2n possible
passwords, and assume 2 n verifications of passwords is a feasible computation. A s
discussed before, collisionful hash functions are useful when small keys are used.
However, poorly chosen passwords reduce the size of the password space, and therefore, make them vulnerable to guessing attack. It is not recommended to use passwords in an ordinary keyed hash function, since a guessed password that satisfies the
checksum is the correct one with a high probability. Anderson and Lomas' proposed
scheme is based on this assumption:
"It is well known that humans cannot in general remember good keys,
and that the passwords which they are able to remember are likely to
succumb to guessing attacks. We shall therefore assume that U and H
share a password P with n bits of entropy, while the eavesdropper E can
perform 2n computation." [3, Page 1040 (Paragraph 5)]
Proposition 5.3 u(P,k) £ u(P',k), VP ± P' G V.
Proof: Suppose there exists P ± P' eV

such that u(P,k) = u(P',k). If x = (P\\k)

and x' = (P'\\k), then,
h(x) = h(P\\k) = u(P, k) = u(P', k) = h(P'\\k) = h(x'). .
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Figure 5.1: Schematic flowchart of the collisionful hash function q. In this figure, P
V (password space), k G Q (key space), u(x,k) = h(x\\k), and w(u) = u m o d 2m.
The resulting qeV
(digest space) is h((h(P\\k) m o d 2m)\\k). Typically, \V\ = 2n,
\Q\ = 2 64 , and \V\ = 2 128 .

Since x ^ x', the above is a contradiction to the fact that h is collision-free. •
The above proposition indicates that if the password space is exhaustively tested,
the corresponding n(P||A:)'s are distinct.
Proposition 5.4 //q(P,k) = q(P',k), then h(P\\k) mod 2m = h(P'\\k) mod 2m.
Proof: Let x = h(P\\k) m o d

2m and x' = h(P'\\k) m o d

2 m . If x ± x', then

h(x\\k) ^ h(x'\\k), because h is collision-free. This results in q(P,k) ^ q(P',k)
which is a contradiction.

'-'

The above proposition ensures that if there is a collision on the first parameter
of q, it has occurred in the previous step (h(P\\k) m o d 2 m ) .
Theorem 5.5 // the output of the hash function h is random, where every bit is

considered to be independent of others, and V is exhaustively searched, the expecte
number of passwords which collide with a given password P EV

is - ^ r + 1 •
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With the above assumptions, for every

P' G V, the corresponding w' (= w(u(P',k))) is a random m-bit number and will
be equal to w with the probability p = A.. Excluding P itself, one should test
\V\ - 1 (= 2n - 1) remaining passwords. Now, considering the binomial probability
distribution (cf. [65, Chapter 5]) with success probability p = A. a n d

r

= 2n - 1

trials, the expected number of successes (occurrence of w) is r • p = 22=1. Including
P, which collides with itself, results in 22=1 _j_ ]_.

•

Using the above theorem, it is expected to reduce the number of candidate
passwords from 2n to 22=1 -[- 1, in thefirststep (Sl) of the attack —

compare the

Sl results in tables 5.3 and 5.4. The correct password can be guessed with the

probability p= (22=1 + l)" 1 .

Corollary 5.6 Let Q denote the reduced set of the candidate passwords obtained i
the above theorem. If w = w(u(h(P), k)), then the expected number of passwords in
Q which collide with P is ^ = ^ + 1.
Proof: Similar to the previous proof, the probability of success in each trial is p =

^

and the number of trials is r = 2-^r (excluding P itself). Therefore, the expected
number of the occurrence of w will be r • p = ^ " ^

= ^ir- Including P will

result in 2^=1 _|- ]_.

•

Similar kind of argument can be used for proving the following corollary.

Corollary 5.7 By repeating password reduction procedure t times, the expected nu
ber of candidate passwords will be equal to ^=r + 1.
Proof: Omitted.
Table 5.4 illustrates the numerical values of the above results, when rn =

•
|

(Anderson and Lomas' ideal case). A comparison between Table 5.3 and Table 5.4
confirms that the practical results conform with the theoretical ones, and the opponent can uniquely determine the correct password.

5.3.5 Optimal Choice of m
It is shown here that if m is properly chosen, the probability of the proposed attack
will be minimised. Assume 5 old session keys are compromised. Therefore, s pairs
of (q(P, k), q(h(P), k)) are available. Using Corollary 5.7, the expected number of

5.3. Anderson and Lomas' Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange

Expected
n
m
ex e2
14 7 129 2
16 8 257 2
18 9 513 2
20 10 1025 2
22 11 2049 2
24 12 4097 2
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Values
e3
1
1
1
1
1
1

Table 5.4: The expected values ex = (2-^± +1), e2 - ($=I + 1), and e3 = ( ^ +1)
corresponding to the three steps Sl, S2, and S3 of the proposed attack, in whi
m = |. (Compare with Table 1.)

candidate passwords will be reduced to |2^1 + 1. Now if E masquerades as H and
sets up a key kv with U, she receives q(P,kv) and can follow one of the following
attacks:

Al. Randomly choosing a password from the reduced set of the candidate pas
E can use the extra piece of information, q(P,ku), and further reduce the
expected number of candidate passwords to 2(2s+i)m + 1 (cf. Corollary 5.7).
Now, she can correctly guess the password with the probability,
i

Pi =

2"-l
2(2»+i)m

9(2s+l)m

+ i"" 2( 2s + i ) m + 2 n - r

A2. Randomly choosing a password after correctly guessing w(u(P,kH)): Suppose
E randomly selects w = w(u(P, kH)) G GF(2m) and sends q(P, kH) (= u(w, kH))
to H. The probability that w is correctly chosen is 2~m.
If w is guessed correctly, H will send back q(h(P),kH). Now F can take the
three extra pieces of information (q(P,kv), q(P,kH), and q(h(P),kH)) and reduce the expected number of candidate passwords to 2 2 ^ ) m +1- Accordingly,
she can guess the right password with the probability of (2^3+3]m + 1)~ , and
therefore, the total probability of success is measured as,
1

V2

2(2a+3)m +

92(s+l)m

I

2( 2s+3 ) m + 2n - 1

A3. Guessing w(u(P,kH)) and w(u(h(P),kv)): Similar to the previous attack, F
randomly selects w = w(u(P,kH)) G GF(2m) and sends the corresponding
q(P,kH) to H. If H responds with q(h(P),kH), E will again randomly select
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n
14
18
22

m
2
3
4
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Candidate passwords
Sl
S2
S3
4098
1026 257
32763 4096 512
262100 16404 1024

Table 5.5: The result of three steps of the attack on the extended protocol (Al).
this case, E cannot uniquely determine the correct password with the knowledg
an old session key.
w(u(h(P),kv)) and send the corresponding q(h(P),kv) to U. The probability
of success in this attack is measured as,

It should be noted that thefirsttwo attacks allow F tofindthe secret password
P, while in A3, she is only able to establish herself as a middle person. If the goal
of the attack is defined as the latter one, E can choose either of the above attacks
and will succeed with the corresponding probability. To minimise the probability of
success, m should be computed such that max(px,p2,p3) is minimised.
It is also important to note that, there are other possible attacks which are not
mentioned here. For instance, F may try to guess P from the information obtained
in the A3 attack. These attacks have negligible probabilities of success, compared
to the three attacks discussed above. Figure 5.2 is a comparison of px, p2, and pz for
n = 40 and s = 0, 1, and 2. It can be seen that m = 10, 7, and 5 are good choices
when s = 0, 1, and 2, respectively — max(pi,p2,p3) is minimised.
Example 5.1 Suppose one old session key is compromised (s = 1). Table 5.5
illustrates the practical results of thefirstattack (Al with px = (^ir +1) _1 ), where
best m's are chosen for several choices of n. Table 5.6 is the expected values which
fairly coincides with Table 5.5.

O

5.3.6 Alternative Solutions for Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange
In this section, alternative solutions are presented to decrease the probability of a
successful attack, when a password is used for authenticating the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange protocol.
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Figure 5.2: Comparing px, p2, and p3, when n = 40 and s = 0, 1, and 2.
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n
14
18
22

m
2
3
4
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Expected Values
e2
e3
ex
4097
1025
257
32769
4097
513
262145 16385 1025

Table 5.6: The expected values for three steps (extended scheme), where ex =
( ^ + 1), e2 = (2J=1 + 1), and e3 = ($=I + 1).
Augmenting Anderson and Lomas' Scheme
To prevent the attack when an old session key might be compromised, U and H can
use Anderson and Lomas' scheme but agree on a different shared key. The protocol
runs as,
1. U->H: gTv,
2. H^U: grH,
3. U^H: q(P,kv),
4. H^U: q(h(P),kH),
where kv = (grH) u and kH = (gru) H. The new session key k will be calculated as
f(kH) (= f(ku)), where / is a one-way function (it can be the same as h). Therefore,
even though a session key k might be compromised, F cannot guess P from the
recorded values q(P,gTu'TH) and q(h(P),gTH-Tu), because gTwrH — gTH-Tu = f~l(k)
and / cannot be inverted.
Other authenticated key exchange protocols
The following is the presentation of two new key exchange protocols that are augmented Diffie-Hellman protocols. The proposed protocols use a password to protect
the shared key against an active spoofer.

1. Suppose V is the set of positive integers smaller than 2n, and g is the generat
of a largefinitecyclic group Q of order \Q\, and P' G V is the smallest password
greater than P such that gcd(P', \Q\) = 1 (ie. P' and \Q\ are co-prime). W h e n
U needs to establish a shared session key with H, U randomly chooses a
positive integer rv (< \Q\) and sends gp,'ro to H. Similarly, H randomly
chooses a positive integer rH (< \Q\) and sends gp 'TH to U That is,
gp'Tu,
1. U->H:
2. H^U: gp'-TH.
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Now, both U and H can calculate the desired session key as k = gp''rvTH ? by
raising the received value to their randomly chosen values. Assuming that the
discrete logarithm problem is hard, an active spoofer F cannot gain anything
by modifying the transmitted values gp''ru and gp''r". The above method
simulates the Diffie-Hellman key exchange with a hidden generator gp . P'
should be chosen co-prime to \Q\ to ensure that gp is itself a generator of Q.
E can however force the protocol to result in two different keys shared with
U and H (middle-person attack), or replay some of the old transmitted values
(replay attack). Random challenge numbers can be used for a hand-shake
between U and H to thwart any modification from an active spoofer or possible '
channel noises. Let Ek(x) denote the encryption of x using the key k, and kv
and kH be the keys calculated by U and H, respectively. The protocol is
completed as follows.
1. U^H: gp'-rv,
2. H->U:

gp'-r»,EkH(cH),

3. U^H:

Eku(Cu;cH),

4. H-+U:

Eka(Cu),

where cv and cH are randomly chosen challenge numbers by U and H, respectively. The protocolfinishessuccessfully only if kv and kH are equal.

2. Similar to the above protocol, U and H can protect the transmitting v
by XORing them to the secret masks, generated from the password P:

1. U^H: gr»@hx(P),
2. H^U:

gr»@h2(P),

where hx and h2 are one-way hash functions — it is assumed that the size
message digests for hx and h2 axe equal to log2 \Q\. The session key will be
calculated by both parties as k = gTv'rn.
Again, F cannot attack the protocol, except middle-person attack or replay
attack. However, these two attacks can be prevented by random challenge
numbers. In the following, a hand-shake protocol is given in which the encryption function is replaced by a keyed hash function v.
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1. U->H:

grv®hx(P),

2. H-+U: gr»®h2(P),v(kH,cH),cH,
3. U-+H: v(ku,(cu\\cH)),cu,
4. H^U:

v(kH,cv).

The protocol finishes successfully only if kv and kH are equal.
Security of the first protocol is based on the discrete logarithm problem. It
needs multiplications P' • rv and P' • rH in a large group which can be efficiently
implemented. The second protocol is more efficient and only needs X O R operations.
It should be noted that, if hx = h2, then F can calculate x = gru © grH by XORing
thefirsttwo transmitted messages. Since the session key is gTvrH and discrete
logarithm is hard, F will gain no information about the session key, nor the password.
Also, because of the low speed and export restriction of encryption functions, it is
recommended to use hash functions for the hand-shaking, in thefirstprotocol.
It should be pointed out that the above two protocols are not examples of "DiffieHellman scheme with short exponents", as studied by Oorschot and Wiener [124].
The attack described in [124] is applicable when the exponents used in the scheme
are short (such as 128 bits, rather than the actual size 512 or 1024 bits). In the
above two schemes, rv and rH have the actual size and so the protocols are safe
against their attack.

5.4 Summary

It was shown that Gong's collision-selectable method of providing integrity is no
secure and an attacker with reasonable computing power can forge a checksum of
an arbitrary message, or binary code. Assuming extra properties for the underlying
hash function, it was possible to prove the security of Gong's construction against
all attacks. Alternative methods that require additional assumptions and meanwhile
provide higher security, smaller chance of success for the enemy, were proposed.
It was also shown that Anderson and Lomas' password-based authenticated
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol is insecure if an old session key is compromised. The probability of success of various attacks was analysed and then the best
value for m, to minimise such a probability, was determined. Alternative protocols
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that achieve the same goal in a secure manner, were also proposed. They let the
users securely establish a shared session key, using a shared password.
It is concluded that a collisionful hash function should be carefully designed
and should clearly specify the minimum key length required to retain the level
of the security needed for the system. Collisionful hash functions are a special
class of keyed hash functions. Since in general one cannot expect users to change
their passwords every time they generate a M A C , it is not clear whether using key
collisions can enhance security of the system. If an enemy collects enough number
of [message,MAC] pairs, s/he can uniquely determine the password. The number
of required pairs could be estimated using an information theoretic approach as
discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.6: Exhaustive key search). O n the other hand if
a search on the key space is infeasible, the key collision concept is wasteful because
even without a key collision, one cannot find the key. It is left as an open question
whether the concept of collisionful is really useful in this context.

Chapter 6
Conclusion and Further Work
This chapter provides a summary of the scope and contributions of this thesis. It
also presents directions for future research in this area.

6.1 Summary of Issues and Results
Consider the case where two communicants wish to send authentic messages to one
another over an insecure channel. Assume that the insecure channel allows an active
spoofer to see and manipulate the contents of a message, with the aim of forging
a fraudulent message that is acceptable by the receiver. A Message Authentication
Code ( M A C ) enables the receiver of a message to validate that it has come from a
legitimate party (who has access to the key). A M A C consists of two algorithms:
1. M A C G algorithm, to generate a tag corresponding to a message; and
2. M A C V algorithm, to verify whether a tag matches the corresponding message.
A M A C is a symmetric key cryptographic primitive and uses the same key in both
M A C G and M A C V algorithms.
There are several methods of constructing a M A C . In Chapter 2, some c o m m o n
construction methods were discussed. In particular, it was noted that M A C s which
are constructed from hash functions, called keyed hash functions, offer some advantages, such as the re-usability of the existing code. O n the other hand, it was shown
that in such constructions the speed of the resulting design is upper bounded by
that of the underlying hash functions. Therefore, a new definition for keyed hash
functions was presented to relax some properties and achieve a faster implementation. T w o security approaches, computational security and unconditional security,
and also their requirements, were considered and discussed. Chapter 2 provided the
ground work for all the succeeding chapters.
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In Chapter 3 some practical M A C constructions were proposed and implemented.
It was shown that the simplest way to construct a M A C is to add a secret key to
the input of a hash function. It was further noted that the security of the resulting
construction heavily depends on the underlying hash function and the way the secret
key was added. Chapter 3 included the modified proposal on keyed hash functions
and also a new design based on highly non-linear boolean functions.
In Chapter 4, new constructions of unconditionally secure M A C s were proposed.
It followed the direction discussed in Chapter 2 to reduce the problem of M A C
constructions to the construction of e-AU2 hash function families. T h e two given
constructions were based on Latin squares and M R D codes, respectively. T h e properties of the designs were highlighted so that they could be compared with other
previously proposed schemes.
In Chapter 5, the concentration was on the cryptanalysis of systems that use
M A C s . In particular, two proposals on collisionful hash functions were analysed
(and cryptanalyzed). T h efirstone could provide selectable key collisions and the
second one could be used for authenticating Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol.
It was shown that the both schemes have major security problems. S o m e alternative
solutions were proposed in each case to thwart the proposed attacks.

6.2 Fulfilment of Aims and Objectives

The aims and objectives of this thesis were briefly outlined in the first chapter. This
thesis has been carried out with the following goal:
"Analysis and design of message authentication codes."
T h e goal was achieved by studying known constructions, cryptanalyzing some
proposals, and designing new methods and algorithms. T h e major contributions of
this thesis can be summarised as follows.
1. N e w definition of keyed hash functions and relating them to M A C s (Chapter 2).
2. Improvement on Tsudik's keyed hash function and proposing a modified version that needs smaller key and achieves higher security (Chapter 3).
3. Design of a new fast M A C based on some non-linear boolean functions (Chapter 3).

6.3. Further Work and Open Problems

4. Design and analysis of two e-AU2 hash function families based on Latin squares
and M R D codes (Chapter 4).
5. Cryptanalysis of two collisionful hash function proposals (Chapter 5).

6.3 Further Work and Open Problems

During the development of the thesis, a variety of interesting issues and problem
arose which were mostly challenging and occasionally frustrating. Some encountered
problems were dispatched in hours and days, but there has been some which required
further study and took even months to be completely resolved.
In this section, some open questions and possible directions for further work are
presented. It should be noted that the importance of the Wegman-Carter framework, described in Chapter 2, is that it provides a solid foundation for devising new
M A C s from universal classes of hash functions. The question remains whether there
exists an optimal solution to that construction approach which can result in the
construction of a M A C with reasonably short key, fast operation, and small security
parameter e.
The Latin square based M A C , described in Chapter 4, is an interesting proposal
which is based on this approach and opens a new direction in the construction of
M A C s based on combinatorial designs. Although some justification was given for
the security of the proposal, the proof of security remains an open question. This
work can be extended to provide more suitable classes of Latin squares that can
result in better hash function families. Also, other combinatorial designs, such as
Room Squares, could replace Latin square — the kernel of the constructed M A C . In
the M R D code based M A C , described in the same chapter, increasing the hashing
rate and developing a fast algorithm for the setup of the system, when n > 19, are
interesting questions.
Another open question, which comes from Chapter 5, is the following:
"Is there any real need for collisionful hash functions as an independent
primitive?"

Almost all the defined collisionful hash function proposals are suggested in an e
ronment where the length of the secret key is short (eg. poorly chosen passwords).
In Chapter 5 two such examples, which could not provide the claimed security, were
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illustrated. It is believed that the key collision property is an advantage and is reco m m e n d e d to be achieved in all M A C constructions. Nevertheless, the key length
should not be too small to make an exhaustive key search feasible.
Finally, the importance of Wegman-Carter M A C construction and the work of
successors such as Stinson, Krawczyk, Rogaway, Shoup, and Johansson must be
emphasised. This line of research which was initiated in the distant past, has a
great potential and can be further developed.
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Appendix A
Source Code for K H F
This chapter provides the source code for K H F . 1 Description of this M A C was given
in Chapter 2. This work was presented in Cryptography: Policy and Algorithms
Conference (cf. [7]).

A.l KHF.C
/*******************************************************************

khf.Vl-S.c
KHF

keyed hash function.

This program reads a message and keys, and computes the
corresponding keyed digest (or Message Authentication Code).
Usage:
khf Kx Ky Kz [filename(message)J,
where Kx, Ky, and Kz are each 32 hexadecimal digits (128 bits)
and filename is an optionalfilename

(stdin if not given).

Note 1:
This program is designed to be used as a MAC. While it
efficiently compresses any arbirtary length message, it is not
gauranteed to be secure when the key is not kept secret among
the trusted comminicators. That is, this program should not be
used as a collision-free hash function. For a complete list of
the specifications and requirements refer to the following
paper:
S. Bakhtiari, R. Safavi-Naini, and J. Pieprzyk.
x

c++21atex software has been used for converting the source codes to WT^X. format so that it
can be included into this thesis.
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KHF.C

Keyed Hash Functions.
In Cryptography: Policy and Algorithms Conference,
Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1029 pages 201-214, July 1995.
Note 2:
To prevent adding message length to the prefix, enter the
message from standard input not as a file.
E.g. khf Kx Ky Kz < filename
Author:
Shahram Bakhtiari < shahram@cs.uow.edu.au >
Center for Computer Security Research,
University of Wollongong, NSW

2522, Australia.

http://www.cs.uow.edu.au/ccsr/shahram
Version:
1.3, 10 May 1995.

Copyright 1995 by Shahram Bakhtiari. All rights reserved.
This program may not be sold or used as inducement to buy a product
without the written permission of the auther.

#def ine CPU-TIME
/* #define DEBUG

*/

#def ine Fv_3

#include <stdio.h>
#include <malloc.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
# include <sys/stat .h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <string.h>

#include"khf .Vl-3.1.h"
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#if def Fv_l
#include "khf. Vl-1.2 .h"
#endif
# if def Fv_2
#include "khf. Vl-2.2 .h"
#endif
#if def Fv_3
#include"khf .Vl-3.2.h"
#endif

main(argc, argv)
int argc;
char *argv[];
{
#if def Fv_2
Long register Ml, M 2 , M3, M 4 , M5;

/* Message variables */

#endif
#if def Fv_l
Long register Ml, M 2 , M3, M 4 , M5;

/* Message variables */
/* Fast variable */

Long register T3;
#endif

/* Fast variables */

Long register Tl, T2, i, M;

/* Round counter */

Long register round=0;

/* Digest chaining buffer */

Long register XI, X2, X3, X4;

/* Message chaining buffer */

Long register YI, Y2, Y3, Y4;
Long 1;
Long s, size;
Long *m, *message;
Long Kx[4], Ky[4], Kz[4];
int fd;
Boolean done;

f-

/* Length of message */
/* Size of allocated buffer */
/* Pointer to the message blocks */
/* Secret key buffers */
/* File descriptor (message) */
/* Boolean variable */

#if def CPU.TIME
printf("\nCPU Time (before) =y.u\n", (unsigned)clockQ);
#endif
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/* Read the keys and open the inputfile*/
process_arguments(Kx, Ky, Kz, &;fd, argc, argv);
1 = get_filesize(fd);

/* Get the message length */

m = message = allocate_buffer(&size); /* Allocate a buffer for message */

/* Initialize digest chaining bufffer */
X I = Kx[0]; X 2 = Kx[l]; X 3 = Kx[2]; X 4 = Kx[3];
/* Initialize message chaining buffer */
YI = Ky[0]; Y2 = Ky[l]; Y3 = Ky[2]; Y4 = Ky[3];

#if def DEBUG
printf("The key entered is:\n\tKx=,/,.8xy..8xy..8x,/..8x\
\n\tKy=Jl. 8x'/.. 8x°/.. 8Xy.. 8x\n\tKz=y.. 8x'/.. 8x'/.. 8x*/,. 8x. \n n ,
X I , X2, X 3 , X 4 , Y I , Y2, Y3, Y 4 , Kz[0], Kz[l], Kz[2], Kz[3]);
printf("The file size is L=y.u\n", 1);
printf("The allocated buffer is '/.u blocks (°/.u bytes).\n",
size, size*BLOCKSIZE);
#endif

T[0] V = 1;

/* L xor T */

strncpy((char *)m, (char *)T, B L O C K S I Z E ) ; /* Prepending L xor T */

Tl = (size- 1) * BLOCKSIZE; /* Size of remaining buffer space */
T 2 = (1 > Tl)? T l : 1;

/* Number of message bytes to be read */

m + = LBLOCKSIZE;
if( read(fd, (char *)m, T2) ± T2 )
error(READ_ERROR, NULL, NULL);

\ _— T2- /* Length of remaining message */
s = T2 + BLOCKSIZE;
m = message;

/* Size of message in message buffer */
/* Pointer to the current message block */

done = FALSE;
for(;;){
while( s > B L O C K S I Z E ){
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process_oneblock(Xl, X2, X3, X4, YI, Y2, Y3, Y4,
m, round, i);
s -= BLOCKSIZE;

}
if( done )
break;

if( 1 = = 0 ){
if( m > (message + LBLOCKSIZE * (size - 2)) ){
/* Last block; Move tofirstblock */
strncpy((char *)message, (char *)m, s);
m = message;

}
Tl = 4 - (s % 4); /* Number of bytes to be padded */
strncpy(((char *)m + s), &P, Tl);
s + = Tl;

/* Pad '100000...' */

/* Size of padded message */

T2 = s / 4; /* Distance between 'm' and new pointer */
strncpy((char *)(m+T2), (char *)Kz, 16);
s -f= 16;

/* Add Kz */
/* Size of result */

T2 += 4;
/* Add L xor T */
strncpy((char *)(m+T2), (char *)T, BLOCKSIZE);
s -f = BLOCKSIZE;

/* Size of result */

done = T R U E ;
} else{
#if def D E B U G
if( s ? 0 )
enor(,"s' != 0 !?.", NULL, NULL);
#endif
Tl = size * BLOCKSIZE; /* Size of message buffer */
s = (1 > Tl)? Tl : 1;

/* Message bytes to be read */

if( read(fd, (char *)message, s) ^ s )
error(READJ5RROR, NULL, NULL);
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l-=s;

/* Length of remaining message */

m = message;

/* Pointer to the current block */

}
} /* end for */

#if def D E B U G
if( (s % 4) ^ 0 )
error("Size should be a multiple of 4.", NULL, NULL);
#endif

if( s ? 0 )
processjestOFblock(Xl, X2, X3, X 4 , YI, Y 2 , Y 3 , Y 4 ,
m , s, round, i);

switch( (round-1) % 5 ){
case 0: printf( M D , X2, X3, X4, X I ); break
case 1: printf( M D , X3, X4, XI, X 2 ); break
case 2: printf( M D , X4, XI, X2, X 3 ); break
default: printf( M D , XI, X2, X3, X 4 );

/* 3 and 4 */

}
free(message);
#if def C P U . T I M E
printf("\nCPU Time (after) =y.u\n", (unsigned)clock());
Sendif

}
void error(stl,st2,st3)
char *stl, *st2, *st3;

{
if(stl ^ N U L L )
fprintf(stderr, '7.s ", stl);
if(st2 + N U L L )
fprintf(stderr, "'/.s ", st2);
if(st3 ^ N U L L )

A.l.

KHF.C

fprintf(stderr, "y.s\n", st3);
exit(l);

}
void process_arguments(Kx, Ky, Kz, fd, argc, argv)
Long *Kx, *Ky, *Kz;
int *fd, argc;
char *argv[];

{
if( argc < M I N A R G S )
error(USAGE, N U L L , NULL);
if( (sscanf(argv[l], "y.Sxy.Sxy.Sxy.Sx",
&(Kx[0]), &(Kx[l]), &(Kx[2]), &(Kx[3]) ) ^ 4 ) ||
(sscanf(argv[2], ,,y.8xy.8xy.8xy.8xn,
&(Ky[0]), &(Ky[l]), &(Ky[2]), &(Ky[3]) ) ^ 4 ) ||
(sscanf(argv[3], "y.8xy,8xy.8xy.8x",
&(Kz[0]), &(Kz[lj), &(Kz[2]), &(Kz[3]) ) ^ 4 )
)

error (KEY_ERROR, "\n", U S A G E ) ;
if( (*fd = open(argv[4], O.RDONLY)) = = N U L L )
error(OPEN_ERROR, argv[4], U S A G E ) ;

}
Long *allocate_buffer(size)
Long *size;

{
Long *buf, temp, i=0;
while( (buf = (Long *)malloc(
*size = M A X B U F S I Z E - (i++) * R E D U C E R A T E ) ) = = N U L L )
if( *size < M I N B U F S I Z E )
error(MALLOC_ERROR, N U L L , NULL);
•size /= BLOCKSIZE; /* Size of buffer in terms of the number of blocks
*/

return(buf);
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}
Long get_filesize(fd)
int fd;

{
struct stat buffer;

if( fstat(fd, &buffer) == ERROR )
error(STAT_ERROR, NULL, NULL);
return(buffer.stjsize);
}

A.2 KHF.H1
khf.Vl-S.l.h
KHF keyed hash function (thefirstheader file).
This headerfileshould be used in conjunction with khf. V1-3.c

/* Constants */

#def ine MINARGS 4 /* Minimum number of arguments */
#def ine T R U E 1

/* True value */

#def ine FALSE 0

/* False value */

#def ine E R R O R -1
#def ine BLOCKSIZE 80

/* Return value on error */
/* Block size (in bytes) - 20 rounds */

#def ine LBLOCKSIZE (BLOCKSIZE/4) /* Block size (in words) - 20 rounds */
#def ine R E D U C E R A T E 5120

/* Reducing the rate for the size */

#def ine MINBUFSIZE 51200

/* Minimum buffer size */

#def ine M A X B U F S I Z E 512000

/* Maximum buffer size */

#def ine modl6(X) ((X) & 15) /* X mod 16 */
#def ine mod32(X) ((X) k 31)
#def ine add(X, Y ) { X + = (Y); }

/* X mod 32 */
/* Add function */
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/* Type Defines */

typedef unsigned long int Long; /* 32-bit unsigned variable type */
typedef int Boolean;

/* True-false variable typr */

/* Error Messages */

char KEY_ERROR[] = "Wrong entered key.";
char USAGE[] = "Usage is: khf Kx Ky Kz filename.\
\n\tKx, Ky, and Kz are each 32 hexadecimal digits (128 bits).";
char OPEN_ERROR[] = "Cannot open the file.";
char STAT_ERROR[] = "Cannot get the file size.";
char M A L L O C _ E R R O R [ ] = "Cannot allocate the minimum buffer.";
char READ_ERROR[] = "Cannot read the input file.";

/* Variables and Functions */

char *MD = "MD = y..8x,y..8x,y..8x,y..8x\n"; /* 'printf' format for digest

/* Fix padding string extracted from the first (BLOCKSIZE*8) bits of Pi */
Long TQ = {
0xc90fdaa2, /* 11001001000011111101101010100010*/
0x2168c234, /* 00100001011010001100001000110100*/
0xc4c6628b, /* 11000100110001100110001010001011 */
0x80dclcdl, /* 10000000110111000001110011010001 */
0x29024e08, /* 00101001000000100100111000001000*/
0x8a67cc74, /* 10001010011001111100110001110100*/
0x020bbea6, /* 00000010000010111011111010100110*/
0x3bl39b22, /* 00111011000100111001101100100010*/
0x514a0879, /* 01010001010010100000100001111001 */
0x8e3404dd, /* 10001110001101000000010011011101 */
0xef9519b3, /* 11101111100101010001100110110011 */
0xcd3a431b, /* 11001101001110100100001100011011 */
0x302b0a6d, /* 00110000001010110000101001101101 */
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0xf25fl437, /* 11110010010111110001010000110111 */
0x4fel356d, /* 01001111111000010011010101101101 */
0x6d51c245, /* 01101101010100011100001001000101 */
0xe485b576, /* 11100100100001011011010101110110*/
0x625e7ec6, /* 01100010010111100111111011000110*/
0xf44c42e9, /* 11110100010011000100001011101001 */
0xa637ed6b /* 10100110001101111110110101101011 */

};
/* (1' followed by 'O's padding (at most 32 bits) */
Long P = 0x80000000;

/* B buffer for keeping message words and adding redundancy */
Long B D = {
0x0bff5cb6, /* 00001011111111110101110010110110*/
0xf406b7ed, /* 11110100000001101011011111101101 */
0xee386bfb, /* 11101110001110000110101111111011 */
0x5a899fa5, /* 01011010100010011001111110100101 */
0xae9f2411, /* 10101110100111110010010000010001 */
0x7c4blfe6, /* 01111100010010110001111111100110*/
0x49286651, /* 01001001001010000110011001010001 */
0xece45b3d, /* 11101100111001000101101100111101 */
0xc2007cb8, /* 11000010000000000111110010111000*/
0xal63bf05, /* 10100001011000111011111100000101 */
0x98da4836, /* 10011000110110100100100000110110*/
0xlc55d39a, /* 00011100010101011101001110011010*/
0x69163fa8, /* 01101001000101100011111110101000*/
0xfd24cf5f, /* 11111101001001001100111101011111 */
0x83655d23, /* 10000011011001010101110100100011 */
0xdca3ad96 /* 11011100101000111010110110010110*/
};
void errorQ; /* Prompts error message and terminates the program */
void process_arguments();
Long *allocate_buffer();

/* Processes the arguments (key andfilename) */
/* Allocates buffer for the message */

A.3. KHF.H2
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/* Getsfilesize (in bytes) */

A.3 KHF.H2
/**************************************************************

khf. V1-3.2M
KHF keyed hash function (thefirstheader file).
This headerfileshould be used in conjunction with khf.Vl-3.c
**************************************************************/

/* Constants */
#def ine shr(X, s) ( X > (s) )
#def ine rol(X, s) ( (X < s) | (X > (32 - s)) )

/* Shift right function */
/* Rotate left function */

/* F functions (in kernel of rounds) */
•define fl(A, B, C, D, E) ( (A&E)A(B&C)A((BAC)&D) )
#definef2(A, B, C, D, E) ( AA(B&(AAD))A(((A&D)AC)&E) )
#definef3(A, B, C, D, E) ( ((A&C)|(B&D))A(C&D&E)AA )
#definef4(A, B, C, D, E) ( ((D&E)|(A&C))AB )
#definef5(A, B, C, D, E) ( (((D&E)AA)&(~(B&C)))ADAE )

/* Round function (one round of KHF) */
#def ine f_round(f, X, YI, Y2, Y3, Y4, M, round) { \
Tl = f(Yl, Y2, Y3, Y4, M); \
add(X, Tl); \
Tl A = (Tl > 16); \
T2 = mod32(Tl); \
X = rol(X, T2); \
B[ modl6( shr(Tl, 3) ) ] A = M; \
T2 = B[ modl6(round) ]; \
add(Yl, T2); \
add(Y2, T2); \
add(Y3, T2); \
add(Y4, T2); \
T2 = modl6( shr(Tl, 5) ); \
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YI = rol(Yl, T2); \
T2 = modl6( shr(Tl, 7) ); \
Y2 = rol(Y2, T2); \
T2 = modl6( shr(Tl, 9) ); \
Y3 = rol(Y3, T2); \
T2 = modl6( shr(Tl, 11) ); \
Y4 = rol(Y4, T2); \
round-)—\-; \

}
/* Processes one full block (BLOCKSIZE bytes) */
#def ine process_oneblock(Xl, X2, X3, X4, YI, Y2, Y3, Y4, m, round, i) { \
M = m[0]; \
f_round(fl, X4, YI, Y2, Y3, Y4, M, round); \
M = m[l]; \
Lround(f2, XI, Y2, Y3, Y4, YI, M, round); \
M = m[2]; \
f_round(f3, X2, Y3, Y4, YI, Y2, M, round); \
M = m[3]; \
f_round(f4, X3, Y4, YI, Y2, Y3, M, round); \
M = m[4]; \
f_round(f5, X4, YI, Y2, Y3, Y4, M, round); \
M = m[5]; \
f_round(fl, XI, Y2, Y3, Y4, YI, M, round); \
M = m[6]; \
f_round(f2, X2, Y3, Y4, YI, Y2, M, round); \
M = m[7]; \
f_round(f3, X3, Y4, YI, Y2, Y3, M, round); \
M = m[8]; \
f_round(f4, X4, YI, Y2, Y3, Y4, M, round); \
M = m[9]; \
f_round(f5, XI, Y2, Y3, Y4, YI, M, round); \
M = m[10]; \
f_round(fl, X2, Y3, Y4, YI, Y2, M, round); \
M = m[ll]; \
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f_round(f2, X3, Y4, YI, Y2, Y3, M, round); \
M = m[12]; \
f_round(f3, X4, YI, Y2, Y3, Y4, M, round); \
M = m[13]; \
f_round(f4, XI, Y2, Y3, Y4, YI, M, round); \
M = m[14]; \
f_round(f5, X2, Y3, Y4, YI, Y2, M, round); \
M = m[15]; \
f_round(fl, X3, Y4, YI, Y2, Y3, M, round); \
M = m[16]; \
f_round(f2, X4, YI, Y2, Y3, Y4, M, round); \
M = m[17]; \
f_round(f3, XI, Y2, Y3, Y4, YI, M, round); \
M = m[18]; \
Lround(f4, X2, Y3, Y4, YI, Y2, M, round); \
M = m[19]; \
f_round(f5, X3, Y4, YI, Y2, Y3, M, round); \
m + = LBLOCKSIZE; \

}
/* Processes an incomplete block */
#def ine process_restOFblock(Xl, X2, X3, X4, YI, Y2, Y3, Y4, m, s, round, i) { \
for( i=0; i<(s/4); i++ ){ \
M = m[i]; \
switch( i % 5 ){ \
case 0: f_round(fl, X4, YI, Y2, Y3, Y4, M, round); break; \
case 1: f_round(f2, XI, Y2, Y3, Y4, YI, M, round); break; \
case 2: f_round(f3, X2, Y3, Y4, YI, Y2, M, round); break; \
case 3: f_round(f4, X3, Y4, YI, Y2, Y3, M, round); break; \
case 4: f_round(f5, X4, YI, Y2, Y3, Y4, M, round); \
Tl = XI; XI = X2; X2 = X3; X3 = X4; X4 = Tl; \
Tl = YI; YI = Y2; Y2 = Y3; Y3 = Y4; Y4 = Tl; \

}\
}\
}

Appendix B
Source Code for our Latin Square Based

MAC
This chapter provides the source code for the M A C based on Latin squares.1 Description of this M A C was given in Chapter 4. This design was presented in Australian
Conference on Information Security and Privacy (ACISP) (cf. [11]).
The following data can be used for testing the program:
8
4

06274531
1 4 3 5 6 7 2 0
2 7 0 6 5 4 1 3
3 5 1 4 7 6 0 2
6 0 7 2 3 1 4 5
7 2 6 0 1 3 5 4
4 1 5 3 2 0 6 7
5 3 4 1 0 2 7 6

60723145
4 1 5 3 2 0 6 7
0 6 2 7 4 5 3 1
2 7 0 6 5 4 1 3
7 2 6 0 1 3 5 4
5 3 4 1 0 2 7 6
1 4 3 5 6 7 2 0
1

c++21atex software has been used for converting the source codes to F T E X format so that it
can be included into this thesis.
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3 5 1 4 7 6 0 2

7 2 6 0 13 5 4

3 5 14 7 6 0 2
4 15 3 2 0 6 7
0 6 2 7 4 5 3 1

6 0 7 2 3 14 5
2 7 0 6 5 4 13

5 3 41 0 2 7 6
14 3 5 6 7 2 0

0 6 2 74 5 3 1
2 7 0 6 5 4 13
6 0 7 2 3 14 5

4 15 3 2 0 6 7
14 3 5 6 7 2 0

3 5 14 7 6 0 2
7 2 6 0 13 5 4

5 3 41 0 2 7 6
3 5 14 7 6 0 2
14 3 5 6 7 2 0

5 3 41 0 2 76
7 2 6 0 13 5 4
2 7 0 6 5 4 13

0 6 274 531
4 15 3 2 0 6 7
6 0 7 2 3 14 5

2 14 3 0 10 5
6 7 6 4 12 2 0
3 7 5 6 4 3 21

0 3 46 7 5 5 5
6 0 10 6 2 3 4
6 7 0 0 7 15 4
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23701263
13422576
00000000
The result of executing the program, using the above data, will be:
LS[0] =062745311435672027065413351476
0 2 6 0 7 2 3 1 4 5 7 2 6 0 1 3 5 4 4 1 5 3 2 0 6 7 5 3 4 1
0 2 76
LS[1] =

6 0 7 2 3 1 4 5 4 1 5 3 2 0 6 7 0 6 2 7 4 5 3 1 2 7 0 6 5 4
1 3 7 2 6 0 1 3 5 4 5 3 4 1 0 2 7 6 1 4 3 5 6 7 2 0 3 5 1 4
7 6 0 2

LS [2]

= 7 2 6 0 1 3 5 4 3 5 1 4 7 6 0 2 4 1 5 3 2 0 6 7 0 6 2 7 4 5
3 1 6 0 7 2 3 1 4 5 2 7 0 6 5 4 1 3 5 3 4 1 0 2 7 6 1 4 3 5
6 7 20

LS[3] =

0 6 2 7 4 5 3 1 2 7 0 6 5 4 1 3 6 0 7 2 3 1 4 5 4 1 5 3 2 0
6 7 1 4 3 5 6 7 2 0 3 5 1 4 7 6 0 2 7 2 6 0 1 3 5 4 5 3 4 1

LS [4]

0 2 76
= 3 5 1 4 7 6 0 2 1 4 3 5 6 7 2 0 5 3 4 1 0 2 7 6 7 2 6 0 1 3
5 4 2 7 0 6 5 4 1 3 0 6 2 7 4 5 3 1 4 1 5 3 2 0 6 7 6 0 7 2

3 14 5
H = 2 1 4 3 0 10 5 6 7 6 4 1 2 2 0 3 7 5 6 4 3 2 10

3467555

6 0 1 0 6 2 3 4 6 7 0 0 7 1 5 4 2 3 7 0 1 2 6 3 1 3 4 2 2 5 7 6
D = 00000000
Digest =35246664

B.l LS-MAC.CPP
#include <iostream.h>
#include"LS.h"
main(){
char ch;
UINTq,b,i,j;
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Quasi **LS;

// £,$ anc[ ifs variants

Quasi *message, *digest;

// Message and Digest

cm » q;

// Read order of LS

cm ^> b;

// Read number of LS variants

// Allocate dynamic memory for the components
LS = (Quasi **) new char[(b+l) * (UINT)sizeof(Quasi *)];
for(i=0; i<b+l; i++)
LS[i] = new Quasi [q*q];
message = new Quasi [q*q];
digest = new Quasi [q];
if(!digest || Imessage || !LS){
cout <C "Cannot allocate memory!";
return 1;

}
for(i=0; i<b-|-l; i++){ // Read and display LS and its variants
cout < "\nLS[" < i < "] = ";
for(j=0; j<q*q;j++){
cin » LS[i][j];
cout < LS[i][j] < ' ';

}
}
cout < "\nM = ";
for(i=0; i<q*q; i++){

// Read and display the message

cin ^> message [i];
cout <& message [i] «C ' ';

}
// The initial digest value should be q times '1' elements.
II However, one may choose a random initial value (or a key)
cout < "\nD = ";
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for(i=0; i<q; i++){ // Read and display the intial digest value
cin ^> digest [i];
cout <C digest[i] < ' ';

}
cout < "\n\n";

LSOneRound(LS, message, digest, q, b); // Calculate the digest

cout < "Digest = ";
for(j=0; j<q-l; j++)

// Display the resulting digest value

cout < digest [j] < ";
cout < digest[q-1] < "\n";

return 0;

B.2 LS.CPP
#include <iostream.h>
#include"LS.h"

// #define DEBUG

II This function receives a Latin Square (LS) and its b variations
II to calculate the digest corresponding to a given message.
void LSOneRound(Quasi **LS, Quasi *message, Quasi *digest, Quasi q, Quasi b){

Quasi i, j, row, col;
Quasi fix_pos;
Quasi var.pos;

#if def DEBUG
// Display the message
cout <C "Message = ";
for(i=0; i<q*q; i++)

// Fix part of the index for LS
// Variable part of the index
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cout < message [i] <C ' ';
cout <C endl;
#endif

for(i=0; i<q*q; i++){

// For all elements of message do

row = message [i];
fix.pos = row * q;
II For all LS variants do

for(j=0;j<b;j++){
col = LS[j+l][i];
var.pos = digest [col];

digest [col] = LS[0][fix_pos -f- var.pos];
// This is value of LS in row 'row' and column 'col'

}
#if def D E B U G
// Print steps
for(j=0;j<q-l;j++)
cout < digestjj] < ' ';
cout < digest[q-l] < " (digest in step " < i < ")\n";
#endif

B.3 LS.H
#if ndef LS_UTILITIES
#def ine LS_UTILITIES

enum bool {false, true};

const int MAXORDER = 10;

typedef unsigned int Quasi;
typedef unsigned int UINT;

// Quasigroup elements type (0 - q-1)
II Unsigned interger type

II This function receives a Latin Square (LS) and its b variants to calculate

B.3.
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LS.H

// the digest corresponding to a given message. It is assumed that the digest
11 is already initialized. Only digestf] will be altered.
void LSOneRound(Quasi **LS,
Quasi *message,
Quasi *digest,
Quasi q,
Quasi b);

#endif

// Array of pointers to LS, LSr\l, ... , LSl\b
// Message block (qxq elements)
// Digest Block (q elements)
// Order of LS
// Number of LS variants

Appendix C
Experimental Results for the Latin
Square based M A C
This appendix provides more details on the experiments towards constructing an
e-AU2 hash function family based on Latin squares. First, it is shown how to partition Latin squares of a certain order into distinct isotopy classes (Algorithm 1).
Then, several algorithms are proposed to estimate the possibility of a collision in
the proposed hashing scheme. It will be observed that most of the collisions occur
when LS variants m a p different elements of the colliding messages to the same digest position. Algorithms 2 and 3 are aimed at finding the probability of such an
event. The experiment is extended for estimating the probability of real collisions
in the hashing scheme (Algorithm 4).
All the algorithms described in this appendix are implemented in C language.
The source codes are however skipped, for simplicity and the lack of space.
Algorithm 1 (Finding the isotopy class of a Latin square) Given a Latin
square of order q, the following algorithmfindsall elements of the isotopy class
containing the given Latin square:
for all q\ possible row permutations do
begin
for all q\ possible column permutations do
begin
for all q\ possible label permutation do
begin
add the permuted Latin square to the class;
end
end
end
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q

class elements repeat
reduced elements
2 C2.1
8
4
2 ( = 8/4)
3 C3.1
216
18
12 ( = 216/18)
4 C4.1
13824
144 ( = 13824/96)
96
C4.2
13824
32
432 |> 13824/32)
5 C5.1 1728000
100
17280 ;= 1728000/100)
C5.2 1728000
12 144000 ('= 1728000/12)

Table C l : In this table, for every class of a particular order q, 'elements' is the tot
number of elements (q\)3, 'repeat' is the exact number of occurrence of every element,
and 'reduced' is the reduced number of elements after removing the repeated ones
(element s / rep eat).

A
In the above, a row (or column) permutation changes the order of rows (or
columns) in the Latin square. A label permutation %j), applied to the Latin square,
results in a Latin square in which all occurrences of an element i are replaced by
ib(i) £ {0,... ,q — 1}. The row, column, and label permutations should be applied
in the given order. That is, given the original Latin square, first rows are permuted, next columns are permuted, and finally elements are relabelled — totally
(g!)3 operations.
Table C l is the implementation results of the above algorithm for isotopy classes
of orders 2 to 5. This table also reports on the number of the repeated elements in
each class. These classes are used for calculating the probability of a collision in the
proposed hashing scheme.
To find the number of the Latin squares that m a p two different messages, that
exactly differ in two elements, to the same digest position, the following algorithm
is used. The algorithm searches through all the possible pairs of positions, in the
message block, checks whether the two positions are mapped to the same digest
position, and finally reports the number of such Latin squares.
Algorithm 2 (Finding the number of Latin squares that map a pair of
positions in the message block to the s a m e digest position) Suppose that q

is the order of the Latin square in an isotopy class. The following algorithm find
the required number of Latin squares:
(* search for all positions in rows 1 to q— 1 *)
for px from 0 to q(q — 1) — 1 do
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begin
(* search for all positions in rows ^ + 1 to q *)
for p2 from q^ + 1) to q2 — 1 do
begin
if px and p2 are not in the same column then
begin
n = 0;
for all Latin squares in the isotopy class do
begin
if the Latin square has same value in px and p2 then
begin
n — n Al;
end
end
display the value ofn;
end
end
end
A
In the above algorithm, the Latin square is stored as an array of q2 elements
(from 0 to q2 - 1). Therefore, an element in row x and column y is accessed by the
index q(x - 1) + (y - 1). In the first for-loop, px varies from the position of the
first element of the first row, to the position of the last element of the second last
row. Similarly in the second for-loop, p2 varies from the first element of the I
row, where p2 itself is in (l - l) t h row, to the last element of the last row.
The results of the experiment for a class of order q, displayed the same value n
for all possible message pairs. It has been noticed that when the chosen elements
are in the same row or column, the repeated number of Latin squares, n, is zero.
This result is expected due to the property of Latin squares. Such cases are not
considered in the algorithm to speed up the search.
The above algorithm can be extended to find the number of Latin squares that
map two messages, which differ in d elements, to the same digest position.
Algorithm 3 (Finding the number of Latin squares that m a p d messageelement positions to the same digest position) Let q be the order of a Latin
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square in an isotopy class. The following algorithmfindsthe number of Latin sq
that map d message elements to the same digest position:
for px from 0 to q(q — (d — 1)) — 1 do
begin
for p2 from q ( ^ -f-1) to q(q -(d-2))-l

do

begin
if p2 is not in the same column where px is then
begin

for pd from q(^f- + 1) to q2 - 1 do
begin
if pd is not in the same column where px to pd-x are then
begin
n = 0;
for all Latin squares LS in the isotopy class do
begin
if LS has same values in px to pd then
begin
n = n A 1;
end
end
display the value of n;
end
end

end
end
end

A
In the above algorithm, the number of different elements, d, cannot exceed the
order of the Latin square, q. Similar to the previous algorithm, the elements in the
same column or the same row are ignored to increase the searching speed. Table C.2
contains the results of implementing the above algorithm. The results of this table
suggest the following.
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q class d num
2 C2.1 2 Oor 2
3 C3.1 2 Oor 6
3 Oor 6
4 C4.1 2 0 or 48
3 Oor 24
4 Oor 24
C4.2 2 0 or 144
3 Oor 72
4 Oor 72
5 C5.1 2 0 or 4320
3 0 or 1440
4 0 or 720
5 0 or 720
C5.2 2 0 or 36000
3 0 or 12000
4 0 or 6000
5 0 or 6000

prob
1 (= 2/2)
1/2 (= 6/12)
1/2 (= 6/12)
1/3 (= 48/144)
1/6 (= 24/144)
1/6 (= 24/144)
1/3 (= 144/432)
1/6 (= 72/432)
1/6 (= 72/432)
1/4 (= 4320/17280)
1/12 (= 1440/17280)
1/24 (= 720/17280)
1/24 (= 720/17280)
1/4 (= 36000/144000)
1/12 (= 12000/144000)
1/24 (= 6000/144000)
1/24 (= 6000/144000)

Table C.2: Experimental results for finding mapping collisions. For every class of
a particular order q, 'd' is the number of different elements, 'num' is the numbe
of functions that have the same values in d positions, and 'prob' is the maximum
probability of that event (hum/elements).

Conjecture Cl The probability that a Latin square maps differing elements of tw
distinct messages into the same digest position is upper bounded by •—.
Another important result of Table C.2 is that when the number of differing
elements increases, the probability decreases. In Chapter 4, it was shown that this
probability is zero when d = 1 (cf. L e m m a 4.5). This suggests that a collision is
most likely when d = 2.
Having the above estimation on the mapping collisions, it is possible to estimate
the number of real collisions for various given messages. It should be noted that
in the above algorithm all the elements of the isotopy class are examined. In the
hash function family proposed in Chapter 4, there are two properties that can further
reduce the collision probability. Those properties are aimed at removing the elements
of the class which are causing most of the collisions.
Algorithm 4 (Finding the maximum number of hash functions that map
two different messages, which differ in exactly two elements, to the s a m e

digest value) Suppose that q is the order of a Latin square in an isotopy class. The
following algorithmfindsthe required number of hash functions:
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m — 0;
for all possible messages Mx do
begin
for px from 0 to q(q — 1) — 1 do
begin
for p2 from q(^ + 1) to q2 — 1 do
begin
if px and p2 are not in the same column then
begin
for all messages M2 that differ from Mx in px and p2 do
begin
n = 0;
for all hash functions h do
begin
if h(Mx) equals h(M2) then
begin
n = n + 1;
end
end
if m is less than n then

begin
m =n
end
end
end
end
end
end
display the value ofm.

A
The above algorithm searches through all the possible message pairs that differ
;tly two elements, and counts the number of hash functions that map the two
in exact
messages into the same hash value. It finally reports the maximum number, over
all possible message pairs, of such hash functions. This result directly corresponds
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to the collision probability of the scheme, which can be used by dividing it by the
total number of the hash functions.
Similar to Algorithm 2, the above algorithm can be extended to the case where
the two messages differ in d elements. However, one should not expect a better outcome from the extended version, due to the observation made earlier from Table C.2.
In other words, it is expected to have more collisions when d = 2.
The Algorithm 4 is implemented but has not been applied to the Latin squares
of the desired orders, namely when q = 4,8,16, •••. The main reasons were the
complexity of satisfying Property 2 (cf. Section 4.3.2) and the enormity of the size
of the search space (number of Latin squares). Based on Conjecture C l and the
fact that each element of message will be mapped to 6 digest positions, it is claimed
that the probability of collision is upper bounded by T—jWr-

Appendix D
Some Improvements in the Designed

MAC
This Appendix provides a n e w version of the M A C designed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3). T h e main two modifications applied to the original design, which appeared
in [7], are:
1. The order of the input parameters in the set of boolean functions /;, i =
0,..., 4, are changed to increase the role of every message block in the process
of the corresponding round function.
2. Each message block is directly added to the digest chain to increase the dependency of the result to that message block.
These two modifications decrease the probability of a successful differential analysis attack. A bit-change in a message block will change the result of the boolean
functions /;, with a higher probability compared to the original set of functions.
Furthermore, the message block is directly added to the digest chain such that flipping one bit will definitely change the corresponding value in the digest change. T h e
new version of the boolean functions are,

' D*E~(((D k EYA) k ~(Bk C)),
if= 0i
(AkBy(EkCY((E*C)kD),
Mi = 1
fi(A,B,C,D,E)={E~(B k (E'D)Y(((E k DYC) k A), i=f 2i
E"(C kDkA)"((EkC) | (B k D)), if=i3
E'((DkB) | (AkC)),
if =*4

(mod 5),
(mod 5),
(mod 5),
(mod 5),
(mod 5),

which are if fact linear transformations (label permutations) of the original ones.
These changes will still keep the required properties of the functions:
They are 0-1 balanced.
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Figure D.l: One round of the new version of the designed MAC.
• They satisfy the Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC).
• They are highly nonlinear.
• They are pairwise linearly non-equivalent.
• They can be described by short Algebraic Normal Forms (ANF).
One round of this MAC is illustrated in Figure D.l. In this new round function,
the message block is added to the digest chain and the B buffer is only added to
three branches (and not all the four branches). Also, in the new version, the result
of /,- function is added to the B buffer to increase the complexity. It should be
noted that the above changes will not change the performance of the system and its
efficiency will remain the same.

